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This Article considers firearms prohibitions for domestic violence 
offenders, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions and the larger, 
national debate about gun control. Unlike other scholarship in the area, 
it confronts the costs of ratcheting up the scope and enforcement of such 
firearms bans and argues that the politicization of safety has come at 
the expense of a sound approach to gun control in the context of 
intimate-partner abuse. In doing so, it expands scholarly arguments 
against mandatory, one-size-fits-all criminal justice responses to 
domestic violence in a direction that other critics have been reluctant 
to go, perhaps because of a reflexive, cultural distaste for firearms.
Both sides in the gun-control debate rely on starkly contrasting, 
gendered images: the helpless female victim in need of state protection, 
including strictly enforced gun laws, and the self-defending woman of 
the National Rifle Association’s “Refuse to be a Victim” campaign. 
Neither of these images accurately describes the position of many 
domestic violence victims whose partners have guns, and neither image 
responds effectively to the heterogeneity of conduct leading to a 
protection order or a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that 
triggers federal and state firearms bans. The emphasis the National 
Rifle Association and other pro-gun organizations place on a woman’s
right to carry a firearm in self-defense ignores the most common 
homicide risks women face, as well as structural inequalities that 
contribute to gender violence. Yet, significant problems afflict an 
uncritically anti-gun approach, too. First, gun-control advocates tend 
to ignore the reality of intimate-partner abuse—a reality in which some 
women fight back; some family livelihoods depend on jobs for which 
firearms are required; not all misdemeanants become murderers; and 
victims have valid reasons for wanting to keep their partners out of 
prison. Second, to the extent that proponents of strict gun regulation 
also exhibit distaste for racialized crime-control policies, they fail to 
acknowledge that zealously enforced gun laws aimed at preventing 
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domestic violence would put more people—including more men and 
women from vulnerable communities of color—behind bars.
The current framing of the argument for tougher firearms laws for 
abusers is derived from public health research on domestic violence 
that makes a reduction in intimate homicide rates its chief goal. Yet, 
since hundreds of thousands of domestic violence misdemeanants are 
thought to possess illegal guns, reformers should also consider the 
potential costs to victims and their families of a move to sweeping and 
rigorous enforcement. Changes in gun laws and their implementation 
in the context of intimate-partner abuse ought to cure over- and under-
breadth problems; provide greater autonomy to abuse victims and 
protections for those who resist their batterers; reconsider the lack of 
an exemption to the misdemeanor ban for firearms required on-duty; 
and include a better mechanism for restoring gun rights to 
misdemeanants who have shown the capacity to avoid reoffending.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The competing images of women deployed in the gun-control debate 
juxtapose the gun-wielding, female survivor of an attack against the vulnerable 
victim who ostensibly needs the state to confiscate her homicidal abuser’s
weapons. However, the real relationship of America’s firearms culture to the 
problem of gender violence lies somewhere between these feverish extremes. 
Gun-control in the context of domestic abuse ought to respond to a variety of 
concerns, not solely the aim of reducing homicide rates. According to some 
researchers, battered women are five times more likely to be killed by an abusive 
intimate partner if the abuser possesses a firearm.1 However, despite the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to endorse a broad definition of domestic violence2
and federal appellate courts’ near unanimity in rejecting Second Amendment 
challenges to domestic violence gun laws,3 strict prohibitions on paper do not 
guarantee women’s safety. Even if governmental actors aggressively enforced 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) and corresponding state laws, which they 
                                                                                                                     
1 See Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive 
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 
1092 (2003). 
2 See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2282 (2016) (holding that petitioners’
possession of guns following conviction under a Maine misdemeanor assault statute that 
encompassed reckless conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)).
3 See infra Part III.B.1. At least a half-dozen circuits have concluded that § 922(g)(9) 
does not violate the Second Amendment. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011);United States v. Booker,
644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); 
United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195 
(10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished order appended to published dissent) (granting petition for 
writ of mandamus directing district court not to instruct jury that § 922(g)(9) is inapplicable 
to persons who do not pose a risk of violence).
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remain reluctant to do,4 stripping all domestic violence offenders of their guns 
for conduct that includes merely reckless infliction of injury5 might have a 
variety of negative outcomes. It might chill the reporting of abuse; exacerbate 
recidivism; lead to unemployment, a known contributor to intimate femicide,6
for abusers whose jobs require them to carry a gun; and leave victims without 
weapons for self-defense. But a simplistic, politically-motivated call for women 
to arm themselves is not the answer either.
For many Americans, the gun debate is not really about guns at all, but a 
culture war between two competing visions of self and nation: a masculine, 
individualistic, self-reliant, arms-bearing America and an urbane society 
grounded in civic solidarity and abhorrence of violence, sexism, and racism.7
The gun-control facet of domestic violence policy has roots in the second social 
model, but it also displays a tough-on-crime orientation. Intimate-partner abuse 
victims, for whom guns are tangible and often life-threatening, have gotten 
caught in the crossfire. This Article favors reasonable gun control.8 It critiques 
the rhetorical use of gender by gun-rights advocates, as well as gun
manufacturers and sellers. Yet, significant problems afflict an uncritically anti-
gun approach, too. 
First, such an approach tends to ignore the reality of intimate-partner 
abuse—a reality in which some women fight back; some family livelihoods 
depend on jobs for which guns are required; not all misdemeanants become 
murderers; and victims have valid reasons for wanting to keep their partners out 
of prison. Second, to the extent that the anti-gun vision of America also exhibits 
distaste for punitive, racialized crime-control policies, it fails to acknowledge 
that zealously enforced gun laws aimed at preventing domestic violence would 
                                                                                                                     
4 See infra notes 29–36, 461–63, 467–75, 496–500 and accompanying text (discussing 
under-enforcement and relatively light punishments for violations of § 922(g)(8) and 
§ 922(g)(9)); see also infra Parts IV.A–B (describing problems of enforcement at the federal 
and state levels).
5 See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2282.
6 See Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1092; see also infra notes 489–91, 502–07 and 
accompanying text (discussing how rigorous enforcement of § 922(g)(9) might put victims 
at risk of retaliatory violence because it would cause batterers who needed guns for work to 
lose their jobs). 
7 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 452–
59 (1999) (describing “the social meaning” of guns). But cf. JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-
PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 19–24, 66–69, 95–
100, 177 (2015) (documenting gun owners’ view that carrying a gun is part of their civic 
duty to protect their home, family, and community in an age of inadequate policing, 
economic stress, and crime).
8 Some courts have upheld the federal law prohibiting domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing firearms, on the ground that there is a “reasonable fit”
between the restriction and its asserted objective. See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139. This 
Article does not challenge the constitutionality of domestic violence gun-control laws.
It nonetheless critiques the scope and enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and other 
firearms restrictions in the context of intimate-partner abuse and questions the soundness of 
proposals for a more punitive and less discretionary approach.
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put more people—including more men and women from vulnerable 
communities of color—behind bars. This Article seeks to expose the blind spots 
and manipulation of stereotypes characteristic of the controversy over firearms 
in the family to facilitate a conversation about gun control that takes into account 
other goals besides reducing intimate-partner homicide rates and other costs 
besides the loss of gun rights. In doing so, it expands scholarly arguments 
against mandatory, one-size-fits-all criminal justice responses to domestic 
violence9 in a direction that other critics have been reluctant to go, perhaps 
because of a reflexive, cultural distaste for firearms.10
Female self-defense concerns play a supporting role in gun-rights advocacy; 
gun-carrying women soften the public face of America’s masculine firearms 
culture. Second Amendment activists frequently deploy images of women 
wielding firearms to protect themselves from armed robbers at home, mass 
shooters in our nation’s schools, and rapists lurking in shadowy parking lots. 
Thus, pro-gun rhetoric aimed at female consumers and voters elides the problem 
of domestic violence by constructing the dangers women face as “stranger 
dangers.”11 Guns are touted as the great equalizer between the sexes in violent 
conflict,12 although the myth of guns as an equalizer is supported by neither 
history nor recent social-scientific evidence.13 Furthermore, the emphasis the 
National Rifle Association (NRA) and other pro-gun organizations place on a 
woman’s right to carry a firearm in self-defense ignores the most common 
homicide risks women face,14 as well as structural inequalities that contribute 
to gender violence.15 Singing the praises of concealed-carry does little to protect 
women from violent attacks by their intimates at home.16
However, gun-control rhetoric can also be charged with manipulating 
stereotypes for ideological and political purposes. According to advocates of 
                                                                                                                     
9 See Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence be Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 53, 58–59 & nn.20–25 (2017) (summarizing such arguments); see also Carolyn 
B. Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender: Domestic Violence and the Failure of Intervention,
120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 337, 379 (2015) (exposing “the ineffectiveness of [domestic violence] 
laws and policies rooted in offender stereotypes” and contending that “[t]he need to adopt 
[new batterer intervention] protocols that reduce resentment and increase long-term change 
is also closely connected to the goal of avoiding reliance on incarceration for less serious 
domestic violence crimes”).
10 See infra note 172 and accompanying text (describing how gun laws like the 
Lautenberg Amendment add a layer of complexity to the crime-control framing of intimate-
partner abuse by inverting typical left/progressive and conservative positions regarding 
crime and punishment).
11 See infra Part II.C.1. But for a description of how gun-rights activists use female self-
defense against domestic violence to promote guns to women, see infra notes 52, 55–56, 60–
66, 68 and accompanying text.
12 A description of the “great equalizer” claim can be found in Part II.A.
13 See infra Part II.C.2.
14 See infra Part II.C.1.
15 See infra Part II.C.2.b.
16 See infra Part II.C.1. 
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broad restrictions on firearms, including outright bans for any person convicted 
of a domestic violence misdemeanor, the vulnerability of women to gun 
homicide cries out for state protection. In this staging of the controversy, the
powerless victims are always female, the homicidal shooters inevitably male.17
Two key federal statutes were adopted in response to this iconic framing of 
domestic violence. First, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), enacted in 1994, bars a person 
subject to a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) from possessing or 
receiving a firearm, if the order meets certain requirements, including actual 
notice to the respondent and an opportunity to participate in the hearing that 
leads to the order’s issuance.18 A second provision, enacted in 1996 and 
commonly known as the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act,19
prohibits the receipt or possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate 
commerce by anyone who has been convicted of or pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence.20 It is the only federal law that prohibits gun 
possession by misdemeanants.21 About half of the states also have statutes 
barring domestic violence misdemeanants from purchasing and possessing 
                                                                                                                     
17 See infra Parts III.A–B.
18 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012). A qualifying restraining order meets four 
requirements. First, the defendant/respondent must have actual notice and an opportunity to 
participate in the hearing that led to the issuance of the order. Id. § 922(g)(8)(A). Second, 
the petitioner must be an “intimate partner” of the defendant/respondent. Id. § 922(g)(8)(B). 
To satisfy this requirement, the parties must be spouses, ex-spouses, parents of a common 
child, or present or former cohabitants. Id. § 921(a)(32). Third, the protection order must 
restrain the defendant/respondent from either: a) harassing, stalking, or threatening the 
intimate partner, child of the defendant/respondent, or child of the defendant/respondent’s
intimate partner; or b) “engaging in other conduct that would place [the] intimate partner in 
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child.” Id. § 922(g)(8)(B). Finally, the order 
must include a finding that the defendant/respondent poses a “credible threat to the physical
safety of [the] intimate partner or child,” or expressly prohibit the “use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against [the] intimate partner or child that would reasonably 
be expected to cause bodily injury.” Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii). As discussed infra notes 340,
353–57, 416–31 and accompanying text, § 922(g)(8) does not apply to ex parte temporary 
restraining orders, which some states allow. In this Article, the acronym “DVRO” is used to 
refer to these synonymous terms: “domestic violence restraining order,” “domestic violence 
protection order,” and “domestic violence protective order.”
19 See Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers Appropriately, 22 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 173, 177–82 (2015) (describing the passage of the Lautenberg 
Amendment).
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). See infra Part III.B.2 for the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of conduct that constitutes a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Section 
922(g)(9) also prohibits a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence from shipping a firearm in interstate commerce. Another provision makes 
it unlawful for a person to transfer a firearm to a domestic violence misdemeanant. Id.
§ 922(d)(9).
21 Laura Lee Gildengorin, Note, Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm 
Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 807, 813 
& n.41 (2016).
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guns, and a substantial number of these have extended the ban beyond 
§ 922(g)(9) to convictions involving a wider class of victims.22
Unlike the DVRO provision from which police, military, and others who 
need firearms for their government jobs are exempted,23 § 922(g)(9) contains 
no exemption for official government use.24 Moreover, while § 922(g)(8)’s gun 
prohibition lasts only as long as the restraining order remains in place, the 
federal ban on possession of a firearm by a domestic violence misdemeanant is 
essentially permanent.25 Legislatures have also enacted gun restrictions at the 
state level for persons subject to a qualifying restraining order. Some of these 
laws expand the types of intimate relationships covered and/or extend gun 
restrictions to ex parte orders.26 Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia 
authorize or require courts to bar individuals subject to qualifying DVROs from 
purchasing or possessing firearms, but “[m]any of these laws have significant 
loopholes.”27 Twenty-seven states have “removal” or “surrender” statutes that
help ensure that DVRO respondents relinquish their guns.28
Despite their “tough-on-abusers” veneer, these gun prohibitions are poorly 
conceived and haphazardly enforced. To date, scholars who have criticized 
§ 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) have focused on the fact that violators are 
prosecuted infrequently and, even if they are convicted, they do not receive 
punishment as severe as that of felons in possession of a firearm.29 Other 
                                                                                                                     
22 See Domestic Violence and Firearms, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/domestic-violence-
firearms/ [https://perma.cc/82CC-9A2K].
23 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012).
24 See id. However, even § 922(g)(8) makes it possible to order the surrender of 
firearms by private-sector employees, such as security guards, who are required to carry guns 
on the job.
25 See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 812, 814.
26 See April M. Zeoli, Domestic Violence and Firearms: Research on Statutory 
Interventions, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & FIREARMS RES. CTR. 3,
http://www.preventdvgunviolence.org/assets/documents/relevant-research/domestic-violence-and-
firearms-research-on-statutory-interventions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PRC-78QW]. Some states 
allow victims of dating violence to apply for protection orders that include gun restrictions. 
See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22. California, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Texas, and West Virginia have extended gun prohibitions to ex parte orders. See id.
27 See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22.
28 See id.
29 See Lininger, supra note 19, at 174 (“[T]he federal government has rarely 
enforced [§ 922(g)(9)], prosecuting approximately thirty to seventy each year among 
hundreds of thousands of potentially eligible defendants.”). Between 1996 and 2001, cases
filed under § 922(g)(8) slowly increased from three to sixty-eight, while § 922(g)(9) cases 
grew from one in 1996 to 125 in 2001. Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 525, 531–32 (2003) [hereinafter Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers]. 
By 2005, there had been an uptick with domestic violence weapons offense referrals to U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices almost doubling since 2002. Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence in 
Federal Court: Abused Women as Victims, Survivors, and Offenders, 19 FED. SENT’G REP.
91, 93 (2006). Section 922(g)(9) violations constituted about 70% of these firearms charges. 
See id. Despite potential sentences of up to ten years in prison, most defendants convicted of 
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researchers charge lawmakers with failing to enact state-level prohibitions and 
enforcement legislation to support the domestic violence provisions in the 
federal Gun Control Act.30 Many of these criticisms have validity. However, in 
contrast to most extant critiques, this Article contends that reform must involve 
something besides broader and more aggressively enforced prohibitions. The 
current framing of the argument for stricter firearms laws is decidedly oriented 
toward crime control and derived from public health research on domestic 
violence that makes a reduction in fatal shootings its chief objective.31 Yet, if 
“hundreds of thousands of convicted domestic violence misdemeanants possess 
firearms,” as some scholars and judges estimate,32 reformers should also 
consider the potential costs of a move to sweeping and rigorous enforcement.
Changes in gun laws and their implementation in the context of intimate-partner 
abuse ought to cure over- and under-breadth problems; provide greater 
autonomy to abuse victims and protections for those who resist their batterers; 
reconsider the lack of an “official use” exemption to the misdemeanor ban for 
firearms required on-duty; and include a better mechanism for restoring gun 
rights to misdemeanants who have shown the capacity to avoid reoffending.
At least on paper, the punitive approach to misdemeanor domestic violence 
reflected in § 922(g)(9) and its state counterparts subordinates a victim’s
choices, especially if she is reluctant to take action that will permanently deprive 
her partner of his firearms. Broad gun prohibitions for domestic violence
misdemeanants also detrimentally affect women who use force to protect 
themselves, yet who do not have viable defenses at criminal law. Indeed, another 
problem with uncritical reliance on gun-control measures to reduce domestic 
violence is that they entrench a stereotype of women as helpless and passive. 
This framing of the necessity of disarming batterers leaves non-traditional 
victims—that is, survivors who physically resist abuse—with neither a gun nor 
                                                                                                                     
domestic violence gun charges received terms of fewer than two years. Lininger, A Better 
Way to Disarm Batterers, supra, at 596–98; Raeder, supra, at 91, 93.
30 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 824–28, 831, 838–39; see also Aaron M. Jolly, 
Patchwork of Protection: American Regulation of Domestic Gun Violence, 53 CRIM. L.
BULL. 674, 706–07 (2017) (noting the trend toward a more proactive approach to preventing 
domestic gun violence at the state level but urging “states with deregulated firearms 
schemes” to enact new laws); Claire McNamara, Finally, Actually Saying “No”: A Call for 
Reform of Gun Rights Legislation and Policies to Protect Domestic Violence Survivors, 13 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 649, 671, 675 (2014).
31 Research by Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell and her colleagues has been influential in 
associating batterers’ access to firearms with intimate-partner homicide. In 1985, Campbell 
developed a Danger Assessment tool “for public health workers to predict the risk of 
homicide for women subjected to abuse.” Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, 
and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 
524 (2010). When she developed the tool—which courts now use for many determinations, 
including “sentencing, probation, parole, bail, bond and alternative treatment decisions,” as 
well as the issuance of civil protection orders, id. at 540—“Dr. Campbell identified the 
decrease of homicide as her only goal.” Id. at 525.
32 Lininger, supra note 19, at 176.
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a good argument in court. Reforms aimed at making domestic violence firearms 
laws work better ought to take such victim-centered concerns into account.
The gun-control camp also tends to depict domestic violence 
misdemeanants as men predisposed to commit a fatal homicide if their firearms 
are not confiscated.33 This stereotype fits uncomfortably with the complex 
reality of intimate-partner abuse, including that perpetrated by women,34 and 
could result in the harsh enforcement of perpetual gun prohibitions on low-level 
offenders. By some estimates, a quarter of violent offenders in local jails 
committed domestic violence crimes.35 Given such statistics, care must be taken 
to ensure that increasing the prosecution of weapons offenses does not inflate 
incarceration without lessening recidivism or accomplishing other important 
goals. Violation of federal gun laws can subject the offender to as many as ten 
years in prison and a $250,000 fine, for one § 922(g)(8) or § 922(g)(9) count 
alone, though few offenders currently receive the maximum punishment.36
This Article examines the relationship between guns and domestic violence 
from legal, historical, social-scientific, and cultural perspectives. Part II shows 
that the image of female gun users that gun-rights activists deploy is misleading 
and harmful. Having a firearm in her home or on her person may not, in fact, 
make a woman safer, especially not if her abusive intimate partner has access to 
it.37 Moreover, when appealing to women, gun-rights advocates ignore 
historical tensions between arms-bearing, the socio-legal status of women (and, 
especially, women of color), and the question of their full citizenship in the 
nation. In doing so, the gun-rights camp discounts the structural inequalities that 
contribute to gender violence.
Part III turns to the strong gun-control position, the arguments its 
proponents make about firearms prohibitions for domestic abusers, and the 
images of women the gun-control camp propagates. With regard to deficiencies 
in current laws, this side wants more: more punitive charging and prosecution 
                                                                                                                     
33 Other aspects of the criminal justice response also stereotype batterers. For example, 
batterer intervention programs often fail to acknowledge contributors to intimate-partner 
violence, including unemployment and substance abuse; varying risk levels posed by 
different types of offenders; and the fact that “individuals who resort to domestic violence 
are not uniformly powerful and controlling, nor are they all straight men.” Ramsey, supra 
note 9, at 371, 378–84.
34 See id. at 395–405.
35 RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE NO. 45, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 13 (2013), https://ric-
zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p123-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/2235-S9ED].
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). However, there is no mandatory minimum 
sentence. In the 1990s, Lininger found that most violators of § 922(g)(8) or § 922(g)(9) got 
prison terms of two years or less and that such sentences were far below the average sentence 
for federal weapons offenses. See Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, supra note 
29, at 536–37, 550–51; see also Raeder, supra note 29, at 93 (updating Lininger’s data but 
finding no change).
37 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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of intimate-partner abuse,38 more comprehensive and rigorously enforced gun 
bans,39 more search and seizure authority to enable firearms confiscation,40 and 
the protection of a broader category of victims.41 Some scholars have also 
argued for fewer procedural protections for defendants. Their proposed changes 
would include extending guns bans to ex parte restraining orders; eliminating 
the requirement for a valid waiver of the right to defense counsel and a jury trial 
for the predicate offense;42 and expanding felony weapons laws to defendants 
who were only arrested, but not convicted, of domestic violence 
misdemeanors.43
Part IV rejects these polarized positions in favor of a more cautious, nuanced 
approach that asks what is working, what has proven ineffective, and what could 
be done instead. Part IV focuses on the shortcomings and potential costs of gun 
prohibitions related to domestic violence. It describes the different types of laws 
in this area and pairs this categorization with empirical evidence showing the
varying levels of success of these approaches to disarming batterers. Ultimately, 
Part IV suggests that the Lautenberg Amendment and related state laws 
constitute a largely ineffective bandage on a thorny, multi-faceted problem. 
America’s hyper-masculine gun culture contributes to the global scourge of 
abuse in families and intimate relationships. Yet, a zealously-enforced, 
potentially lifelong ban on gun possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants, even those who did not intend to inflict bodily injury, sounds 
better in the halls of Congress and the Supreme Court than it does in the gritty, 
complicated landscape of intimacy.
This Article offers a critique, not a watertight solution. It extends unease 
with mandatory domestic violence laws and policies, which are often rooted in 
victim and offender stereotypes, to include serious concerns about the 
criminalization and carceral punishment of gun possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants and DVRO respondents. However, it does not completely reject 
either gun control or criminal justice interventions in nonfatal domestic 
violence. Instead, it sketches the outlines of a more sophisticated understanding 
                                                                                                                     
38 See Lininger, supra note 19, at 204.
39 See, e.g., Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 841–46 (advocating such measures as
providing federal funds for states to implement gun relinquishment laws, promulgating 
guidelines to facilitate relinquishment, allowing officers to confiscate weapons at the scene 
of a domestic violence incident, and improving background check laws so they do not offer 
loopholes for abusers to purchase weapons); Jolly, supra note 30, at 706 (making similar 
proposals).
40 See McNamara, supra note 30, at 653 (advocating the passage of state laws allowing 
officers to confiscate firearms at the scene of a domestic violence offense). About eighteen 
states have such laws. See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22; see also infra
notes 445–51 and accompanying text.
41 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 812; Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers,
supra note 29, at 599.
42 See Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, supra note 29, at 600.
43 See id.
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of women’s relationship to firearms than the rhetoric that either the gun-rights 
or gun-control camps offers. 
Parts IV and V conclude that, from this new perspective, it might be possible 
to design an approach to firearms and domestic violence that recognizes abused 
women’s capacity to choose a path that best serves their interests, supported (but 
not infantilized) by the state. Whatever the precise outlines of re-drafted gun 
restrictions in the context of abuse, they should be narrowly tailored to target 
the most dangerous offenders; imposed at the victim’s initiative, or at least with 
her support; and adjustable in duration to differentiate recidivists from offenders 
who learn to avoid using violence against intimates and family members. The 
last of these suggestions aims to treat domestic violence offenders as a 
heterogeneous and possibly redeemable group of individuals and to exclude 
such offenders from the right to possess guns only as long as their behavior 
warrants it. Such changes have the potential to make domestic violence gun 
control more reasonable, enforceable, and sensitive to victims’ priorities and 
concerns.
II. THE SELF-DEFENDING WOMAN IN GUN-RIGHTS RHETORIC AND GUN
MARKETING
During the 2016 presidential election, the NRA released a video entitled 
Don’t Let Hillary Leave You Defenseless.44 This video not only claimed that 
Supreme Court justices appointed by candidate Hillary Clinton would 
undermine women’s Second Amendment right to possess a gun in self-
defense;45 it also disparaged women’s reliance on the government to protect 
them from violent crime. On average, it claimed, police officers take eleven 
minutes to respond to a 9-1-1 call, which is “too late.”46 Consequently, 
depriving the female protagonist of the handgun she kept locked in her bedroom 
safe would place her in imminent, lethal danger from a male intruder.47 The 
video thus brought together two themes that have animated gun-rights rhetoric 
for several decades: (1) the purported role of firearms as the great equalizer in 
women’s struggle against gender-based violence and (2) the incompetence and 
                                                                                                                     
44 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, Don’t Let Hillary Leave You Defenseless, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPM8e_DauUw [https://perma.cc/B3VH-
GZ3A].
45 Id. As a candidate, President Trump made statements widely interpreted to (at least 
jokingly) encourage Second Amendment advocates to use violence against Hillary Clinton 
if she were elected: “Hillary wants to abolish—essentially abolish the Second Amendment. 
By the way, if she gets to pick, if she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks. 
Although the Second Amendment people, maybe there is, I don’t know.” Jeremy Diamond 
& Stephen Collinson, Donald Trump: ‘Second Amendment’ Gun Advocates Could Deal with 
Hillary Clinton, CNN POLITICS (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/politics/
donald-trump-hillary-clinton-second-amendment/index.html [https://perma.cc/5W62-23E4].
46 Don’t Let Hillary Leave You Defenseless, supra note 44.
47 Id.
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even malevolence of big government, which seeks to strip Americans of their 
guns.
By casting Hillary Clinton as the arch-villain, the NRA video went beyond 
an attack on the evils of paternalistic government to charge liberal, female 
politicians with endangering women via gun control. The campaign to recruit 
women as firearms purchasers and gun-rights activists gives America’s gun 
culture a claim to gender inclusivity. However, its rhetorical insistence on the 
power of guns to neutralize violent crime, including domestic abuse, is 
dangerously overstated. This Article will emphasize that violence, especially 
criminal homicide, is a social event. Because killing stems from hierarchy and 
inequality, as well as from norms for dealing with conflict, it is naïve (or perhaps 
more accurately, disingenuous) to propose gun possession as a simple solution 
to the complex problem of domestic violence. However, as Parts III and IV will 
show, one-size-fits-all gun prohibitions for domestic violence offenders that are 
poorly conceived, and even more sloppily enforced, provide no magic bullet 
either.
A. Guns as an Equalizer in Gender Violence
Gun-rights spokeswomen cite the need for firearms to defend against male 
strangers who attack with intent to rape, rob, or murder. For example, a 
prominent profile on the NRA Women website tells the story of Amanda 
Collins, who was brutally raped in a parking garage when she returned to her 
vehicle after an evening class at the University of Nevada-Reno.48 Collins was 
not carrying a gun, even though she owned one, because concealed-carry was 
illegal on her university’s campus, but she believes she could have prevented 
the rape if she had been armed.49 Alluding to female survivor stories, NRA 
President Wayne LaPierre told the audience at the Conservative Political Action 
Conference in 2013 that “[t]he one thing a violent rapist deserves to face is a 
good woman with a gun.”50 LaPierre juxtaposed the image of an armed, female 
survivor of a rape attempt against his fiery criticism of politicians, including 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, who favor an assault weapons ban and other 
restrictions on gun ownership to curb lethal shootings and other violent crime.51
                                                                                                                     
48 Amanda Collins: A Survivor’s Story, NRA WOMEN, http://www.nrawomen.tv/refuse-
to-be-a-victim/video/amanda-collins-a-survivor-s-story/list/refuse-to-be-a-victim-feature 
[https://perma.cc/HER6-WNCN].
49 See id.
50 Aaron Blake, NRA Head: A “Violent Rapist Deserves to Face . . . a Good Woman 
with a Gun,” WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2013/03/15/nra-head-a-violent-rapist-deserves-to-face-a-good-woman-with-a-
gun/ [https://perma.cc/5BXE-7XZ3].
51 See id.
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Such pro-gun narratives depict the violence women face as being similar to 
the dangers men confront.52 In doing so, they construct women’s need for self-
defense as part of a universal imperative of personal protection against criminals 
that the government ostensibly will not, or cannot, restrain. As one scholar puts 
it, “although gun carriers may actively promote guns for women, they assume a 
particular understanding of crime that reproduces masculine privilege by 
emphasizing fast, warlike violence perpetrated by strangers—the kinds of crime 
men, as opposed to women, are more likely to face.”53 The discursive 
deployment of firearms as “equalizers” is not limited to confrontations between 
men and women. In the rhetoric of strong gun-rights proponents, law-abiding 
citizens need to equalize the threat from criminals: men must neutralize the 
advantage that younger, stronger male attackers have, and because criminality 
has racial connotations in the popular mind, white gun owners envision the 
imperative of defending themselves against black and Hispanic “thugs” and 
“gangbangers.”54
Domestic violence plays a relatively minor role in the drive by the NRA and 
other entities to convince women to embrace guns, rather than gun restrictions, 
for their personal safety. However, some Second Amendment activists have 
added intimate-partner abuse to the list of dangers against which women, in 
particular, must empower themselves. For example, in an NRA Women TV 
video, conservative talk show host Dana Loesch warns “every rapist, domestic 
abuser, [and] violent criminal thug” that millions of women are “flocking to gun 
stores and gun ranges” to exercise their “right to choose” their own lives over 
the lives of the “despicable cowards” who prey on female victims.55 Loesch’s
inclusion of domestic abusers in an umbrella category of bad guys largely 
comprised of male strangers who brutalize women constructs intimate-partner 
violence as “a clear-cut crime [involving] a fast, bloody act” that can easily be 
                                                                                                                     
52 See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer, Cramer: On the Right Side of the Bullet, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/9/on-the-right-side-of-the-
bullet/ [https://perma.cc/6DXC-Y8P7] (describing how eighteen-year-old Sarah McKinley 
fatally shot a robber who entered her home, while she was home alone with her three-month-
old baby).
53 Jennifer Carlson, The Equalizer? Crime, Vulnerability, and Gender in Pro-Gun 
Discourse, 9 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 59, 61 (2014).
54 Id. at 72–74. In her recent book on American gun culture, Jennifer Carlson observes:
The broad appeal of guns to men of diverse backgrounds suggests that this may be an 
inclusive moment in gun politics, but guns are inherently exclusionary objects in the 
sense that they are about aggressively policing others—. . . (suspected) criminals who 
are always imagined as hyperaggressive men and often (but not always) imagined as 
economically precarious people of color involved in drug dealing or gangs.
CARLSON, supra note 7, at 15.
55 NRA, Freedom’s Safest Place: Real Empowerment, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjuNe5fXfxQ [https://perma.cc/P6AM-RXCN] (emphasis 
added).
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repelled with the use of a firearm in self-defense.56 It also associates batterers 
with irresponsible, dangerous classes of people, including criminals and the 
mentally ill, that moderate gun owners are happy to regulate.
Loesch touts her Second Amendment activism broadly to “moms,
grandmothers, and professional women.”57 Regardless of age and 
socioeconomic profile,58 the gun-carrying woman transforms herself from 
victim to heroine, capable of defending herself and her family against male 
predators. Her possession of a firearm and the ability to shoot it empowers her 
against threats to her safety.59
Ordinary women who own guns tend to embrace the “equalizer” narrative 
enthusiastically. For instance, a white, female secretary from Detroit says she 
believes that the possession of a gun levels any disparity in size, strength, age, 
or gender: “You know, a grandma can pull the trigger. It has nothing to do with 
[the gender of] who’s carrying it. [My husband is] no more dangerous than I am. 
We can both pull the trigger. It’s just that simple.”60 A recent news article about 
a young woman stabbed nearly to death by a jealous ex-boyfriend describes how 
she endured a painful recovery, married the man of her dreams, and obtained a 
concealed-carry permit.61
Stories like these imply that a woman abused by her male intimate-partner 
need not depend on mandatory arrest laws, no-drop prosecution policies, or the 
imposition of gun prohibitions on domestic violence offenders. She can defend 
herself if she has a firearm and knows how to shoot it accurately. By contrast, a 
woman who refuses to take action, relies on the state for help, or succumbs to 
her abuser’s requests for reconciliation stays a vulnerable victim.62
Such overtly gendered messaging is not confined to the NRA; it is a 
pervasive theme in a variety of pro-gun media, mainstream news, and 
conservative or libertarian scholarship advocating strong Second Amendment 
guarantees. The National Association for Guns Rights, for example, has an 
advertisement featuring a woman aiming a handgun with the caption, “Mama 
                                                                                                                     
56 Carlson, supra note 53, at 75.
57 Freedom’s Safest Place: Real Empowerment, supra note 55.
58 The profiles of female gun owners on sites like NRA Women are relatively 
homogenous. They tend to highlight white women as hunters and target shooters with 
recreational, as well as self-defense, interests in gun ownership and shooting skills. See
Armed & Fabulous, NRA WOMEN, http://www.nrawomen.tv/armed-and-fabulous 
[https://perma.cc/ELQ8-6NAW]; New Energy, NRA WOMEN, http://www.nrawomen.tv/
new-energy [https://perma.cc/ZH22-GUGR].
59 See CARLSON, supra note 7, at 100–03. Some gun owners and gun-rights activists 
may actually place a higher value on women’s maternal defense of their children. See id. at 
103.
60 Carlson supra note 53, at 70.
61 Melissa Dohme, Marrying the Man Who Saved My Life, BBC NEWS MAGA. (Jan. 17, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38302839 [https://perma.cc/65JB-DUYQ].
62 See Carlson, supra note 53, at 75.
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didn’t raise a victim.”63 Arming Women Against Rape for Endangerment 
(AWARE), a nonprofit organization promoting female self-defense, similarly 
encourages gun ownership, among other strategies, to protect women against 
violent crime.64 Like Dana Loesch, AWARE stresses that domestic violence 
victims number among the especially vulnerable women for whom having a gun 
for self-defense is potentially life-saving. The AWARE website provides 
anecdotes about victims like Betsy McCandless Murray and Janice LaCava, 
whose murder at the hands of their estranged intimate partners might have been 
prevented if they had learned to use guns self-defensively.65
The tragic stories of these domestic homicide victims (murdered despite 
obtaining restraining orders and, in Murray’s case, filing criminal charges)66
underscore a prevalent refrain in gun-rights rhetoric: The state will not protect 
you; it will only tax you and confiscate your firearms.67 Female gun owners who 
disparage traditional means of protection, such as calling 9-1-1, as inadequate 
to defend against criminal violence espouse comparable messages. Finally, 
academic supporters and other advocates of law-abiding citizens’ right to bear 
arms also emphasize the ineffectiveness, and even unwillingness, of the police 
to protect domestic violence victims from crime.68
B. Efforts to Increase the Appeal of Guns to Women
The efforts of gun-rights proponents and gun sellers to appeal to female 
voters and consumers did not begin in this century. Rather, the move to promote 
guns and gun rights among women dates back at least as far as the 1980s and 
1990s. During these decades, the Second Amendment Foundation debuted the 
Women and Guns Magazine—“The Worlds [sic] First Firearm Publication for 
Women”—largely focused on the issue of self-defense.69 The NRA launched its 
“Refuse to be a Victim” campaign primarily, but not exclusively, for women in 
1993.70 At the same time, it unsuccessfully opposed the Violence Against 
                                                                                                                     
63 See Advertisement, Mama Didn’t Raise a Victim, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR GUN RIGHTS,
http://ww2.hdnux.com/photos/17/72/37/4171721/3/1024x1024.jpg [https://perma.cc/7N7V-
J6HQ].
64 Self Defense Is Important, ARMING WOMEN AGAINST RAPE ENDANGERMENT (Feb. 
20, 2017), http://www.aware.org/self-defense/is-important [https://perma.cc/QZ63-PN6W].
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Blake, supra note 50 (reporting that, in 2013, NRA President Wayne 
LaPierre asserted, “In the end, there are only two reasons for federal government to create [a] 
federal registry of gun owners—to tax them, or to take them”).
68 See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Alice Marie Beard, Response, Murder, Self-Defense, and 
the Right to Arms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1691–93 (2013) (arguing that domestic violence 
victims cannot depend on the police to protect them).
69 See WOMEN & GUNS, http://www.womenandguns.com/ [https://perma.cc/58X9-VTZS].
70 See Ruthann Sprague, Refuse To Be a Victim Celebrates 20 Years, AM. RIFLEMAN,
Jan. 2013, at 89, 89.
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Women Act (VAWA).71 The Refuse to be a Victim self-defense program, which 
continues to exist today, is advertised on the NRA Women website along with 
videos about carrying and using a firearm that feature female instructors’ advice 
to presumptively female viewers.72 NRA Women describes the self-defense 
program as “more than just a class: it’s a mindset.”73
Today, female consumers can find pastel-colored, bejeweled, and zebra-
print guns for sale.74 Accessories, including high-end handbags to conceal 
firearms, also cater to female purchasers. The retail site Armed in Heels offers 
everything from feminine holsters to guns in colors designed to appeal to 
women.75 A similar retailer, Concealed Carrie, advertises purses and other gear 
that allow women to tote concealed weapons and still be fashionable.76 Yet, 
despite the advertising of feminine accessories for everything from handguns to 
assault weapons, such gender-specific marketing tends to be paired with an 
obvious appeal to women’s assertiveness in exercising their “right” to self-
defense.
Some manufacturers even eschew soft advertising gimmicks with a direct 
claim that their weapons make women as formidable as men in violent 
confrontations. For example, Glock, Inc., the American subsidiary of a popular 
gun manufacturer, features eight categories of gun ownership on its product site 
and asks, “Which Glock are you?”77 The seventh category of Glock owners are 
women,78 and here, the sales pitch reminds female consumers that “[y]ou have 
every right to defend yourself.”79 The advertising of guns on the site both 
explicitly and implicitly sends the message that the proper equipment and the 
ability to shoot will level the playing field in a lethal struggle between an 
innocent woman and her male attacker. Under the Glock Women tab on the 
product site, the manufacturer promises: “[Y]ou won’t find a ‘Woman’s’ model 
here. If someone crosses that line, you require equal stopping power.”80
Research indicates that concern about personal safety constitutes the driving 
force behind female gun ownership,81 even though rates of lethal violence in the 
                                                                                                                     
71 Carlson, supra note 53, at 60.
72 See Refuse To Be a Victim, NRA WOMEN (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.nrawomen.tv/
refuse-to-be-a-victim [https://perma.cc/3FHJ-9MDX].
73 Id.
74 April M. Zeoli & Amy Bonomi, Commentary, Pretty in Pink? Firearm Hazards for 
Domestic Violence Victims, 25 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 3, 4 (2015).
75 See ARMED IN HEELS, http://www.armedinheels.com [https://perma.cc/B4FB-8EBQ].
76 See CONCEALED CARRIE, http://www.concealedcarrie.com [https://perma.cc/XYP7-
QJH6].
77 See Which Glock Are You?, GLOCK, https://us.glock.com/products [https://perma.cc/
5CQY-VUC2].
78 Id.
79 Id.; see also Glock Women, GLOCK, https://us.glock.com/products/sector/women
[https://perma.cc/TD45-RZYC].
80 Glock Women, supra note 79.
81 See Lois Beckett, Domestic Violence and Guns: The Hidden American Crisis Ending 
Women’s Lives, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/
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United States have decreased from a peak in the 1990s.82 In response to 
women’s fears, gun manufacturers, gun sellers, and publications for gun 
enthusiasts emphasize that female firearms possession reduces victimization. 
The effect of this aggressive marketing on women’s attitudes toward guns 
remains unclear. Studies conducted in the 1990s, when the gun industry began 
to focus on female consumers, indicate that advertisements for guns and gun-
related products are not likely to make a woman significantly more pro-gun.83
Indeed, only a relatively small percentage of women own guns today—15% to 
almost 25%, compared to about 45% of men84—despite the proliferation of 
gender-based marketing. Advertising, combined with self-defense courses and 
other firearms-related education, likely has a greater influence on the creation 
of a loyal, female customer base than the stand-alone marketing of guns.85
C. Criticizing the Use of Gender in Pro-Gun Rhetoric
Female empowerment is a worthy goal, but the rhetorical deployment of 
gender by pro-gun entities raises myriad concerns. Violence and homicide arise 
from social forces and pressures, including inequality, hierarchy, and masculine 
norms for dealing with conflict. Hence, it is simplistic to think of guns as a 
straightforward, unilateral solution to a problem like domestic violence. 
Although this Article does not aim primarily to refute the gun-rights view that 
                                                                                                                     
11/domestic-violence-shooting-deaths-women-husbands-boyfriends [https://perma.cc/5U4E-
D89Z]; see also M. Elizabeth Blair & Eva M. Hyatt, The Marketing of Guns to Women: 
Factors Influencing Gun-Related Attitudes and Gun Ownership by Women, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y
& MARKETING 117, 124 (1995) (“[F]ully 50% of those who possess firearms solely for the 
purpose of self-protection are women.”); Garen J. Wintemute et al., Correspondence: 
Increased Risk of Intimate Partner Homicide Among California Women Who Purchased 
Handguns, 41 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 281, 282 (2003) [hereinafter Wintemute et al., 
Increased Risk of Intimate Partner Homicide] (stating that two-thirds of female gun owners 
purchased their weapons to protect against crime).
82 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., GUN HOMICIDE RATE DOWN 49% SINCE 1993 PEAK;
PUBLIC UNAWARE 1–2, 4 (May 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/firearms_
final_05-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXZ6-T6RQ].
83 Blair & Hyatt, supra note 81, at 124.
84 Jeffrey M. Jones, Men, Married, Southerners Most Likely To Be Gun Owners,
GALLUP (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160223/men-married-southerners-likely-
gun-owners.aspx [https://perma.cc/EE74-NR52]. A Gallup poll in 2011 revealed a slightly 
different, though still significant gender gap, with 46% of men, compared to 23% of women, 
reporting that they owned guns. Lydia Saad, Self-Reported Gun Ownership in U.S. Is Highest 
Since 1993, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150353/self-reported-gun-
ownership-highest-1993.aspx [https://perma.cc/MT6N-CSK5].
85 See Lisa Parsons-Wraith, Strategies for Success in the Women’s Market, SHOOTING 
INDUSTRY, Jan. 2015, at 40.
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women need to possess a firearm for personal protection,86 several criticisms 
reveal the liabilities of the self-defending woman image.
1. Guns and Intimate-Partner Violence
First, the tendency of gun enthusiasts and activists to depict threats to law-
abiding women as exterior to the home largely elides the problem of domestic 
violence. Homicides committed with firearms in the home by family members 
and acquaintances are more prevalent than stranger killings in public. According 
to a recent study of data from the National Violent Death Reporting System 
(NVDRS) and other sources, “nearly half of all incidents of firearms-related 
homicide take place in the home,”87 as do almost 80% of nonfatal acts of 
intimate-partner violence.88 One-third of female homicide victims are killed by 
their intimate partners, and about two-thirds of intimate-partner homicide 
victims are killed with a gun, usually a handgun.89 Social-scientific data further 
                                                                                                                     
86 See infra notes 187–207, 213–17 and accompanying text (discussing women’s use 
of force, as well as abuse survivors’ perception that women trained to use a gun should be 
able to possess one to defend against battering).
87 Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary 
Violence, 90 IND. L.J. 151, 156, 165 (2015) [hereinafter Fan, Disarming the Dangerous]. 
48% of the homicides reported by NVDRS in 2011 occurred in the home (including 
apartments, single-family houses, and the curtilage, as well as the residential structure itself). 
Id. at 165 tbl.2. In 2011–2014, firearms violence at home occupied an even greater proportion 
of the NVDRS total—50%. Mary Fan, Preventing Ordinary and Extraordinary Violence, in
THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane Stoever ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18–19
& tbl.2) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Fan, Preventing]. National data produced 
slightly higher numbers: 55% of homicides and more than 60% of assaults occurred within 
a home or residence in both 2012 and 2014. Id. (citing 2014 National Incident-Based 
Reporting System: Crimes Against Persons Offenses, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2014/tables/by-location/crimes_against_
persons_offenses_offense_category_by_location_2014_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL2K-
TDX8]); Fan, Disarming the Dangerous, supra, at 165–66 (presenting statistics for 2012). 
NVDRS data from seventeen states shows that, for 2011–2014, 45% of the counted 
homicides were killings of family or intimates. Fan, Preventing, supra, at 17–18 tbl.1. Less 
than 20% of the killings were perpetrated by strangers. Id.
88 See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 2444697, SPECIAL REPORT:
NONFATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2003–2012, at 1 (Apr. 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5Z6-CRFJ].
89 Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting Access to 
Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?, 30 
EVALUATION REV. 313, 313 (2006) (stating that about 60% of intimate-partner homicides 
are committed with a firearm); Garen J. Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of 
Arrest Among Respondents to Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, Article in Injury 
Epidemiology, SPRINGERLINK 1, 2 (Dec. 2015), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.11
86%2Fs40621-015-0047-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M3R-HTGN] [hereinafter Wintemute et 
al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest] (“In 2008, firearms were used in 53.0% of female 
and 41.9% of male intimate partner homicides.”). For the types of guns used to kill intimate 
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indicates that a domestic violence perpetrator’s access to a gun increases his 
victim’s risk of being killed by him at least fivefold.90 According to case-
controlled research by Jacqueline Campbell and her coauthors, firearm access 
is one of several risk factors—including the abuser’s unemployment, the 
couple’s estrangement, and prior physical violence or threats to kill—that 
increase the risk of intimate-partner homicide.91
Admittedly, such statistics indicate only that extremely violent abusers tend 
to own and use guns, and that guns are more lethal than other weapons, not that 
the availability of guns causes femicide. Moreover, as pro-gun scholars note, 
homicide statistics likely underestimate the number of justifiable shootings, 
including women’s use of guns to defend themselves or their children against a 
current or estranged partner.92 Part III of this Article will consider how 
conflating correlation with causation and ignoring women’s use of guns in self-
defense has led to overbroad firearms prohibitions in the context of domestic 
violence. That said, guns exacerbate the dangers an abuse victim faces: the 
perpetrator’s use of a firearm increases her risk of death due to the lethality of 
shooting, compared to beating, stabbing, and other methods of inflicting 
injury.93
                                                                                                                     
partners, see Susan B. Sorenson & Rebecca A. Schut, Nonfatal Gun Use in Intimate Partner 
Violence: A Systematic Review of the Literature, Article in Trauma, Violence, & Abuse,
SAGE JOURNALS 1, 2 (Sept. 14, 2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/15248
38016668589 [https://perma.cc/F8DX-ABKH] (“[A] substantial majority of the guns used 
in intimate partner homicides are handguns.”), and Susan B. Sorenson & Douglas J. Wiebe, 
Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412, 1413 tbl.1 (2004) 
(stating that women in shelters who self-reported victimization with a gun reported it was a 
handgun twice as often as a long gun).
90 Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1092.
91 See id. at 1090–92.
92 See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer, Essay, Why the FBI’s Justifiable Homicide Statistics 
Are a Misleading Measure of Defensive Gun Use, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 505, 
507 (2016) (stating that FBI justifiable homicides do not include excusable homicides 
committed during “sudden combat”; homicides charged as murder that later lead to 
dismissal, acquittal, or dropped charges; or any self-defensive killing that did not involve a 
reported crime taking place when the homicide was committed); see also infra note 205.
93 In the 2003 study by Campbell et al., abusers’ use of a gun (versus another weapon, 
including physical assault) was associated with a marked increase in women’s homicide and 
“[t]he substantial increase in lethality associated with using a firearm was consistent with the 
findings of other research assessing weapon lethality.” Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1091-
–92. Older research on family and intimate assaults in Atlanta found that many abusers who 
kill their victims with a gun “would be unable or unwilling to exert the greater physical or 
psychological effort required to kill with another, typically available weapon.” Lininger, A
Better Way to Disarm Batterers, supra note 29, at 528–29 (citing Linda E. Saltzman et al., 
Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate Assaults, 267 JAMA
3043, 3045–46 (1992)). Because not all intimate homicides are premeditated or even 
intentional, guns may increase lethality beyond the outcome the perpetrator contemplated 
and desired. Franklin Zimring reached a similar conclusion about homicides in general in a 
pair of studies in the late 1960s. See Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent 
Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 722–24, 728, 735 (1968) [hereinafter Zimring, Is Gun 
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Second, while gun-rights activists like Dana Loesch claim to support 
women’s empowerment against domestic abuse, single-minded reliance on self-
defense with a firearm is misguided. The available evidence suggests that 
buying a gun might actually put a female abuse victim at greater risk, especially 
if she resides with her batterer. According to one study, for example, women in 
California who purchased handguns to protect themselves doubled their 
domestic murder risk, though the researchers could not determine whether 
buying a gun actually increased the danger or was simply “an imperfect 
protective measure taken by women who [were] at high risk of intimate partner 
homicide for other reasons.”94 This Article cautions against uncritical reliance 
on the stereotype of the innocent woman who is too helpless and passive to 
defend herself with a firearm.95 Notwithstanding this warning, I favor better 
tailoring gun restrictions for perpetrators of abuse and improving support 
services for their partners, rather than enacting laws that make it easier and faster 
for victims to get guns.96
Some female domestic violence survivors question the value of owning a 
firearm for self-defense. Unlike stranger violence, intimate-partner abuse often 
unfolds cyclically; it is seldom characterized by a single, life-or-death incident 
of the type depicted in the imagery of gun organizations and pro-gun media. 
Moreover, unlike stranger violence, domestic violence involves a tangle of 
personal relationships and interdependencies. In a 2004 study, the majority 
(66.9%) of interview subjects drawn from California emergency shelters said 
they felt less safe because their partner had a gun, and an even larger number 
(79.2%) felt less safe when there was a gun in the home.97 Similarly, in a sample 
of forty-two abuse survivors in the southern United States, many thought having 
a gun in the house would create greater danger and lead to their death at the 
hands of their abuser or to their imprisonment for killing him.98 One woman 
                                                                                                                     
Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?]; see also Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms, 
Violence, and the Potential Impact of Firearms Control, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 34, 35 
(2004) [hereinafter Zimring, Firearms, Violence, and the Potential Impact of Firearms 
Control] (“[T]he capacity of a weapon to inflict life-threatening injury [including a firearm’s
caliber] would have an important influence on the death rate from assault.”).
94 Wintemute et al., Increased Risk of Intimate Partner Homicide, supra note 81, at 
282.
95 See infra Part III.A.1 and notes 200–02, 207, 215–17, 296–311 and accompanying 
text.
96 In Kentucky, for example, a court issuing an emergency restraining order can 
automatically issue a concealed-carry permit to the person whom the order protects. See
Sorenson & Schut, supra note 89, at 3.
97 Sorenson & Wiebe, supra note 89, at 1414. Their fear may have stemmed in part 
from unsafe storage practices. Almost 50% lived in a residence “where a gun was kept 
unlocked and loaded or unlocked and with ammunition.” See id.
98 Kellie R. Lynch & T.K. Logan, “You Better Say Your Prayers and Get Ready”: Guns 
Within the Context of Partner Abuse, Article in J. Interpersonal Violence, SAGE JOURNALS
1, 9, 11–12 (Nov. 15, 2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/0886260515613344 [https://perma.cc/8E9Y-YRPG].
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decided to get rid of her gun because she felt that it simply armed her batterer 
with a lethal weapon.99
There was an even stronger “sentiment that participants would not have 
wanted to seriously harm or kill their abuser and that a gun would increase the 
risk of that happening.”100 Participants worried that they might misjudge the 
threat and shoot when doing so would not constitute self-defense under the 
criminal law and/or when it was not necessary in either a moral or practical 
sense.101 They also “commonly expressed concern for the safety of children 
with regard to having guns around for protection.”102
As Part III.A explains, participants in this study did not display implacable 
hostility toward firearms, nor did they have positive experiences with the 
enforcement of gun prohibitions on domestic violence offenders. But, 
collectively, their comments to interviewers revealed a more complex 
understanding of the risks of bringing a firearm into an abusive relationship than 
gun-rights imagery and rhetoric acknowledges.
2. The Myth of Guns as the Great Equalizer
The gun-rights camp’s gendered rhetoric purveys another myth, that of 
firearms as the “great equalizer” between men and women in a violent 
confrontation. The term “equalizer” is misleading in several respects.
a. Gender Disparities in the Perpetration of Intimate-Partner Gun 
Violence
Some studies indicate that women are more likely to use a gun against an 
intimate partner than men are, in an effort to counter imbalances in physical 
strength.103 However, in the aggregate, guns have not balanced gender 
disparities in the commission of homicide, either historically or today. For 
                                                                                                                     
99 Id. at 9 (“In my case I got rid of the gun that I had because basically I was just arming 
him . . . .”).
100 Id.
101 See id. at 10–12.
102 Id. at 10.
103 See Poco Kernsmith & Sarah W. Craun, Predictors of Weapon Use in Domestic 
Violence Incidents Reported to Law Enforcement, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 589, 593–94 (2008) 
(finding that, in a study of 393 domestic violence cases reported to the San Diego County 
Sheriff’s Department, women were three times more likely to use a weapon against a man 
than vice versa “to compensate for their generally smaller physical size relative to their male 
partner”). Marianne Hester’s data on domestic violence perpetration in Northumbia, 
England, from 2001–2007 indicates that, although men were more likely to engage in 
physical violence and threats, “women were much more likely to use a weapon although this 
was at times in order to stop further violence from their partners.” MARIANNE HESTER, N.
ROCK FOUND., WHO DOES WHAT TO WHOM? GENDER AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PERPETRATORS 8 (June 2009), http://www.nr-foundation.org.uk/downloads/Who-Does-What-to-
Whom.pdf [https://perma.cc/P76L-UDHR].
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example, urban historian Eric Monkkonen said of the rise of guns as consumer 
objects and their use in the commission of murder:
Men, not women, engineered the turn to guns [in New York]: only about 5 
percent of murderesses used guns throughout the whole time period [i.e. 1797–
1994], a stable proportion. Women did not seek guns, even though they have 
often been called “equalizers,” in the sense that strength may not determine the 
outcome of a fight. These gender differences suggest that weapons should be 
considered culturally chosen tools.104
As gun usage by both male and female perpetrators increased in New York, 
“women were still less likely than men to use guns [to kill].”105 Monkkonen’s
data was city-specific and may not support broad generalizations.106 Historian 
Randolph Roth found that, in the United States more generally, women often 
used guns if they sought to defend themselves against abusive spouses.107
However, “[o]nly a few women tried to murder husbands who left them, and 
those who did were far less likely than men to use a firearm . . . .”108
Today, men overwhelmingly commit more intimate-partner homicides than 
women do.109 Firearms constitute the most frequently used weapon in such 
killings. More than two-thirds of men and women killed by spouses or ex-
spouses between 1980 and 2008 were killed with guns.110 Some social-scientific 
studies have found that the few women who kill their spouses or non-marital 
                                                                                                                     
104 ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 38–39 & fig.2.1 (2001).
105 Id. at 43.
106 By contrast, according to historian Jeffrey Adler, more than three-quarters of 
Chicago husband killers in the late 1800s and early 1900s used guns, often aiming for the 
head and firing multiple shots to make sure their abusive spouse died. See JEFFREY S. ADLER,
FIRST IN VIOLENCE, DEEPEST IN DIRT: HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO, 1875–1920, at 104–05 (2006).
107 See RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 268 (2009) (stating that, in the 
nineteenth century, 65% of self-defensive homicides of abusive husbands by their wives 
were perpetrated with guns).
108 Id. at 266. 
109 In 2014, about 49% of female homicide victims, compared to just 6% of male 
homicide victims, were killed by intimate partners, in cases with known perpetrators. Zeoli, 
Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 26, at 1 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010: EXPANDED HOMICIDE 
DATA TABLE 10 (Sept. 2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2010/tables/10shrtbl10.xls [https://perma.cc/9MBL-PCH8?type=image]). Two hundred 
forty-one males and 1095 females were murdered by an intimate partner in 2010. Intimate 
Partner Violence: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html
[https://perma.cc/68S5-VLXZ] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra).
110 ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1980–2008, at 19–20 & figs.29a, 29b, & tbl.11 (Nov. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D2T-QL7Z]. However, the proportion of 
both male and female intimate homicide victims who are fatally shot, as opposed to being 
killed with other weapons, has actually decreased since 1980. Id. at 19–20.
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intimate partners are more likely to use guns than male domestic killers are.111
But the death of men at the hands of their partners has declined, perhaps due to 
the opening of battered women’s shelters, the greater availability of protection 
orders, and the creation of an improved (though still incomplete) social safety 
net.112
Nonfatal gun use has been studied less than intimate homicide, and the 
relevant research reflects greater methodological disparities, including the lack 
of an agreed-upon definition of “gun use.”113 Researchers have not reached a
consensus about the frequency of nonfatal gun violence or the gender 
breakdown of its perpetrators.114 Nevertheless, the predominant understanding 
seems to be that men more often inflict nonfatal injuries on their intimate 
partners with firearms than women do. The rate of violent but nonfatal 
victimization of women by their intimate partners was 6.2 per 1,000 persons 
aged twelve or older, between 2003 and 2012, compared to just 1.4 per 1,000 
for men.115 According to a 2003 study of shooting victims who visited hospital 
emergency rooms, “a higher percentage of women than men were hospitalized 
for having been shot or pistol whipped by a current or former spouse.”116
                                                                                                                     
111 See Philip J. Cook, The Effect of Gun Availability on Violent Crime Patterns, 455 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 66 (1981); Kernsmith & Craun, supra note 103, at 
594. For similar findings by historians about gender and gun use in intimate-partner 
homicides in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, see ADLER, supra note 106,
at 104–05, and ROTH, supra note 107, at 268.
112 Of all homicides between 1980 and 2008 for which the victim-offender relationship 
is known, the percentage of men killed by an intimate partner dropped 53% from 10.4% in 
1980 to 4.9% in 2008. COOPER & SMITH, supra note 110, at 18. During the same period, the 
percentage of women killed by their intimate partners increased by 5%. Id. For the purposes 
of this data, the term “intimate” included spouses, ex-spouses, boyfriends, girlfriends, and 
same-sex relationships. Id.
113 Sorenson & Schut, supra note 89, at 5, 7. Many studies count being pistol-whipped, 
shot at, or shot, but not being threatened with a gun, as nonfatal gun use. The available data 
is limited because studies derived from the Conflict Tactics Scale conflate guns and knives, 
and the most regularly kept statistics relate to homicides, rather than nonfatal assaults. See 
id.; Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 323.
114 Many researchers believe that gun use in intimate-partner violence is relatively rare. 
See Kernsmith & Craun, supra note 103, at 595 (“[T]he data, from this and other studies, 
indicates that common household objects, such as telephones are the most commonly used 
weapons . . . .”). Fists, feet, and other types of weapons are used more frequently than guns 
to inflict physical injury in intimate-partner abuse. See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 
323; Katherine A. Vittes & Susan B. Sorenson, Are Temporary Restraining Orders More 
Likely To Be Issued When Applications Mention Firearms?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 266, 273 
(2006); see also infra note 212 and accompanying text. But see Sorenson & Wiebe, supra 
note 89, at 1414 (“Nearly two-thirds (64.5%) [of the women interviewed in domestic 
violence shelters] responded that the partner had used one of the guns to scare, threaten, or 
harm her.”).
115 TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 88, at 11 & tbl.11.
116 Sorenson & Schut, supra note 89, at 5 (citing Douglas J. Wiebe, Sex Differences in 
the Perpetrator-Victim Relationship Among Emergency Department Patients Presenting 
with Nonfatal Firearm-Related Injuries, 42 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 405, 405 (2003)).
1280 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
If reports of menacing and intimidation get factored into the analysis, 
women in the general population are more likely to have been threatened by an 
intimate partner with a gun than a knife.117 Indeed, threats may constitute the 
most common type of gun use in domestic violence situations,118 and men may 
be more likely to make threats to kill than women.119 If this is so, then data on 
nonfatal injuries probably underplays both the role of firearms in domestic abuse 
and the prevalence of threats. Since victims may be more likely to acquiesce 
when a gun, instead of a less deadly weapon, is used against them, a gun-
wielding perpetrator who seeks control might not need to inflict physical 
harm.120 “[S]imply knowing that an abusive partner has access to a gun can 
signal a credible risk that instills fear regardless of whether the partner has been 
physically violent.”121 Firearm access by batterers can thus impose emotional 
and psychological injuries on women, even if they do not become shooting 
victims.
b. Structural Inequalities
In a structural sense, the “equalizer” label also distorts the role of gun 
violence in the larger arena of contestation over economic resources, social 
status, power, and authority in the family and society—an arena in which 
women and people of color occupy an unequal place. Historically, women have 
had an ambivalent relationship to guns and the Second Amendment. Linda 
Kerber explains that, “[i]n the eighteenth-century context, arms-bearing was 
both a personal right (‘the natural right of resistance and self-preservation’) and 
a personal duty (to assist ‘in the execution of the laws and the preservation of 
the public peace’).”122 Because women did not shoulder the burden of militia 
service or pursue criminals when a hue and cry was raised, their status with 
regard to arms-bearing remained unclear. James Burgh, an English political 
writer familiar to the American Revolutionaries, claimed: “He, who has nothing, 
and who himself belongs to another, must be defended by him, whose property 
he is, and needs no arms.”123
This type of thinking about the right to possess guns may have supported 
the exclusion of women, children, and slaves from Second Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
117 Sorenson & Schut, supra note 89, at 5.
118 See id. at 2.
119 See HESTER, supra note 103, at 8, 10 (finding men more often made threats and used 
violence to establish fear and control than women and, unlike women, men were arrested for 
threatening to kill their partners).
120 See id.
121 Sorenson & Schut, supra note 89, at 1 (emphasis added).
122 LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 240 (1998).
123 Id. at 238.
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guarantees.124 Colonial and state legislation from the eighteenth century through 
Reconstruction clearly aimed to prevent blacks from bearing arms.125 However, 
there is little or no evidence that any laws actually barred women (as a class) 
from having access to guns. Whether women had affirmative gun rights is a 
more clouded question. Women may have been understood to uphold the 
reciprocal obligations associated with arms-bearing rights through their 
patriotism,126 their ownership of guns for use by their militia-aged sons and 
servants,127 or their nurturance of a new generation of young boys who would 
provide military service in the future. Upholding the constitutionality of a 
concealed weapons prohibition in 1846, for example, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia stated in dicta:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not 
militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely 
as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, 
in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the 
rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the 
security of a free State.128
The ambiguity of this passage with regard to women’s right to bear arms lay in 
the tension between the court’s claim that the right belonged to the individual, 
on the one hand, and the rationale the court offered for the existence of the right, 
on the other: “rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia . . . .”129 Were 
women included in the court’s definition of “the whole people” because the 
judges literally expected women to carry guns, or simply because they were 
responsible for “rearing up” future militiamen?
Since colonial times, American women had practical access to guns to hunt 
and defend their families against wild animals and human attackers, especially 
when their husbands were absent.130 Moreover, despite feminist concerns about 
                                                                                                                     
124 However, state legislatures in the United States did not actually impose some of these 
restrictions—the prohibition on firearms purchases by minors, for example—until the late 
nineteenth century. See ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 344–45 (1997).
125 See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.
126 As late as 1928, the Supreme Court held that a fifty-year-old woman’s refusal to 
agree to bear arms in the national defense (an obligation she actually could not have fulfilled) 
provided sufficient grounds for deeming her unfit to become a naturalized citizen. See 
KERBER, supra note 122, at 246–48.
127 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW AND 
WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE 4, 7 (2006).
128 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (emphasis on “women” added). But see Lucilius 
A. Emery, The Constitutional Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 476 
(1915) (“Only persons of military capacity to bear arms in military organizations are within 
the spirit of the guaranty. Women, young boys, the blind, tramps, persons non compos 
mentis, or dissolute in habits, may be prohibited from carrying weapons.”).
129 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251 (emphasis added).
130 CRAMER, supra note 127, at 4, 7, 80, 236 (noting that female household heads were 
required to own guns in parts of colonial America). When the Royalists confiscated arms 
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the male focus of self-defense doctrine at criminal law,131 women in the past 
successfully made self-defense—and even defense of honor—arguments when 
charged with fatally shooting their husbands or lovers.132 These cases were 
decided under substantive criminal law, not provisions guaranteeing a 
constitutional right to bear arms for personal self-defense, such as the Supreme 
Court relatively recently has interpreted the Second Amendment to provide.133
But the acquittal of women charged with domestic murders in the past tends to 
indicate that courts and juries believed female victims of gender violence could 
use a gun justifiably to protect themselves.
Even so, female access to guns, including for self-defense, must be placed 
in the larger context of other legal disabilities that constrained women’s lives. 
Under the system of coverture, a wife’s legal self was subsumed by that of her 
husband: She could not enter contracts, except as her husband’s agent; hold any 
property that she did not inherit; or sue in her own name without her husband’s
concurrence and participation in the lawsuit.134 Divorces were difficult to 
                                                                                                                     
from colonial households, women complained, “What should they do if the Indians come 
upon them, being thus strip’d of men and Arms to defend them.” Id. at 80. Cramer also 
quotes an account of frontier life in Indiana during the War of 1812: “Some of [the women] 
could handle the rifle with great skill, and bring down the game in the absence of their 
husbands . . . .” Id. at 208 (quoting WILLIAM C. SMITH, INDIANA MISCELLANY 78 (Cincinnati, 
Poe & Hitchcock 1867)). A travel narrative Cramer consulted revealed that Ozark women in
the 1810s used guns to hunt. Id. at 212 (citing HENRY ROE SCHOOLCRAFT, RUDE PURSUITS 
AND RUGGED PEAKS: SCHOOLCRAFT’S OZARK JOURNAL, 1818–1819, at 55 (1996)).
131 See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
114 (2000) (“With respect to battered women who kill, gender bias pervades the entire 
criminal process. It permeates perceptions of appropriate self-defense and the legal standard 
of self-defense, the broader problem of choice of defense, and the need for expert testimony 
on battering, all of which are interrelated.”).
132 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American 
West and Australia, 1860–1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185, 236–44, 249–55 (2011) [hereinafter
Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention]. See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, A
Diva Defends Herself: Gender and Domestic Violence in an Early Twentieth-Century 
Headline Trial, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 1347 (2011) (analyzing the 1910 trial of opera singer 
Mae Talbot, who was prosecuted and acquitted of fatally shooting her husband in Reno, 
Nevada).
133 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (“[The Second Amendment]
protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to 
use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”).
134 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at 430–32 (University of Chicago Press
1979) (explaining the law of coverture); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mrs. Stanton’s Address to 
the Legislature of the State of New York (1854), in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1848–
1861, at 598–99 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., reprint ed. 1985) (describing marriage 
in nineteenth-century America as “instant civil death” for the wife, due to her legal 
disabilities); see also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 115 (2000) 
(explaining the meaning of coverture). Hartog argues that law and social conventions were 
manipulated to avoid “the plain meaning of the Blackstonian text,” but he concedes that “to 
play on the legal field of domestic relations required litigants—and their lawyers—to accept 
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obtain, and nationwide female suffrage awaited the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920.135 These disabilities collectively made it difficult for 
women to escape abusive marriages or to have a voice in civic life.136 Thus, 
invoking the Second Amendment and comparable state guarantees as a panacea 
for gender violence ignores long-standing structural inequalities that perpetuate 
women’s victimization. The use by activists and gun manufacturers of terms 
like “choice” and “empowerment” to muster female support for expansive 
Second Amendment rights displays an “unwillingness to consider, let alone 
problematize or scrutinize, patriarchal power.”137
The gun-rights movement has made efforts to accord women and minorities 
at least a token presence in Second Amendment advocacy. For example, the 
named plaintiffs in the District of Columbia v. Heller litigation initially included 
an elderly black woman, Shelly Parker, who battled to reclaim her Capitol Hill 
neighborhood from drug dealers and who wanted a gun for self-protection 
against their retaliatory violence; and a gay man, Tom Palmer, who used a 
firearm to defend himself against homophobic assailants.138 Ultimately, all but 
Dick Heller, the white security guard who unsuccessfully applied to register one 
of his personal handguns in the District, were dismissed from the suit for lack 
of standing.139 Besides these strategically chosen individuals, marginalized 
groups sometimes employ a self-defense narrative to promote gun ownership.
For example, the nonpartisan organization, Pink Pistols, advocates concealed-
carry,140 claiming that “[a]rmed queers don’t get bashed.”141 Similarly, a recent 
study analyzing the viewpoints of gun-carrying African-Americans, among 
                                                                                                                     
that starting premise of coverture: that by marriage a wife became a feme covert, a woman 
whose political and legal identity was covered by her husband, who became responsible for 
her care.” Id. at 121–22.
135 See Stanton, supra note 134, at 595–96 (describing women’s exclusion from voting 
rights in nineteenth-century America); see also HARTOG, supra note 134, at 63–64
(“Throughout the United States [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries], the law was 
dedicated to discouraging separations and divorces and to punishing those responsible.”).
136 See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 132, at 196 
(stating that women could only vote in a few states prior to 1920); id. at 215–16 (describing 
the legal and social impediments to escaping a bad marriage).
137 Mary D. Vavrus & August Leinbach, Postfeminism at the Shooting Range: 
Vulnerability and Fire-Empowerment in the Gun Women Network, in DANGEROUS 
DISCOURSES: FEMINISM, GUN VIOLENCE, & CIVIC LIFE 179, 184 (Catherine R. Squires ed., 
2016).
138 See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 43, 60, 91 (2011). The case was originally filed as Shelly Parker v. District of 
Columbia. See id. at 60. Otis McDonald, who raised a landmark constitutional challenge to 
a municipal gun law in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), was also black. 
See NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS 295–96 
(2014).
139 See WINKLER, supra note 138, at 42, 91–92.
140 See About the Pink Pistols, PINK PISTOLS, http://www.pinkpistols.org/about-the-
pink-pistols/ [https://perma.cc/TE3S-U7JK].
141 Id.
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others, in the rust belt describes how a group of black Detroit men “organized 
to ‘take back’ their communities from criminals while also contesting a police 
force they saw as simultaneously inadequate and abusive.”142
However, particularly with regard to race, the token inclusivity of pro-gun 
activism obscures a complicated relationship between the right to bear arms and 
minority communities torn by gun violence. Because the impact of gun control 
on vulnerable populations is a factor that proponents of rigorously enforced 
domestic violence firearms bans ought to consider, it is worth briefly exploring 
this fraught relationship. Laws prohibiting blacks and Indians from arming 
themselves, with certain exceptions for free householders, dated back to the 
early eighteenth century in some colonies.143 After the American Revolution, a 
handful of state constitutions in the 1700s and 1800s expressly extended gun 
rights to white men only,144 and the United States Supreme Court in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford infamously opined that it could not recognize the citizenship of 
blacks because doing so “would give to persons of the negro race . . . the right 
to . . . keep and carry arms wherever they went.”145 Before the Civil War, 
Southern slave patrols seized guns and ammunition from free and enslaved 
blacks,146 and even after the Civil War, state legislation barred African-
Americans from buying or using guns or serving in state militias.147 White 
posses, including the Ku Klux Klan, used murderous violence in an effort to 
enforce this race-based disarmament.
African-Americans have defiantly wielded firearms to resist white men’s
public and private violence for much of American history148—from the seizure 
                                                                                                                     
142 CARLSON, supra note 7, at 122–23.
143 See Verna L. Williams, Guns, Sex, and Race: The Second Amendment Through a 
Feminist Lens, 83 TENN. L. REV. 983, 995–99 (2016).
144 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 21 (“That the free white men of this State 
shall have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense.”). For similar 
constitutional provisions in other states, see FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 21; TENN. CONST.
of 1834, art. I, § 26; and TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26. It is perhaps notable that state 
constitutions extending guns rights only to white men in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries often tended to describe the purpose of arms-bearing as “the common defense,”
whereas state constitutions that spoke more generally of “citizens” or “people” included 
other purposes, such as self-defense and protection of home and property. See, e.g., COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be 
called in question . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”). For a compilation of state 
constitutional provisions from the Framing Era to the present, see generally Eugene Volokh,
Reference Materials, State Constitutional Rights To Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 191 (2006).
145 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1857). 
146 See WINKLER, supra note 138, at 133.
147 See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 168–69 (2006). 
148 Ida Wells—a female African-American leader who defied lynching, segregated 
seating on trains, and other manifestations of the Jim Crow regime—famously said: “The 
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of the courthouse in Colfax, Louisiana, in 1873 by black militia men opposing 
a fraudulent election that involved the intimidation of black voters,149 to the 
ideology of Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, who asserted, “[t]he gun is the only 
thing that will free us . . . .”150 The conspicuous arms-bearing of the Black 
Panther Party for Self-Defense and other “black nationalist” groups in the 1960s 
provoked a backlash that led to the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and 
its state law counterparts.151 Citing such examples, writers of varied 
perspectives have implied that strict firearms laws constitute tools of white 
supremacy and social control.152
                                                                                                                     
Winchester rifle deserves a place of honor in every Black home.” JOHNSON, supra note 138,
at 105–06. Yet, as this Article will briefly discuss, infra notes 153–64 and accompanying 
text, the relationship between firearms and black resistance to oppression and violent crime 
is more complex (and has involved more internal debate among African-Americans) than 
gun-rights advocacy tends to acknowledge.
149 In 1873, the black militia from Grant Parish was burned out of the courthouse and 
killed by armed whites during the so-called “Colfax Massacre,” which led to a Supreme 
Court ruling that the federal government lacked authority to prosecute the white perpetrators.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556–60 (1875). 
For further discussion of the Colfax Massacre and the Supreme Court’s Cruikshank
decision, see CORNELL, supra note 147, at 190–97. For a detailed discussion of white 
violence against black militias, including the Colfax Massacre, and the connection between 
firearms and racial oppression in the post-bellum South, see JOHNSON, supra note 138, at
100–03 (suggesting that, for blacks in the post-bellum South, armed resistance “doomed to 
failure might actually have been the best among the dreary options”); WINKLER, supra note 
138, at 143–44; and Williams, supra note 143, at 1001–21 (analyzing events like the 
Hamburg Massacre of 1876, which was precipitated by a black militia’s Independence Day 
parade through the streets of a predominantly African-American town in South Carolina). 
These narratives of conflict over blacks’ self-armament during the Reconstruction 
seek, at least indirectly, to substantiate differing views of twenty-first century judicial 
decisions about gun rights. For example, Williams argues:
[T]he hostilities sparked by Reconstruction illustrate that the right to keep and bear arms 
was integral to white hegemonic masculinity . . . . The Court’s historical narrative [in 
Heller and McDonald] turned a blind eye to this part of the [Second] Amendment’s
story. In doing so, the Court protected white patriarchal norms, and as a consequence, 
reinforced longstanding racialized and gendered subordination connected to gun 
ownership and use, as illustrated by Stand Your Ground legislation.
Williams, supra note 143, at 1021. In contrast, Johnson embraces the black tradition of arms 
and sees potential in the Second Amendment to protect the individual choice to possess a 
gun for self-defense. See JOHNSON, supra note 138, at 29, 299–300, 303, 318.
150 WINKLER, supra note 138, at 234.
151 See id. at 230–53. Other black leaders, including H. Rap Brown of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), urged blacks to arm themselves and be 
prepared to use violence. Id. at 250. Even Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., renowned for his 
peaceful approach to achieving civil rights, unsuccessfully sought a concealed-carry permit 
in 1956 after his home was fire-bombed. Id. at 235.
152 To cast doubt on gun-control measures, some proponents of strong Second 
Amendment rights describe the sordid history of racist firearms restrictions and whites’ use 
of violence to disarm and subordinate blacks. See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots 
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Yet, the racist associations of gun control do not tell the whole story. Indeed, 
the gun-control issue has divided the black community internally in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.153 As African-Americans obtained greater 
sociopolitical influence, including positions in local government, some adopted 
a stringent gun-control stance.154 For example, African-American leaders in the 
District of Columbia who passed the handgun law challenged in Heller argued 
that restricting guns was a necessary first step to end the plague of black-on-
black shootings.155 Black gun-rights proponents and crime victims, especially 
women, retorted that stripping D.C. residents of their handguns would put 
women at the mercy, not only of rapists and robbers, but also of their “nasty 
tempered husbands.”156 According to James Forman, the turn to gun control by 
African-American leaders and ordinary blacks who felt victimized by intra-
racial crime constituted “a civil rights triumph” because it arose from the sense 
                                                                                                                     
of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 23 (1995); Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Control: 
Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 370 (1994). In a different vein, 
progressive law professor Maxine Burkett exhorts scholars and others to recognize and 
attend to “the race-based implications of the gun debate.” Maxine Burkett, Much Ado 
About . . . Something Else: D.C. v. Heller, the Racialized Mythology of the Second 
Amendment, and Gun Policy Reform, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 57, 104–05 (2008). She 
argues that “[f]or the predominantly black District of Columbia . . . the choice to limit gun 
ownership, even with the understanding of gun control’s history of racial oppression, 
deserved significant judicial respect.” Id. at 104. However, a few black scholars support a 
strong, individual right to bear arms for self-defense. Nicholas Johnson argues, for example:
Empirically it is far from obvious that the Parker/McDonald class [i.e. law-abiding 
black citizens] is better off disarmed. So it seems fair to give them the option. But choice 
also resonates beyond cold empirical assessment. As a matter of long practice and 
policy, the black tradition of arms respected, indeed, exalted, the self-defense interest 
of individual black people.
JOHNSON, supra note 138, at 318.
153 James Forman shows how the struggle for gun control in the District of Columbia 
divided black residents and black civic leaders in the 1970s. See JAMES FORMAN, JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 47–77 (2017). He also 
describes the support of black judges, municipal officials, police officers, and prosecutors 
for incarceration and mandatory minimum sentencing for firearms offenses. See id. at 3–6, 
60–61, 114, 206–07. According to Forman, “many of these voices would propel, not 
constrain, an emerging tough-on-crime movement” that contributed to the mass incarceration 
of African-Americans. Id. at 115. Besides Forman’s nuanced discussion of conflict within 
the black community over gun control, other African-American academics cited in this 
Article espouse heterogeneous perspectives on America’s firearms conundrum. See supra
notes 149, 152 (presenting the views of Verna Williams, Maxine Burkett, and Nicholas 
Johnson). 
154 See FORMAN, supra note 153, at 56 (describing black City Councilman John Wilson’s
successful campaign for strict gun control in the District of Columbia).
155 See id. at 63.
156 Id. at 72.
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that black-on-black street violence now posed a greater threat than white racist 
attacks.157
However, women of color’s need to defend themselves against intimate-
partner violence complicates this picture. Black and Native American women 
historically were, and still are, vulnerable to being shot to death by their 
husbands or lovers. In the nineteenth century, spousal murder rates for blacks 
surpassed those for whites, as the experience of poverty and racial 
discrimination fueled marital tensions.158 This trend continued between the 
World Wars.159 The tendency of African-American women to use force in self-
defense probably escalated marital violence and increased the intimate homicide 
rate for the black population.160 Domestic homicide rates for Native Americans 
were also high in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.161 In more recent 
times, data from 2003 to 2012 showed higher nonfatal domestic violence rates 
for blacks than any other racial group.162
The NRA has never fully embraced women (or men) of color.163 Despite 
the instrumentality to gun-rights advocates of the connection between gun 
control and race-based oppression, the implicit and explicit cultural association 
of African-Americans with criminality gives the NRA’s personal self-defense 
                                                                                                                     
157 Id. at 72–73.
158 See ROTH, supra note 107, at 271–72.
159 See LANE, supra note 124, at 230, 233 (noting that blacks carried firearms for 
protection against whites, but those guns were “turned too often against family and friends”).
160 See id. at 233; ROTH, supra note 107, at 272. See supra note 92 and accompanying 
text (discussing how homicide statistics often obscure whether the killing was done in self-
defense); infra note 205 and accompanying text (addressing the same issue).
161 See ROTH, supra note 107, at 108, 128, 276.
162 TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 88, at 11 & tbl.11 (“In 2003–12, non-Hispanic 
blacks (4.7 per 1,000) and non-Hispanic persons of two or more races (16.5 per 1,000) had 
the highest rates of intimate partner violence compared, to non-Hispanic whites (3.9 per 
1,000) . . . .”). According to evidence from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, the 
proportion of black females killed by an intimate is more comparable to that for white 
women. In 2008, the domestic murder of black females constituted 43% of all homicides of 
black women for which the victim-offender relationships was known. The intimate homicide 
of white women averaged 43% of killings of white women from 1980 to 2008. COOPER &
SMITH, supra note 110, at 18.
163 For example, the NRA sparked fury with its “near silence” about the fatal shooting 
of black motorist Philando Castile, who informed police officers during a traffic stop that he 
had a firearm (for which he had a valid permit) in his car. See Avi Selk, Guns Owners Are 
Outraged by the Philando Castile Case. The NRA Is Silent., WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/18/some-gun-owners-are-
disturbed-by-the-philando-castile-verdict-the-nra-is-silent/?utm_term=.80ffed9d0a2c 
[https://perma.cc/8RK2-ZDA5].
“We don’t want the NRA to be just for old white guys,” a member of the gun group 
wrote . . . on Hot Air—one of several right-leaning outlets upset with the organization’s
failure to speak out on Castile. “[The NRA] needs to represent everyone who supports 
and defends the Second Amendment and stays on the right side of the law.”
Id.
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platform a racially-loaded character. The NRA Women website and other pro-
gun media outlets contain few, if any, profiles of blacks or other minority 
women among their “armed and fabulous” female gun owners.164 In American 
society in general, racial stereotypes continue to stigmatize black females (and 
males) as blameworthy and prone to violence.165
This does not mean that gun control is the obvious answer to curb either 
violent street crime or domestic abuse. As Part IV.C will explain, gun-control 
measures passed in service of punishing and preventing intimate-partner 
homicide likely have a disproportionate impact on black and Hispanic 
communities. This effect would be exacerbated if broader laws and stricter 
enforcement became the norm. Unfortunately, neither racial minorities, nor 
women in general, nor women of color especially, can always count on the 
government for protection. Any safety the state offers seems to come at a cost 
to autonomy. Like other mandatory criminal justice approaches to domestic 
violence, gun control does not offer an easy, unproblematic solution. Before 
turning to the costs to abuse victims, families, and vulnerable communities that 
would accompany a more rigorous system of disarming domestic violence 
offenders, Part III will unpack some of the paradigms on which the gun-control 
position relies.
III. THE PARADIGM OF THE BATTERER IN ARGUMENTS FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE GUN CONTROL
When Senator Frank Lautenberg proposed an amendment to the federal Gun 
Control Act to prohibit persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence from possessing a firearm, as well as the sale or transfer of a firearm 
to such persons,166 he asserted that “the difference between a murdered wife and 
a battered wife is often the presence of a gun.”167 Quantitative research tends to 
confirm that gun access is a significant risk factor for intimate-partner 
homicide.168 But the image of the helpless battered woman, doomed to become 
a fatal shooting victim without government measures to keep firearms away 
from her abuser, comes with dangers and disadvantages, as well as presumably 
good intentions.
The internal critique of domestic violence law and policy within feminist 
scholarship is, by now, well-known.169 Concern about the construction of a 
                                                                                                                     
164 See supra note 58 (describing the homogeneity of the female profiles on the NRA 
Women website); see also Vavrus & Leinbach, supra note 137, at 191–92, 203.
165 See HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER 
ABUSE 136 (2008) (“Black women are raised in the United States with the stereotype of being 
strong, angry, and more masculine than White women . . . .”). 
166 The final version was codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) and § 922(g)(9).
167 Lininger, supra note 19, at 178 (quoting Senator Lautenberg).
168 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
169 One of the leading critics of mandatory interventions, Leigh Goodmark, argues that 
“[m]andatory policies are disempowering because they deprive women who have been 
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paradigmatic battered woman—weak, passive, and traumatized to the point of 
incapacity to make rational decisions—constitutes a key component of this 
pushback against mandatory responses to intimate-partner abuse.170 Gun 
prohibitions for domestic violence offenders add another dimension to the 
problem. If the batterer is arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor, federal law makes it a crime for him to possess a firearm, 
even if he needs one for his job, and regardless of whether the victim wanted 
that consequence to be imposed upon him.171 Laws like the Lautenberg 
Amendment thus add a layer of complexity to the crime-control framing of 
intimate-partner abuse that developed in the late twentieth century.172
Indeed, broadly speaking, criminal weapons laws are a topic that 
“complicates and subverts” expectations about the positions of left and right in 
scholarship and advocacy.173 Support for strong gun rights is a central feature 
of the Republican Party platform,174 part of the appeal of newly-elected 
President Trump to some right-wing voters,175 and a driving force in 
                                                                                                                     
battered of the ability to control their use of tools like arrest, prosecution, and mediation.”
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009); see id. at 13–
14 (criticizing hard no-drop prosecution policies for prioritizing “safety over all other aims, 
including fostering the agency of the woman who has been battered”). Goodmark and Aya 
Gruber both challenge aspects of second-wave feminism, especially the “dominance feminist 
theory” pioneered by Catharine MacKinnon, which they believe led domestic violence 
reformers to advocate punitive, mandatory laws and policies. See id. at 43–44; Aya Gruber, 
Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1371 (2013).
170 See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 76 (2008); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on 
Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 797 (2007); Gruber, supra note 169, at 1366–68, 1380; G. 
Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 241 (2005); 
Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention,
113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 584 (1999).
171 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012) (stating that the government use exemption does not 
apply to § 922(g)(9)).
172 Several scholars have expressed concern about the conservative, crime-control 
approach with which some feminists have allied. See Gruber, supra note 169, at 1330–31; 
Miccio, supra note 170, at 322. See generally Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009) (extending her “neofeminist” argument to rape law 
reform).
173 See Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2193 (2016) 
(calling attention to the racial dimension of criminal gun possession laws, which have harsh 
implications for blacks).
174 See id. at 2191–92; see also FORMAN, supra note 153, at 51.
175 During the election, President Trump presented himself as a gun-rights champion, 
and he received the NRA’s endorsement. See Reena Flores, Where Donald Trump Stands on 
Gun Control, CBS NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-donald-
trump-stands-on-gun-control/ [https://perma.cc/5A75-EF8T]. The details of his position on 
gun laws are hard to identify, as he has changed his arguments several times. However, 
broadly speaking, he seems to favor strong Second Amendment rights, including national 
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congressional politics, where the NRA has the power to defeat gun legislation, 
even after the slaughter of twenty schoolchildren and six teachers in Newtown, 
Connecticut.176 In contrast, “[s]upport for stringent gun control has become 
deeply embedded in the contemporary liberal/progressive worldview and enjoys 
an important place in the package of views generally shared by the U.S. Left.”177
Some gun-rights advocates, notably Don Kates, claim that Second Amendment 
protection of an individual right to bear arms does not extend to criminals or 
other non-virtuous persons.178 But gun-rights champions and feminist advocates 
for battered women make an uneasy alliance. From another angle, Ben Levin 
has argued that liberals and progressives ignore the impact of gun-possession 
laws on vulnerable, marginalized communities at peril to their commitment to 
racial equality.179
Such tensions make firearms prohibitions for domestic violence offenders a 
thorny issue. Perhaps for this reason, law professors and other experts writing 
about intimate-partner abuse have been wary of criticizing the Lautenberg 
Amendment, except to note problems arising from prosecutorial discretion, poor 
legislative drafting, and other failures of enforcement.180 A real danger exists, 
however, that the politics of gun control will overwhelm and distort the search 
for a sound approach to intimate-partner violence.
                                                                                                                     
concealed-carry permits, for people he deems to be law-abiding gun owners, as well as 
policies designed to get law-breakers and the mentally ill off the streets and to prevent 
individuals on terror watch lists from buying firearms. See id.; Chris Sanchez, This Is Where 
Donald Trump Stands on Gun Control, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.business
insider.com/this-is-where-donald-trump-stands-on-gun-control-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/3BBZ-
QSKL]. Although aggressive use of stop-and-frisk procedures in high-crime areas (which 
Trump supports) likely would have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities, neither 
Trump nor gun-rights advocates, with the exception of groups like Black Guns Matter and 
the National African-American Gun Association, have commented on this issue. See Igor 
Bobic & Elise Foley, Gun Rights Advocates Go Silent When Trump Wants to Frisk Black 
People, HUFFPOST (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-
gun-rights_us_57e42e32e4b0e28b2b52e4f2 [https://perma.cc/VBY3-DCPT].
176 See, e.g., Sarah Childress, How the Gun Rights Lobby Won After Newtown,
FRONTLINE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-gun-rights-
lobby-won-after-newtown/ [https://perma.cc/J4W8-86WS].
177 Levin, supra note 173, at 2215–16.
178 See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1341, 1343, 1360 (2009).
179 See Levin, supra note 173, at 2194 (arguing “people of color bear the brunt of 
enforcement” of weapons possession laws); id. at 2177–78, 2194, 2196–97, 2206, 2213 
(contending the war on guns, like the war on drugs, contributes to mass incarceration, 
employs pretextual police procedures, and has detrimental social and economic impacts).
180 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 810; Jolly, supra note 30, at 706; Lininger, supra 
note 19, at 175; see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
interpretation of the physical force requirement). See generally Melanie C. Schneider, The 
Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment and the Resulting Problems for the 
Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 505 (2008) (highlighting ambiguity in the meaning of 
the physical force and domestic relationship requirements under § 922(g)(9), prior to the 
Supreme Court’s rulings on these issues). 
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Although this Article advocates reasonable gun control, it exposes the way 
gun-control arguments in the context of domestic violence employ problematic 
stereotypes and gendered images. Gun-control rhetoric creates a sense of 
urgency, even panic, despite the fact that fatal shootings, including domestic 
killings, have declined from a late twentieth-century peak.181 The moral panic 
over guns arguably has led to the passage of laws that do little to protect abuse 
victims, or realize their preferences, yet have the potential to result in the 
incarceration of people who might never commit a fatal shooting, based solely 
on their possession of illegal weapons. Laws like § 922(g)(9) generate cultural 
backlash that inhibits their enforcement and results in retaliation against victims 
without clearly producing big reductions in intimate-partner gun violence.182
Furthermore, such laws assume a binary: a passive female victim who is 
always on the receiving end of force and a male offender who will inevitably 
use a firearm to kill her, if he isn’t prevented from possessing guns. By 
entrenching traditional associations of women with nonviolence and 
victimhood, the current approach underestimates the extent to which women are 
convicted of domestic violence offenses and thus subjected to firearms 
prohibitions. Gun-control rhetoric renders women who use force invisible; the 
potential impact of gun restrictions on them is ignored.183 Finally, the gun bans 
erroneously assume that all defendants convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanors are heterosexual, white men, despite the more heterogeneous 
reality of those subject to mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies.184
                                                                                                                     
181 COOPER & SMITH, supra note 110, at 17 (“[T]he percentage of homicides committed 
by intimate partners that involved a gun declined from 69% of all intimate homicides in 1980 
to 51% in 2008 . . . .”); ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 243035, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN
THE U.S. KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2011, at 1 (Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/hus11.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9AH-NQHE] (showing the rate of gun homicides in 
general decreased by half from 1992 to 2011); see also SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 243300, SPECIAL 
REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993–2011, at 1 (Nov. 
2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf [https://perma.cc/ S9B6-78GE] 
(“From 1994 to 2011, the rate of serious intimate partner violence declined 72% for females and 
64% for males.”). Even a recent FBI report, which shows an increase in violent crime in 2016 
over rates in 2012 and 2015, actually documents a decline from the higher violent crime rates of 
the early 2000s and the 1990s. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016: TABLE 1 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/GN55-YEVL].
182 See infra notes 218–19, 229, 519 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts III.B.1 
and III.B.2.
183 See infra Part III.A.1; see also infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
184 Ramsey, supra note 9, at 358, 373–74 (discussing the dramatic increase in female 
arrests, including women in same-sex relationships, after the advent of mandatory arrest 
laws, despite the paradigm of the batterer as a white, heterosexual male); see also Gruber, 
supra note 169, at 797–98, 798 n.243 (suggesting black and Hispanic men are 
disproportionately incarcerated for domestic violence offenses, despite the common 
assumption that most batterers are white).
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In fact, such laws can be used to target low-income and minority communities—
a facet of the problem that should trouble anyone who cares about racial equity 
and the stabilization of poor, violence-torn neighborhoods.185
To summarize: Although existing prohibitions on gun possession by 
domestic abusers are grounded in a well-meaning concern to prevent intimate-
partner homicide, they rely on multiple stereotypes that threaten to undermine 
their legitimacy and feasibility. In the subsections that follow, Part III explores 
how the paradigms of victim and offender prevalent in gun-control rhetoric 
shape firearms prohibitions related to domestic violence and undercut their 
effectiveness.
A. The Vulnerable, Unarmed Female Victim
1. The Myth that Women Don’t Fight Back
Domestic violence gun laws rely on the paradigm of the passive female 
victim: a battered woman who neither risks arrest by fighting back, nor has 
priorities that conflict with the state’s goal of confiscating her batterer’s
firearms. Feminist theorists have been reluctant either to confront or to embrace 
women’s use of physical force.186 Yet, in both the United States and England, 
arrests of female perpetrators of intimate-partner violence have increased.187
Indeed, women may be disproportionately likely to be taken into police custody, 
despite the fact that men commit more acts of abuse, including physical 
violence, threats, harassment, and damage to their partner’s property.188 While 
women are the chief victims of intimate-partner violence,189 they have the 
capacity to use force, and in one Gallup poll, almost a quarter of female survey 
participants reported possessing a gun.190 Moreover, when women engage in 
physical resistance to battering,191 they may retaliate or use preemption in ways 
that fail to satisfy self-defense doctrine.192 Their aggressive acts may also arise 
from mixed motives and emotions. Female arrestees report using force “to make 
an intimate partner listen or refrain from leaving during an argument, to regain 
self-respect . . . as a strategy in child custody battles,” and even to express anger
                                                                                                                     
185 See infra Part IV.C.
186 See Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts of 
Violence, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 293 (2016).
187 See HESTER, supra note 103, at 10; Ramsey, supra note 9, at 374, 395.
188 See HESTER, supra note 103, at 9.
189 See Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, supra note 109 (“Nearly 1 in 4 women 
(22.3%) and 1 in 7 men (14.0%) aged 18 and older in the United States have been the victim 
of severe physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.”).
190 See Saad, supra note 84.
191 See POTTER, supra note 165, at 9–10, 115–37.
192 See Mary Anne Franks, Men, Women, and Optimal Violence, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
929, 949–54 (2016); Ramsey, supra note 9, at 397.
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about physical or emotional traumas inflicted in the past by a completely 
different person.193
Advocates of toughening firearms prohibitions in the context of abuse and 
forcing prosecutors to charge batterers with qualifying predicate offenses often 
paint a sensational picture of a helpless woman slaughtered by her gun-toting 
husband, boyfriend, or former partner.194 Federal gun laws and scholarship 
about them thus risk entrenching harmful stereotypes about innocent women’s
lack of skill and determination to use firearms in self-defense195 and converse 
assumptions about monstrous females who shoot or otherwise fight their 
attackers.196
For example, when Congress made § 922(g)(9) applicable to public 
employees, including police officers, who need a gun for official government 
use, it seemed to assume that any employee stripped of his gun would be a 
batterer, not a victim (and probably a man, not a woman). But some police 
officers are abused by their partners, and they face a stark choice when they 
suffer domestic violence. One female officer, Suzanne Walton, who later 
conducted research on the effects of the federal gun ban, recalled her 
experiences when her husband hit her:
I encountered the greatest frustration when I sought advice from my mentors 
and supervisors in the police department. After explaining the situation, I 
would ask the question, “Could I have fought back?” Some of the answers I 
received demonstrated my supervisors’ confusion: “I don’t know.” “It would 
be best if you didn’t.” I was advised, “Whatever he does, don’t fight back or 
                                                                                                                     
193 Ramsey, supra note 9, at 403–04 (citing Lisa Young Larance, Serving Women Who 
Use Force in Their Intimate Heterosexual Relationships: An Extended View, 12 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 622, 628, 631 (2006)).
194 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 19, at 173–74 (describing Ronald Lee Haskell’s fatal 
shooting of his ex-wife and her relatives after his abusive marriage to her ended in divorce); 
McNamara, supra note 30, at 649–50 (recounting the tragic story of Melissa Batten, whose 
estranged husband killed her with a weapon he purchased at a gun show after he relinquished 
his other guns pursuant to a temporary restraining order).
195 See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing a California study 
claiming that women who purchased guns put themselves at more risk of being killed by 
their abusive partners).
196 Cultural stereotypes influence the evaluation of violent acts. See Sayoko Blodgett-
Ford, Note, Do Battered Women Have a Right To Bear Arms?, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
509, 553 (1993). In one study, for example, “women who competently shot a burglar were 
blamed more than women who wielded the gun incompetently and made a lucky hit.” Id. A
leading scholar on domestic violence, Elizabeth Schneider, frames the failure of women’s
self-defense arguments as an equal rights problem and argues “[t]he equal-rights problem 
for battered women who kill has many sources: [including] widespread views of women who 
act violently, particularly against intimates, as ‘monsters.’” SCHNEIDER, supra note 131, at 
113.
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you’ll lose your gun.” This shocked me. They essentially told me, a victim of 
domestic violence, that I could not defend myself or I would lose my job.197
Walton’s study, which was based on self-reporting, showed a 25% rate of 
claimed victimization among police officers.198 It also indicated that the federal 
gun ban was more likely to influence the behavior of victimized officers, who 
were afraid to act in self-defense, than of abusive officers.199
Negative reactions to the scenario of a police officer acting in self-defense 
when her husband hits her find parallels in prevalent attitudes toward civilian 
victims. For example, grant funding through VAWA and other sources has 
rarely extended to self-defense instruction, in part because physical resistance 
is still perceived as “highly threatening, for what it implies about women’s
autonomy and the prevalence and degree of violence in our society.”200 We lack 
sufficient data on how often women use weapons, and whether such uses occur 
in self-defense, to know how detrimental the impact of rigorously-enforced 
domestic violence gun bans on self-defending women might be. One study 
established that, although a group of shelter women (most of whom were racial 
minorities) rarely self-reported using guns against their intimate partners, about 
one-third had considered it.201 Other researchers have actually found a higher 
likelihood that a woman will use a gun against a male partner than vice versa.202
Such conclusions are necessarily tentative. Studies of female-perpetrated 
violence based on police reports may be distorted by the possibility that “male 
victims [are] more reticent to involve law enforcement than females, but are 
more likely to call the police when their female perpetrator uses a weapon.”203
Abusers also manipulate mandatory arrest laws by summoning law enforcers as 
a strategy to harass and intimidate resisting victims.204 Another complicating 
                                                                                                                     
197 Suzanne Walton & Mark Zelig, “Whatever He Does, Don’t Fight Back or You’ll
Lose Your Gun”: Strategies Police Officer Victims Use to Cope with Spousal Abuse, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 365, 366 (Donald C. Sheehan ed., 2000).
198 Id. at 367.
199 See id.
200 Lisa R. Hasday, What the Violence Against Women Act Forgot: A Call for Women’s
Self-Defense, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 178, 189 (2001).
201 Sorenson & Wiebe, supra note 89, at 1415 (stating that the main reasons for thinking 
about gun use included self-defense (20.8%), to kill (18.2%), to threaten or intimidate 
(6.5%), and to injure but not kill the batterer (5.2%)). Another 18% kept guns to defend 
themselves against stranger intruders. Id.
202 See Kernsmith & Craun, supra note 103, at 594; see also Cook, supra note 111, at 
66, 71.
203 See Kernsmith & Craun, supra note 103, at 594.
204 See POTTER, supra note 165, at 131–32 (quoting an African-American woman’s story 
about how her physically abusive boyfriend called the police when she responded to being 
hit and thrown into a rosebush by beating him with wooden-soled sandals); Ramsey, supra
note 9, at 409 (noting that mandatory arrest, dual arrest, and primary aggressor policies often 
backfire in cases of lesbian partner violence). An abuser can also exploit a battered 
immigrant woman’s fear of deportation to coerce and control her. See Mariela Olivares, 
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factor is that statistics on gun homicides often fail to break down the numbers 
in a way that reveals the sex of the perpetrator or whether the shooting occurred 
in self-defense.205 Studies focused solely on gun homicide also fail to capture 
victims’ nonfatal use of guns to deter a severe assault.206
In short, a stringent regime of domestic violence law enforcement, featuring 
stricter and broader gun bans, might have a punitive impact on women who 
resort to force, even to a minimal degree, as a means of self-help or who act 
aggressively for other sympathetic reasons. It would require such abuse 
survivors to relinquish their firearms and rely solely on government institutions 
(i.e. police, prosecutors, and courts) and non-profit service providers to protect 
and advocate for them. This is a strategy that some abused women, especially 
women of color, might want to avoid.207 Although proponents of sweeping gun 
control for domestic violence offenders are perhaps willing to gamble that 
abused women will not lose their firearms and suffer other punitive 
consequences, discussions in this area would benefit from a candid 
acknowledgement that women, as well as men, use force, get served with 
restraining orders, and are convicted of qualifying misdemeanors. We shall 
delve deeper into this issue in Part II.B.
2. The Role of Victim Preferences
Many, but not all, abused women want the government to take away their 
partner’s guns. For example, in a study of seventeen women who obtained 
temporary restraining orders for domestic abuse in a pilot program in San Mateo 
County, California, eleven cases involved an express request for gun 
confiscation or surrender. However, five of the women did not make this 
request, which they explained by reference to fear (two of the women), 
                                                                                                                     
Battered by Law: The Political Subordination of Immigrant Women, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 
238 (2014).
205 A couple of student researchers perceptively noted this deficiency in the 1990s. See
Blodgett-Ford, supra note 196, at 534–38; Inge Anna Larish, Note, Why Annie Can’t Get 
Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 507 
(1996). Justifiable homicides arguably continue to be undercounted today, whether the crime 
defended against is intimate-partner violence or some other kind of threat. See Cramer, supra
note 92, at 507–08. A focus on justifiable homicide may also underestimate the defensive 
use of guns because such use can thwart crime without resulting in a homicide. See id. at 
511–13.
206 Blodgett-Ford, supra note 196, at 534–36. From a gun-rights perspective, Cramer 
suggests that a better measure of defensive gun use would be “crimes prevented,” rather than 
“dead criminals.” Cramer, supra note 92, at 512.
207 Potter states, “[T]here has been an increase in arrests of women victims of intimate 
partner abuse, and, as demonstrated by the stories of the women in my study, stereotypical 
images (such as that of the ‘angry Black woman’) reinforce this practice.” POTTER, supra
note 165, at 6; see also Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material 
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1041–50 (2000) 
(explaining how, “[f]or some poor women of color, the risks of arrest encouraging policies 
may outweigh the potential benefits”).
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uncertainty about whether the abuser actually had a gun (one woman), and 
“wanting the restrained person to be able to keep his job as an armed security 
guard” (one woman); the fifth woman did not provide a reason for not wanting 
her partner’s guns removed.208 Six women in the study chose not to seek a more 
permanent protection order.209 Their reasons included reconciliation with their 
partner and “not wanting to further disrupt the restrained person’s life.”210
About one-third of the petitioners seemed to desire only temporary state 
intervention, which suggests that permanent weapons removal was not one of 
their primary goals.211 Furthermore, just a small minority (three) of the 
seventeen women reported being attacked or threatened with a gun in the six 
months preceding the issuance of the restraining order.212
The previous subsection emphasized that battered women sometimes 
respond to abuse with force, including the use of a firearm.213 Qualitative studies 
indicate that female victims also believe that women ought to be able to possess 
guns to protect themselves in violent relationships and after separation, even if 
they personally would not want a gun in the house. For example, the study by 
Kelly Lynch and T.K. Logan discussed in Part II indicates that many battered 
women fear an abuser might turn a firearm against them or their children.214 But 
Lynch and Logan’s results also reflect a strong belief on the part of the interview 
subjects in a constitutional right to bear arms or “a woman’s right to protect 
herself.”215 Some participants affirmatively stated that women ought to learn 
how to use a firearm for self-defense and receive proper instruction on shooting 
and gun safety.216 Several of the female interview subjects even complained that 
being barred from gun possession due to convictions or pending criminal 
charges hindered them from protecting themselves.217
Furthermore, while many participants in the Lynch and Logan study 
believed that guns in the hands of their abusers might result in murder, they also 
feared that government confiscation of firearms would lead to retaliatory 
violence. Both the victim’s own effort to remove guns from the home and a call 
                                                                                                                     
208 Katherine A. Vittes et al., Removing Guns from Batterers: Findings from a Pilot 
Survey of Domestic Violence Restraining Order Recipients in California, 19 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 602, 609 (2013).
209 Id. at 610–11.
210 Id.
211 See id. at 612.
212 See id. at 608. The most common type of physical abuse the women experienced in 
the six months prior to obtaining a temporary order was not inflicted with a gun but, rather, 
involved pushing, shoving, and grabbing. See id.
213 See supra Part III.A.1. Potter’s qualitative sociological findings based on interviews 
with forty battered black women indicated that black women often engage in physical 
resistance, see POTTER, supra note 165, at 115–37, or at least perceive themselves as the type 
of strong woman who would fight back. See id. at 27–55.
214 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
215 Lynch & Logan, supra note 98, at 12. 
216 See id. at 13.
217 See id. at 12.
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to the police to get them confiscated posed the frightening scenario of lethal 
payback.218 Some women also worried that they would face negative social 
consequences in communities in which many residents were gun collectors.219
Thus, although the majority of the women in the study thought that male 
batterers should lose their gun rights,220 several participants denied that the 
government was entitled to remove all firearms from the home over a female 
abuse victim’s objection.221 Indeed, several opined that gun removal should not 
be mandatory when a woman seeks a protection order.222
Finally, Lynch and Logan’s study of restraining order cases fails to capture 
an additional set of concerns—those raised by § 922(g)(9). First, unlike a civil 
restraining order, for which an abuse victim applies, a misdemeanor conviction 
or a guilty plea to a qualifying predicate offense automatically triggers a long-
term federal gun prohibition, regardless of whether the victim desired it. For 
example, in United States v. Carter,223 the defendant had been convicted under 
Maine’s general assault statute for shoving and spitting at his live-in girlfriend, 
even though his girlfriend “said that she was not hurt, did not want Carter 
arrested, and did not want to press charges; she only wanted him removed from 
the house.”224 Carter was subsequently charged with a § 922(g)(9) offense when 
he tried to buy back a pawned rifle.225 After entering a conditional guilty plea, 
he was sentenced to one year and one day in prison—a relatively lenient
punishment that resulted from the judge’s departure below the bottom of the 
guidelines range.226 In short, even though Carter’s prison term was short, neither 
                                                                                                                     
218 See id. at 15 (reporting some interviewees’ fear that government confiscation of the 
gun might “make an abuser much angrier and put a woman’s life in danger”). Study 
participants also tended to believe that any action the abuse victim took to hide her abuser’s
firearms and bullets herself would likely result in physical harm or even death. See id. at 11 
(“[T]hey’re going to come back and say, ‘where’s my gun?’, and beat the crap out of you 
because you got rid of the gun.”). Several women in the study commented on the possible 
futility of mandated gun restrictions in protection orders. For example, one interviewee said, 
“I think these men that never honored a DVO or EPO, why would they honor the gun part?”
Id. at 15. Another argued more forcefully that trying to confiscate the abuser’s guns under a 
protection order “would be the time he would kill her.” Id.
219 See id. at 16.
220 See id. at 14.
221 Lynch & Logan, supra note 98, at 15–16.
222 See id.
223 United States v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017) 
(holding that conviction was proper but remanding for reconsideration of sentencing issue).
224 Id. at 10–11. 
225 See id.
226 See id. at 11–12. Nevertheless, the case went “around the barn and back” while the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014), and Voisine v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). Carter, 860 F.3d at 42–43. Carter continued to 
challenge his sentence even after he had served his prison term on the grounds that he should 
have qualified for “a substantially lower guidelines sentencing range based on . . . the 
‘“sporting purposes or collection” exception.’” Id. at 43.
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his sentence nor his prior assault conviction was a result that his girlfriend 
sought.
A second key difference between a gun disability arising from a DVRO and 
the potentially perpetual ban for domestic violence misdemeanants under 
federal law is that the latter contains no exemption for guns required for 
government jobs, such as police and military.227 The misdemeanor gun 
prohibition might have a serious financial impact on affected families, as we 
shall see.228 Knowing that her partner could be stripped of the gun he needs for 
his job, the abused spouse or girlfriend of a police officer often decides not to 
call the police;229 at the very least, it is a consequence she should consider, since 
unemployment and poverty both constitute risk factors for domestic violence.230
B. Gun Possession and the Stereotype of the Inevitably Homicidal, Male 
Abuser
In addition to stereotyping and infantilizing abuse victims, the extant 
firearms restrictions pigeonhole domestic violence offenders and obfuscate the 
complex relationship between gun access and intimate-partner violence. The 
federal courts’ uncritical adoption of the paradigm of the inevitably homicidal 
male abuser and his helpless victim has affirmed ineffective laws that ought to 
be reformed. Several areas of concern are the scope of the prohibitions and their
potential to reduce the risk of harm. Federal court holdings arguably stem from 
stereotypes about who poses a risk of lethal domestic gun violence; whether the 
exclusion of people in this category from gun rights can be analogized to bans 
with historical roots; and how long excluded persons should be barred from
possessing and purchasing firearms.
1. The Batterer Paradigm in Constitutional Analysis
All of the federal circuits that have heard Second Amendment challenges to 
§ 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) have upheld these federal gun prohibitions. A few 
federal circuit courts have concluded, with little or no reliance on history or 
                                                                                                                     
227 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012) (stating that the government use exemption does 
not apply to § 922(g)(9)).
228 See infra Part IV.B.2.
229 See Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police 
Officers Who Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183, 1204 (2015). 
Goodmark calls § 922(g)(9) “a powerful disincentive to report abuse.” Id. at 1204; see also 
infra Part IV.B.2.
230 See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal 
and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 686 (1992) (finding that 
arrest correlated to a 53.5% increase in recidivist violence among unmarried and unemployed 
batterers, in contrast to a reduction in repeat offending by married and employed batterers); 
see also SAMPSON, supra note 35, at 14 (noting that being low-income and a resident of rental 
housing are factors associated with high rates of domestic violence victimization); infra Part 
IV.B.2 (discussing employment-related impacts of domestic violence gun laws).
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social scientific evidence, that § 922(g)(9) fits under Heller’s non-exhaustive 
list of presumptively lawful, “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms” by certain categories of irresponsible individuals, including felons.231
They simply employed the logic that the Lautenberg Amendment sought to 
close a loophole created by widespread reluctance to charge batterers with 
felonies.232 Hence, those who commit misdemeanor crimes of domestic 
violence can be analogized to felons for the purposes of Second Amendment 
analysis.
In contrast, most federal circuit courts to address the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(9) have applied intermediate scrutiny,233 using a two-step inquiry.234
First, the court asks whether the restriction implicates the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.235 Because the gun laws at issue 
burden Second Amendment rights, the court next evaluates the restriction under 
some form of means-ends review.236 Domestic violence misdemeanants are not 
“law-abiding, responsible citizens,” so their claims are not within the core of 
Second Amendment protection; hence, courts have applied intermediate (rather 
than strict) scrutiny.237 Section 922(g)(9) imposes a “substantial” burden on the 
right to bear arms, although courts have been skeptical that it really is a total 
“lifetime ban.”238 However, analyzing this law under the middle tier of scrutiny, 
federal appellate courts have concluded that reducing domestic gun violence
constitutes an important governmental objective to which the firearms disability 
bears a substantial relation.239
                                                                                                                     
231 See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010); In re United 
States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”).
232 See, e.g., White, 593 F.3d at 1205 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 
(2009)); see also 142 CONG. REC. 22,985 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
233 See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also
United States v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 
25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Donovan, 410 F. App’x 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2011).
234 See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating the majority of 
circuits use a two-step inquiry in Second Amendment cases).
235 United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United 
States v. Chester (Chester II), 628 F.3d 673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010)).
236 Chovan, 736 F.3d at 1136–37; Chester II, 628 F.3d at 680.
237 Chester II, 628 F.3d at 683; see also Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137–38 (quoting District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). The Supreme Court did not specify the 
appropriate tier of scrutiny in Heller but indicated that rational basis was not the appropriate 
standard. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. Multiple circuits, including the Ninth Circuit in 
Chovan, have held that § 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment, applying 
intermediate scrutiny. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136 (following the First, Fourth, and 
Seventh circuits).
238 See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing whether § 922(g)(9) should be considered a 
permanent ban).
239 See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139; United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 
2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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Decisions that uphold the constitutionality of the DVRO gun prohibition,
§ 922(g)(8), have taken a similar approach.240 Despite asserting that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms, the Fifth Circuit, in its 
pre-Heller decision United States v. Emerson,241 held that Emerson fell into a 
class of irresponsible people, including felons and the mentally ill, who could 
be barred from possessing guns, because he “posed a credible threat to the 
physical safety of his wife.”242 According to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he nexus 
between firearm possession by [Emerson] and the threat of lawless violence, is 
sufficient, though likely barely so, to support the deprivation, while the order 
remains in effect, of the enjoined party’s Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms.”243
Significantly, many federal circuit courts have relied on a particular 
paradigm of the domestic violence offender to find a substantial relation 
between § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) and the objective of preventing “armed 
mayhem.”244 For example, after analogizing domestic violence misdemeanants 
to felons, the Seventh Circuit stated in United States v. Skoien that “firearms are
deadly in domestic strife,” and “persons convicted of domestic violence are 
likely to offend again.”245 The court thus linked a couple of disparate sets of 
statistics (the lethality of guns and the likelihood of domestic violence 
recidivism) to depict all domestic violence misdemeanants as men with a high 
likelihood of committing a fatal shooting.246 Several other circuits have relied 
on Skoien and the types of data that the government and the Skoien court 
cited.247 If one accepts that intermediate scrutiny is the correct tier of review, 
such social scientific evidence is probably enough to show a substantial relation 
between both § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) and the objective of preventing fatal 
shootings in intimate and family relationships.
                                                                                                                     
240 Compare United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225–26, 231 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(using a two-part test and intermediate scrutiny to uphold § 922(g)(8) against an as-applied 
Second Amendment challenge), and United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–05 (10th Cir. 
2010) (holding that, as applied to Reese, § 922(g)(8) passed constitutional muster under 
intermediate scrutiny using a two-step analysis), rev’d, 559 F. App’x 777 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(overturning Reese’s conviction on other grounds), with United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 
1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011) (analogizing § 922(g)(8) to gun-control regulations that the 
Heller Court found presumptively lawful and finding § 922(g)(8) consistent with “a
common-law tradition that permits restrictions directed at citizens who are not law-abiding 
and responsible”).
241 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
242 See id. at 226 n.21, 260–61, 264.
243 Id. at 264.
244 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642; see also Chapman, 666 F.3d at 228–31.
245 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643.
246 See id.at 643–44.
247 See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 163–68 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25–
26 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801–04 (10th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 559 
F. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (overturned on other grounds); see also Chapman, 666 F.3d 
at 228–31 (upholding § 922(g)(8) on the basis of similar social-scientific data).
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But in their eagerness to secure the constitutionality of these gun 
prohibitions, lawyers and domestic violence experts have swept from view the 
cases that do not fit the paradigm. And by adopting the binary of the homicidal 
male offender and the passive victim at the level of constitutional jurisprudence, 
courts have given their imprimatur to that erasure. Indeed, the majority opinion 
in Skoien also employed the stereotype of the helpless, beaten woman to 
underscore the need for state intervention to prohibit batterers from possessing 
guns. At one point in its analysis, for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
abused women are often “willing to forgive the aggressors” or are “so terrified 
that they doubt the ability of the police to protect their safety.”248 The reluctance 
of victims to cooperate with police and prosecutors means that “many 
aggressors end up with no conviction, or a misdemeanor conviction, when 
similar violence against a stranger would produce a felony conviction.”249
Hence, courts and police have authority to take the abuser’s guns, even if the 
woman, who has lost any agency of her own, tries to object.
Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from 
Second Amendment protection appears rather thin. Though spousal violence 
was illegal in Puritan New England and nineteenth-century America, typical 
colonial punishments included whipping and the stocks; wife beaters in the 
1800s and early 1900s often served short jail terms, paid substantial fines, or 
both.250 Judges in this time period were more likely to confiscate a wife beater’s
liquor than his guns.251 However, circuit courts have reasoned by analogy to the 
dicta in Heller about the “longstanding” exclusion of felons from Second 
Amendment protection—a development that seems to date from the early- to
mid-twentieth century, not from the eighteenth or even the nineteenth.252 In 
short, neither the Heller majority nor federal appellate judges subsequently 
                                                                                                                     
248 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643.
249 Id.
250 See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 132, at 199–204, 
206–08, 216–20; Ramsey, supra note 9, at 346–47.
251 See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 352–53.
252 According to one researcher who has traced this history: 
The federal “felon” disability . . . is less than fifty years old. A disability from all such 
persons’ receiving any firearm in interstate commerce dates to a 1961 amendment of 
the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (“FFA”). Congress in 1968, using the same standard, 
banned possession and extended the prohibition on receipt to include any firearm that 
ever had traveled in interstate commerce.
C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
695, 698 (2009). The original FFA of the 1930s (supported by NRA President Karl T. 
Frederick) only covered offenders who had been convicted of a crime of violence, defined 
as “murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking, and certain 
forms of aggravated assault.” Id. at 699, 707. Derived from the Uniform Firearms Act, which 
eleven jurisdictions adopted in 1930, the FFA applied to all types of firearms and sought to 
“eliminate the gun from the crooks’ hands, while interfering as little as possible with the law-
abiding citizen.” Id. at 699; see also id. at 700, 705. The rise in violent crime during 
Prohibition probably spurred this development. See id. at 701.
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upholding § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) have insisted on much historical 
evidence to support carving out certain categories of individuals for exclusion 
from core Second Amendment protection. Instead, circuit courts have focused 
on the danger of harm that gun possession by batterers creates.253 Some 
sympathetic defendants whose past offenses suggest little risk of future lethality 
and/or who have remained nonviolent for many years after committing a 
domestic violence misdemeanor might have grounds for as-applied challenges. 
Yet such claims have not gained traction.254
Although multiple circuits have upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), 
the scope and potential duration of the ban it imposes should raise concerns 
about its soundness as a matter of domestic violence law and policy. Courts and 
commentators have not given adequate consideration to the costs that zealous 
enforcement of this prohibition might have on defendants, abuse victims and 
their families, and vulnerable, minority communities. In questioning the highly 
punitive approach to § 922(g)(9) and complementary state laws that other 
scholars recommend,255 I stop short of arguing that these gun bans violate the 
Second Amendment. I favor reforming, not abolishing, firearms restrictions for 
domestic abusers. Yet, unfortunately, circuit courts upholding § 922(g)(8) and 
§ 922(g)(9) have used reasoning that further cements victim/offender 
stereotypes, which reduce the positive impact of the gun laws and exacerbate 
backlash.
                                                                                                                     
253 See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1487–
98 (2009) (discussing the “scope” and “danger reduction” justifications that legislatures and 
appellate courts use to deny or burden the Second Amendment rights of untrustworthy 
people).
254 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying 
appellant’s “as applied” challenge to § 922(g)(9) when his qualifying misdemeanor occurred 
fifteen years before and he had no subsequent domestic violence convictions); United States 
v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 581–83, 597–98 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (denying an “as applied”
challenge to § 922(g)(9) by a male defendant with three prior domestic violence convictions, 
none involving the use of a firearm, who tried to become the registered owner of a shotgun 
that his girlfriend had given him for Christmas), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 357, 359 (4th Cir. 2012). 
The Ninth Circuit also recently upheld a California state law that imposed a ten-year gun ban 
on domestic violence misdemeanants against facial and “as applied” Second Amendment 
challenges by a private security guard. See Fortson v. L.A. City Attorney’s Office, 852 F.3d 
1190, 1191–92, 1194 (9th Cir. 2017). In Fortson’s case, a sentencing judge had modified his 
sentence to allow him to keep firearms for use at work. Id. at 1192. The challenged seizure 
of firearms and ammunition instead occurred at his home. Id. at 1192–93. Cf. United States 
v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting an “as applied” challenge to
§ 922(g)(8) by an appellant who possessed six firearms and threatened to kill himself in his 
ex-wife’s presence while he was subject to a DVRO).
255 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (summarizing other scholars’ 
criticisms of the laxity of domestic violence gun laws and their enforcement).
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2. The Batterer Paradigm and the Scope of Gun Prohibitions
The Supreme Court recently adopted a broad interpretation of 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” the predicate offense that triggers
§ 922(g)(9).256 In doing so, it also relied on the model of coercive control 
developed by scholars and other well-meaning opponents of violence against 
women. For example, in United States v. Castleman, the Court adopted the 
common-law definition of force—“offensive touching”—as the meaning 
incorporated in § 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.”257 The Castleman opinion is notable for the extent to which 
it accepts the paradigm of the inevitably homicidal, gun-carrying male abuser. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor asserted that there are “hundreds of 
deaths from domestic violence each year” and that “[d]omestic violence often 
escalates in severity over time.”258 The majority also cited familiar statistics 
about how “the presence of a firearm increases the likelihood that [domestic 
violence] will escalate to homicide.”259 The Court then turned to the patterned 
nature of abuse as grounds for declining to require a violent offense to trigger 
the § 922(g)(9) gun prohibition. Rejecting Castleman’s claim that “force” must 
include violence, the majority argued, “‘Domestic violence’ is not merely a type 
of ‘violence’; it is a term of art encompassing acts that one might not 
characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context.”260 Because intimate-partner 
abuse is comprised of a pattern of coercive behavior, “the accumulation of such 
acts over time can subject one intimate partner to the other’s control.”261
The following year, in Voisine v. United States, the Court interpreted the 
phrase “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for the purposes of
§ 922(g)(9) to include reckless, as well as intentional or knowing, assaults.262
Because “the word ‘use’ does not demand that the person applying the force 
have the purpose or practical certainty that it will cause harm,”263 someone who 
throws a plate at a wall, causing injury to his or her partner, or slams a door, 
inadvertently spraining his or her partner’s finger, has committed a qualifying 
predicate offense.264 This activates the potentially perpetual federal gun 
                                                                                                                     
256 See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2280, 2282 (2016); United States v. 
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 (2014).
257 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410.
258 Id. at 1408.
259 Id. at 1408–09 (citing Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner 
Homicide, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Nov. 2003, at 14, 16 (“When a gun was in the house, an 
abused woman was 6 times more likely than other abused women to be killed.”)).
260 Id. at 1411 (citing Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/EQD2-VBBX] (defining physical forms of domestic 
violence to include relatively minor acts like “[h]itting, slapping, shoving, grabbing, 
pinching, biting, [and] hair pulling”)).
261 Id. at 1412.
262 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2280, 2282 (2016).
263 See id. at 2279.
264 See id.
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disability. My use of the awkward phrase “his or her” is quite deliberate: such a 
conviction could just as easily be obtained against a woman as a man.
Justice Scalia went too far in his Castleman concurrence when he argued 
that extending the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to 
encompass virtually any harm inflicted upon a woman by her intimate partner 
would render the phrase meaningless and absurd. “When everything is domestic 
violence,” he wrote, “nothing is.”265 But Scalia’s overstatement contains an 
important kernel of caution against the overbroad imposition of punitive 
consequences on persons convicted of minor offenses associated with domestic 
abuse. Much good scholarship describes the role of less severe violence (as well 
as psychological, economic, and other forms of coercion) in a pattern that may 
eventually result in murder.266 Journalistic reports also hint at possible links 
between intimate terrorism, misogynistic or homophobic gender violence, and 
the mass shooting of strangers.267 For example, Omar Mateen allegedly engaged 
in a pattern of financial control, isolation, and severe beating of his wife before 
                                                                                                                     
265 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1420–21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
266 See, e.g., Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/ Men 
Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 93–94 (1992) (“[T]he majority of men 
who kill their wives have a documented history of violent assaults . . . . [M]en who kill and 
men who batter have remarkably similar personality traits and similar motivations.”); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century: 
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 356 (2008) (“We now have a far 
more extensive understanding of forms of abuse that go beyond physical abuse. The core 
concept is the exercise of power and control, for domestic violence involves a wide range of 
behaviors including physical abuse, verbal abuse, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, coercion, 
and economic control.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of 
Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 
961 (2004) (“Domestic violence is generally understood—outside the criminal law—as
patterned in nature and largely defined by non-physical manifestations of domination.”).
267 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, What Do Many Mass Shooters Have in Common? A History 
of Domestic Violence, WASH. POST (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/06/15/what-do-many-mass-shooters-have-in-common-a-history-of-
domestic-violence/?utm_term=.ee2e5d223fad [https://perma.cc/5YMQ-R925]; Jane Mayer, The 
Link Between Domestic Violence and Mass Shootings, NEW YORKER (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-link-between-domestic-violence-and-mass-
shootings-james-hodgkinson-steve-scalise [https://perma.cc/RT6P-4EX3]; Amanda Taub, 
Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in Common, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/world/americas/control-and-fear-
what-mass-killings-and-domestic-violence-have-in-common.html [https://perma.cc/E4K5-
KT8A]. Most sources that make the connection between domestic violence and mass 
shootings are journalistic. Charlotte Alter, Why So Many Mass Shooters Have Domestic 
Violence in Their Past, TIME (June 14, 2017), http://time.com/4818506/james-hodgkinson-
virginia-shooting-steve-scalise/ [https://perma.cc/E44N-R5ZJ] (quoting Susan B. Sorenson, 
an expert from the University of Pennsylvania who studies firearms and domestic violence, 
for the caution that no published academic research has established a firm link between 
domestic violence and mass shootings). News reports indicate that relatively few mass 
shootings involve domestic abusers as perpetrators, but that when they do, the incident tends 
to be more lethal. See Beckett, supra note 81.
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he massacred forty-nine people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.268
However, recent research indicates that there are other types of intimate-partner 
conflict, besides intimate terrorism, as well as various categories of abusers, 
some of whom might never employ lethal force against their intimate partner or 
any law-abiding person. The different models are not mutually exclusive.269
Indeed, the one-size-fits-all paradigm of the “batterer” employed by 
advocates of mandatory criminal justice responses to domestic violence is now 
being questioned. The iconic narrative of inevitably escalating abuse inflicted 
by an omnipotent, controlling man simply fails to describe all situations that are 
prosecuted as domestic violence.270 A critical problem that gave rise to the 
Lautenberg Amendment was the tendency of many state codes to lump plate-
throwing and door-slamming with potentially lethal acts like strangulation,
under the rubric of misdemeanor offenses.271 Such classifications recently have 
begun to change. For instance, Arizona reclassified strangulation as an 
aggravated assault felony in 2010, and other states have followed suit.272
Although the reclassification process is slow, in the long run it is preferable to 
slapping all domestic violence misdemeanants with potentially permanent gun 
prohibitions and imprisonment for violating them, in cases where that offender 
might never use a gun to threaten, let alone kill, his or her partner.
a. Over-Inclusiveness: Misdemeanants Who Are Unlikely to Kill
Let us now consider the potential for firearms laws to apply punitively to 
individuals who are unlikely to become homicidal shooters.273 Courts largely 
                                                                                                                     
268 See Taub, supra note 267.
269 For an example of a social-scientific study positing more than one type of domestic 
violence, see MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE 
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 3 (2008).
270 See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 381, 387–414 (arguing that perpetrators of intimate-
partner violence are not invariably controlling, heterosexual men; they can be heterosexual 
women, gay men, lesbians, and heterosexual males who neither fit a single psychological 
profile nor enjoy power in socioeconomic or racial hierarchies).
271 The Lautenberg Amendment sought “to bar those domestic abusers convicted of 
garden-variety assault or battery misdemeanors—just like those convicted of felonies—from 
owning guns.” Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2280 (2016). According to the 
Voisine Court, “[b]ecause fully two-thirds of . . . state [assault and battery] laws extend to 
recklessness, construing § 922(g)(9) to exclude crimes committed with that state of mind 
would substantially undermine the provision’s design.” Id. at 2278. The Court refused, for 
this reason, to distinguish reckless acts, such as plate-throwing and door-slamming, that 
cause injury from intentionally or knowingly harmful conduct, like strangulation. See id. at 
2278–80. For further critical discussion of the Voisine case and its potential impact, see supra
notes 262–64 and infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text. Cf. infra notes 475–76 (noting 
that Voisine does not prevent plea deals in which the defendant pleads guilty to a charge, 
such as disorderly conduct, that does not include a “force” element).
272 Jamie Balson, Using Danger Assessment in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
Cases, 9 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE Q. 33, 38 (2016).
273 See supra note 269 and infra notes 276, 279–311 and accompanying text. 
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have dismissed concerns about the over- and under-inclusiveness of the 
domestic-violence gun prohibitions; indeed, “no [federal] circuit has accepted 
an over-breadth challenge in the Second Amendment context.”274 Admittedly, 
the defendants in many of the leading § 922(g)(9) cases were hardly paragons 
of virtue. They looked more like the violent law-breakers that some gun-rights 
advocates readily agree should be excluded from the Second Amendment 
protections.275 Yet, others subject to § 922(g)(9) never used a firearm against an 
intimate partner.276
From a theoretical and practical perspective, rather than a constitutional 
one,277 § 922(g)(9) reaches too far. If calls for more vigorous enforcement of 
this statute were followed, domestic violence misdemeanants who committed 
relatively trivial conduct would lose their guns, despite their generally law-
abiding, nonaggressive lifestyles. Some would have to surrender firearms or 
face federal charges, even if the misdemeanor of which they were convicted 
constituted an act of resistance against a partner who clearly should have been 
deemed the primary aggressor, and even if their employment required carrying 
a gun.
One does not need to embrace largely discredited theories of gender parity 
in domestic violence perpetration278 or deny the prevalence of coercive, 
controlling abuse to be concerned that batterer stereotypes have led to unsound 
                                                                                                                     
274 United States v. Chester, 514 F. App’x 393, 395 (4th Cir. 2013).
275 See Kates & Cramer, supra note 178, at 1341, 1343, 1360. For example, even though 
Christopher Meade had a previous domestic assault conviction and was subject to a 
restraining order, he banged on his estranged wife’s door, threatening to shoot her, and then 
reached for a loaded handgun when police confronted him. United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 
215, 217–18 (1st Cir. 1999). Meade was also convicted of violating § 922(g)(9). Id. In 
another case, Michael Wyman threatened his estranged partner and her companions with a 
shotgun by firing into some trees, six years after he was barred from possessing a gun for 
assaulting the same woman. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2011).
276 See, e.g., United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 581–83, 597–98 (S.D.W. Va. 
2010) (denying a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) by a male defendant with 
three prior domestic violence convictions, none involving use of a firearm, who tried to 
become the registered owner of a shotgun that his girlfriend had given him for Christmas), 
aff’d, 468 F. App’x 357, 359 (4th Cir. 2012).
277 Constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(9) based on over-breadth have been 
unsuccessful. For example, the Fourth Circuit stated resoundingly that:
[T]he net cast by § 922(g)(9) may be somewhat over-inclusive given that every 
domestic violence misdemeanant would not necessarily misuse a firearm against a 
spouse, former spouse, or other person with whom such person had a domestic 
relationship . . . if permitted to possess one. However, this observation merely suggests 
that the fit is not perfect. Intermediate scrutiny does not require a perfect fit . . . .
United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167 (4th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (addressing a Second Amendment challenge to 
another provision of the Gun Control Act, § 922(k)).
278 See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 396 & nn.334–35 (explaining the “gender parity” thesis 
and its widely perceived shortcomings).
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laws and policies, including the Lautenberg Amendment. Michael Johnson has 
suggested, for example, that there are multiple forms of intimate-partner 
violence, including the type of patriarchal terrorism that has long been the target 
of battered women’s advocates.279 Besides forceful self-protection by abuse 
victims, another common type—situational couple violence—arises 
sporadically from tensions over money, unemployment, parenting, sex, and 
communication styles, not from patterns of coercive control and violent 
resistance.280 Both men and women engage in situational couple violence, and 
although it can be lethal, it often involves little or no physical injury. In other 
words, it does not seem to follow the pattern associated with intimate 
terrorism.281
Compared to other methods of inflicting injury, “[g]uns are not commonly 
used in domestic abuse incidents.”282 A recent study based on the National 
Crime Victimization Survey found that guns were used by intimate partners to 
inflict only 3.4% of nonfatal intimate-partner injuries.283 The majority of 
domestic violence committed between 2003 and 2012 was simple assault.284
Katherine Vittes and Susan Sorenson found that “[b]eing hit, beat[en], kicked, 
and/or pushed was the most common type of abuse (84.5%)” suffered by 
temporary restraining order applicants, whereas only 16% of the applicants 
mentioned firearms.285 Abusers with access to guns tend to engage in the most 
severe nonfatal abuse,286 but they do not always use guns directly to inflict 
injury.287 The available studies show that high-risk individuals often possess 
guns, not that gun access causes them to be especially violent.288 Moreover, as 
the empirical data above indicates, most domestic violence is not inflicted with 
firearms.289 Some people who are convicted of predicate misdemeanors that 
include an element of “offensive touching” or “reckless infliction of bodily 
injury” possess firearms for self-defense, work, or sport that they did not (and 
might never) use to hurt an intimate partner. Should all of them be forced to 
relinquish their guns and barred for the long term from buying new ones? Access 
to firearms seems to add fuel to the fire and increase the likelihood of death.290
                                                                                                                     
279 See JOHNSON, supra note 269, at 2–12.
280 See id. at 63–68, 70.
281 See id. at 60–62.
282 Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 323.
283 TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 88, at 9 tbl.7.
284 Id. at 7.
285 Vittes & Sorenson, supra note 114, at 273. 
286 See Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1092; Zeoli, supra note 26, at 1.
287 See Zeoli, supra note 26, at 1–2.
288 See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (noting the strengths and limitations 
of several prominent empirical studies of the connection between guns and domestic 
homicide).
289 See supra note 114 (discussing National Crime Victimization Survey data and a study 
by Vittes and Sorenson on allegations regarding firearms in restraining order applications).
290 See supra note 93 (discussing the role of guns’ greater lethality, compared to other 
weapons, in homicide causation).
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Yet, as Franklin Zimring acknowledged in 2004: “Firearm ownership and use is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of violent death in the United
States.”291 Correlations between guns and lethality are much stronger than the 
evidence that modern gun-control efforts save lives.292 Zimring believed that 
categorical bans for certain classes of individuals or guns might be effective,293
but he cautioned, “[m]ost gun control efforts do not make measurable impacts 
on gun use, particularly low budget symbolic legislation.”294
Besides prohibiting a broader class of men from possessing guns than the 
especially dangerous abusers for whom they are most appropriate,295 a
rigorously-enforced version of § 922(g)(9) would almost certainly sweep some 
battered women into the courts and prisons, too. In fact, despite the relatively 
low number of prosecutions, the existing § 922(g)(9) has already imposed harsh 
results on female defendants.296 The predominant theory about female use of 
force maintains that women arrested for domestic violence usually acted in self-
protection or retaliation for abuse,297 which domestic violence experts have 
                                                                                                                     
291 Zimring, Firearms, Violence, and the Potential Impact of Firearms Control, supra 
note 93, at 36.
292 See id. at 34.
293 Id. at 37.
294 Id.
295 Long-term gun prohibitions are most appropriate for a core group of intimate 
terrorists prone to recidivism and escalating violence. Assessing other interventions, such as 
batterer treatment and incarceration, several domestic-violence experts have focused on the 
problem posed by habitual offenders. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF, THE FUTURE OF BATTERER 
PROGRAMS 6, 72, 125, 237 (2012); see also Goodmark, supra note 9, at 102 (“Even those 
who are most concerned about the detrimental aspects of criminalization have experience 
with offenders who they believe should be isolated from the greater society.”); id. at 106 
(“Criminal legal interventions should target habitual domestic violence offenders.”);
Ramsey, supra note 9, at 380 (acknowledging that these are the most difficult offenders to
rehabilitate or deter). 
296 For example, Myrna Raeder recounted the case of a Virginia woman who received a 
state sentence of more than seven years in prison after she pled guilty to the manslaughter of 
her abusive husband, against whom she had obtained eight protection orders and two arrest 
warrants. Raeder, supra note 29, at 99. She claimed he threatened her with a gun before she 
shot him. Id. She was also charged with two federal gun offenses, based on a prior domestic 
violence misdemeanor conviction. Id. She received two consecutive prison sentences 
amounting to 210 months, due to the federal judge’s view that she acted with malice (in part 
due to her efforts to buy firearms illegally). Id. (noting the federal sentence was vacated in 
light of United States v. Booker, but that there was “a distinct possibility . . . that she could 
receive the same sentence in light of the judge’s previous findings” of malice as a sentencing 
factor). See United States v. Holbrook, 368 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’g 207
F. Supp. 2d 472 (W.D. Va. 2002).
297 L. Kevin Hamberger & Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested 
for Domestic Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 125, 
128, 134–35 (1994); Kris Henning et al., Treatment Needs of Women Arrested for Domestic 
Violence: A Comparison with Male Offenders, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 839, 841–
42, 851 (2003).
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variously described as “violent resistance”298 or “dynamic resistance.”299 Even 
though female violence may not satisfy the requirements of self-defense 
doctrine,300 women rarely engage in repeat battering underpinned by a desire to 
control their partners coercively in the long term.301 They are less likely than 
men to inflict serious injury302 and also “less likely than male perpetrators to 
have offending histories that suggest a propensity to commit further 
violence.”303 Even if African-American women tend to use physical force 
against their abusers more often than white females do, the proportion of black 
males killed by an intimate has declined since 1980.304
I am not arguing that all women convicted of intimate-partner assaults are 
blameless or that gun prohibitions are always inappropriate for female 
misdemeanants. Nor do I think women should be encouraged to rely on arms-
bearing for self-protection in a way that exempts society and the state from the 
burden of supporting and providing safety for abuse victims. However, while 
purchasing a handgun is associated with an increased risk of being killed by an 
intimate partner, the available evidence is not strong enough to support denying 
abuse resisters a choice about whether to purchase and possess a weapon.305
Indeed, Campbell and her coauthors concede that “[a] victim’s access to a gun 
could plausibly reduce her risk of being killed, at least if she does not live with 
the abuser.”306 The current inability of police and prosecutors to screen out 
resisting victims with sufficient accuracy at the misdemeanor arrest stage offers 
little confidence that domestic violence gun prohibitions will be applied justly, 
especially if future reforms require prosecutors to take the most punitive course 
possible when charging misdemeanor abuse and seeking convictions for 
weapons offenses.307
Women who use force in their intimate relationships do not fit the stereotype 
of the batterer for whom mandatory criminal justice responses (including the 
                                                                                                                     
298 JOHNSON, supra note 269, at 52.
299 POTTER, supra note 165, at 9, 28, 46–55 (coining the phrase “dynamic resistance” to 
describe African-American women’s response to intimate-partner abuse but stating that it 
does not necessarily involve physical retaliation). As noted above, fighting back and distrust 
of the state’s willingness or ability to help is prevalent among lesbians and women of color. 
See supra notes 201, 204, 207 and accompanying text.
300 See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 398–99.
301 See Shamita Das Dasgupta, A Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of 
Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1364, 1366–68, 1378 (2002); Lisa Young Larance, When She Hits Him: Why the Institutional 
Response Deserves Reconsideration, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN NEWSL. (Violence 
Against Women Project), Summer 2007 at 10, 11, 13.
302 See Hamberger & Potente, supra note 297, at 125.
303 See POTTER, supra note 165, at 119.
304 See COOPER & SMITH, supra note 110, at 18–19.
305 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
306 Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1092.
307 See Lininger, supra note 19, at 198, 204 (advocating such reforms).
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imposition of gun bans) were designed, but they are still subject to them.308
Door slammers and plate throwers, whether male or female, can be ordered to 
surrender their guns and prevented from buying new ones, even if they need 
their weapons for self-defense or job-related use.309 They both can be convicted 
and punished for gun offenses based on a misdemeanor conviction; and they 
both can be sentenced to substantial prison terms.310 A hasty turn towards 
aggressive enforcement of domestic violence gun prohibitions might further 
entrench paternalistic assumptions about female incapacity for self-protection 
and penalize abused women for trying to defend themselves or keep others 
safe.311
                                                                                                                     
308 See supra Part III.A.1 and notes 215–17, 296–307 and accompanying text (discussing 
women’s use of force against abusive partners).
309 See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text (discussing the Voisine case); supra
notes 19–20, 24–25 and accompanying text (describing the restrictions that § 922(g)(9) 
imposes).
310 This Article focuses on problems with basing long-term firearms prohibitions on 
misdemeanor convictions that do not distinguish accurately between extremely violent 
individuals with a high likelihood of reoffending and those whose use of force is minimal, 
rare, and even self-defensive. Although some empirical research indicates that handguns are 
more likely to be used in domestic violence than long guns, see Sorenson & Schut, supra 
note 89, at 2 fig.1, this Article does not recommend that domestic violence firearms 
prohibitions differentiate among types of guns. A discussion of whether certain types of 
firearms, such as assault weapons, should be banned independently from the problem of 
domestic violence lies beyond the scope of this Article.
311 Constructive possession of a firearm by a prohibited person requires intent to exercise 
control, which would likely preclude a § 922(g)(8) or § 922(g)(9) conviction of a woman for 
illegal gun possession simply because someone in her household kept a firearm on the 
premises. See Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015) (“Section 
922(g) . . . covers possession in every form . . . , preventing the felon from knowingly 
possessing his (or another person’s) guns . . . [and] encompassing what the criminal law 
recognizes as ‘actual’ and ‘constructive’ possession alike . . . . Constructive possession is 
established when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and 
intent to exercise control over the object.” (emphasis added)). However, the law of the 
federal circuits remains unsettled as to whether, and under what circumstances, a person 
charged with a § 922(g) crime could successfully raise a defense based on the temporary use 
and control of a gun for self-defense or to remove it from the hands of a child. 
One circuit has authorized a defense, in the context of a § 922(g)(1) charge (felon in 
possession of a firearm), for possession that is both “innocent” and “transitory.” United 
States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, at least a half dozen other 
circuits reject such a defense. See United States v. Webster, 296 F. App’x 777, 778 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (stating that the majority of circuits have declined to recognize an innocent 
possession defense and that the D.C. Circuit is the only one to adopt it); see also United 
States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 349 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Palma, 511 F.3d 1311, 
1316 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (10th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Johnson, 459 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gilbert, 430 
F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2005). Without absolutely precluding a “fleeting” or “innocent”
possession defense, at least a couple of circuits have found it inapplicable to the facts of the 
cases before them. See United States v. Wright, 682 F.3d 1088, 1090–91 (8th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2004). Yet, some of these holdings
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b. Under-Inclusiveness: Excluded Relationships
At the same time, the relevant provisions of the Gun Control Act exclude 
certain types of intimate or family relationships in which violence can lead to 
tragic results.312 In other words, domestic violence gun laws also tend to be 
under-inclusive. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” that triggers the
§ 922(g)(9) firearms ban must have been committed by:
[A] current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person 
with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting 
with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a 
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.313
By its terms § 922(g)(8) requires that the respondent be an intimate partner of 
the victim or an intimate partner of the parent of a child-victim.314
These definitions of qualifying relationships for the purposes of § 922(g)(8) 
and § 922(g)(9) exclude dating partners who are not current or former 
cohabitants and who do not share a common child with their victims.315 Yet, 
from 2003 to 2012, “[c]urrent or former boyfriends or girlfriends (7.8%) 
                                                                                                                     
were based on a pre-Henderson view that Congress sought to prohibit all “knowing”
possession of guns and ammunition by prohibited persons and that knowledge was sufficient 
to show constructive possession. See, e.g., Wright, 682 F.3d at 1090; Baker, 508 F.3d at 
1325. Other courts suggest, perhaps with excessive optimism, that no general exception is 
needed because prosecutors and juries will be sensible enough not to convict prohibited 
persons in sympathetic cases. See, e.g., United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 
2005) (“Consider if a schoolboy came home with a loaded gun and his ex-felon father took 
it from him, put it in drawer, and called the police . . . .”).
With regard to cases involving self-defensive conduct, defendants might have a 
stronger argument using the common-law defense of justification. See United States v. 
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541–42 (3d Cir. 1991). However, the applicability of the justification 
or necessity defense is also quite narrow. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 
1113, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The necessity defense is a narrow exception to stringent 
federal firearms laws” that should be “strictly and parsimoniously applied.”). Some courts 
indicate that, if a justification defense exists, it is limited to circumstances in which the 
defendant possessed the gun no longer than absolutely necessary and can meet a high burden 
in showing each element. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472–73 (6th 
Cir. 1990). To establish a justification defense in jurisdictions that recognize it, a defendant 
must show all four elements of a multi-factor test that the Fifth Circuit established, and that 
several other circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, have adopted. See United States v. Gant, 
691 F.2d 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Singleton, 902 F.2d at 472–73.
312 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012) (requiring that a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” be committed by a perpetrator in at least one of several designated relationships 
with the victim).
313 Id.
314 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B).
315 Id. § 921(a)(32) (defining “intimate partner” for the purposes of § 922(g)(8)(B)); Id.
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (providing that a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” must be 
committed by a person in a qualifying relationship with the victim).
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committed a greater percentage of all violent victimizations than spouses (4.7%) 
and ex-spouses (2.0%).”316 Non-marital intimate-partner homicides—that is, 
killings by a boyfriend or girlfriend of the victim—have increased since 1980, 
such that in 2008, boyfriends and girlfriends perpetrated a slightly larger 
percentage of killings than spouses.317 At least one empirical study has found 
some positive effects of state DVRO firearm prohibitions on nonfatal violence 
in dating relationships,318 but federal § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9) do not extend 
to non-cohabiting dating partners.319
Judicial interpretation of the relationships covered by the federal 
misdemeanor gun ban indicates that children who victimize their parents are 
also excluded,320 although the statute expressly covers the reverse situation.321
This constitutes a significant omission, in light of the growing problem not only 
of elder abuse, but also of patricide and matricide. Adult children commit the 
most elder abuse—by one estimate, 47% of all incidents.322 According to a 
report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “[p]arents killed by one of their 
                                                                                                                     
316 TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 88, at 3 tbl.1 (reporting data from the National 
Crime Victimization Survey or NCVS). The victim-defined terms “boyfriend” or 
“girlfriend” that the NCVS data uses apparently include persons who do not cohabit with the 
victim, as well as those who do, since the Truman & Morgan report notes that some might 
consider the offenders mere acquaintances or friends, likely due to the casual nature of the 
relationship. See id. at 14.
317 COOPER & SMITH, supra note 110, at 19 & fig.28 (showing that spouses committed 
46.7% of intimate-partner homicides, compared to 48.6% perpetrated by boyfriends and 
girlfriends).
318 See April M. Zeoli et al., Risks and Targeted Interventions: Firearms in Intimate 
Partner Violence, 38 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 125, 131 (2016) (citing Laura Dugan, Domestic 
Violence Legislation: Exploring Its Impact on the Likelihood of Domestic Violence, Police 
Involvement, and Arrest, 2 CRIMINOLOGY PUB. POL’Y 283, 302 (2003)); see also infra note 
365 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of state firearms restrictions for DVRO 
respondents who allegedly abused their dating partners).
319 See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) (omitting non-cohabiting dating partners from definition 
of “intimate partner” under § 922(g)(8)(B)); Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (establishing the same 
limits to qualifying relationships under § 922(g)(9)).
320 See United States v. Skuban, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1254–55 (D. Nev. 2001) (“The 
relationship defendant had with his victim, i.e. child-aggressor and parent-victim, is not 
specified in the statute as one that meets the predicate requirements for a ‘misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence.’”). The court further stated that the relationships listed in
§ 921(a)(33)(A) do not merely constitute examples, that the Lautenberg Amendment arose 
from Congressional concern about spousal abuse, and that it was meant to be limited in 
scope. Id. at 1255.
321 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (providing that the term “misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence” includes a misdemeanor that has as an element “the use or attempted use 
of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon . . . by . . . [a] parent or guardian 
of the victim”).
322 Margaret Sholian, Comment, An Ethical Dilemma: Attorneys’ Duties Not to Reveal 
Elder Abuse in Washington State, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1471, 1479–81 (2015).
2017] FIREARMS IN THE FAMILY 1313
children have been an increasing proportion of family homicides, rising steadily 
from 9.7% of all family homicides in 1980 to 13% in 2008.”323
Several states have adopted laws that extend gun prohibitions to stalkers and 
those who commit elder abuse.324 But proposals to address some of these gaps 
at the federal level have, to date, been unsuccessful. For example, 
Representative Lois Capps, a Democrat from California, introduced a bill in 
May 2015 that would have expanded the definition of “intimate partner” in 
federal firearms provisions to include a current or former dating partner and the 
definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include a 
misdemeanor offense perpetrated by a current or former dating partner.325
Capps’ bill also would have barred possession of a firearm by someone 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of stalking or threatening his victim with a 
deadly weapon.326 Less than one-third of states classify stalking as a felony on 
the first offense; yet, more than three-quarters of femicide victims have been 
stalked; more than one-half reported the stalking to police before their deaths; 
and about one-fifth of stalking cases involve the use of a weapon to threaten or 
inflict harm.327 Since one-quarter of women and almost of one-third of men who 
suffer stalking are stalked by acquaintances, rather than spouses or intimate 
partners,328 an amendment to § 921(a)(33)(A) is necessary to bring them under 
the protection of the misdemeanor gun ban. Yet, Capps’ bill was referred to 
committee, and it apparently proceeded no further.329 A similar Senate bill, 
introduced by Democratic Senator Amy Klobuchar, from Minnesota, also 
appears to have died in committee.330
Hence, while the Supreme Court has interpreted misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence to include relatively trivial “offensive touching” and reckless 
infliction of bodily injury,331 § 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition of qualifying 
misdemeanors leaves out stalking and threatened use of a deadly weapon by a 
                                                                                                                     
323 COOPER & SMITH, supra note 110, at 21.
324 See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22; see also Jolly, supra note 30,
at 694–95 (discussing California’s protection of a broader class of restraining order 
petitioners and its extension of gun bans to “certain violent misdemeanors such as assault or 
battery without reference to the relationship between the victim and the defendant”).
325 See Protecting Domestic Violence and Stalking Victims Act, H.R. 2216, 114th Cong. 
(2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2216/text [https://perma.cc/
YW2A-WPB6].
326 See id. The existing federal DVRO gun ban includes stalking, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)(B) (2012), but § 922(g)(9) does not.
327 STALKING RES. CTR., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, STALKING FACT 
SHEET (Jan. 2015), http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/default-source/src/stalking-fact-sheet-2015_
eng.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/288J-UPAX].
328 See id.
329 See H.R. 2216.
330 See Protecting Domestic Violence and Stalking Victims Act of 2015, S. 1520, 114th 
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1520/text 
[https://perma.cc/L7BP-UP3P].
331 See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
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stalker who does not meet the specified relationship criteria, such as current or 
former spouse, cohabiting intimate-partner, or parent of a common child.332 It 
also excludes crimes against dating partners and vulnerable, elderly parents.333
Ironically, the Lautenberg Amendment and federal courts’ interpretation of 
it inverts the problem that Deborah Tuerkheimer saw in the criminalization of 
stalking, but not domestic violence, as a menacing course of conduct.334 The 
gun prohibition extrapolates from one act of domestic violence to condemn all 
misdemeanants as intimate terrorists, while ignoring the potential of stalkers and 
adult children to engage in an escalating pattern of abuse that might culminate 
in a gun homicide. Moreover, it treats a slap, a thrown plate, or a slammed door 
as conduct that portends a fatal shooting, when a spouse or cohabiting intimate 
partner does it, while ignoring the import of an actual threat with a gun by 
someone who is not in a qualifying relationship with the victim. 
IV. WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T: THE COSTS OF POORLY-CONCEIVED 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE GUN-CONTROL LAWS
This Part provides a detailed analysis of the scope and enforcement of two 
broad categories of gun prohibitions at the federal and state levels: (1) those 
trigged by civil and criminal restraining orders and (2) bans applicable to 
domestic violence misdemeanants. Some other types of laws, including scene-
of-the-crime gun confiscation and firearms prohibitions imposed under ex parte 
orders, are also briefly considered. 
A. The Limited Success of DVRO Gun Prohibitions
An amendment to the Gun Control Act in 1994 established a federal ban on 
the possession or receipt, by anyone subject to a qualifying DVRO, of a firearm 
or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce.335 This amendment is § 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Court orders that 
bring a respondent under the control of § 922(g)(8) “restrain[] such person from 
harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner . . . or child of such 
intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an 
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child.”336 In 
addition to satisfying certain Due Process requirements,337 a qualifying order 
includes a finding that the respondent “[1] represents a credible threat to the 
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or . . . [2] by its terms explicitly 
prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against” the 
                                                                                                                     
332 See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012).
333 See id.
334 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Breakups, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 52–53 (2013).
335 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012).
336 Id. § 922(g)(8)(B).
337 Id. § 922(g)(8)(A).
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protected persons.338 The DVRO gun ban ends upon expiration of the order and 
contains an exemption for official use.339 Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires that the 
order be issued after a hearing in which the respondent had actual notice and an 
opportunity to participate.340
Section 922(g)(8) does not contain any provision specifying how the ban is 
to be enforced; federal law leaves the task of compelling relinquishment of the 
abuser’s firearms to the states.341 The majority of states now have laws that 
support, imitate, or even exceed § 922(g)(8).342 Some only allow the 
confiscation of firearms pursuant to a permanent or final restraining order 
obtained after a hearing in which the respondent could participate, while others, 
such as California, also extend the ban to ex parte orders.343 The heterogeneity 
of gun bans imposed as part of civil and criminal protection orders—including 
what kinds of victim-offender relationships the law covers, how much discretion 
the issuing judge has, what conduct the gun provision prohibits (e.g. possession 
and/or purchase), whether the defendant must have the opportunity to participate 
in a hearing, and whether a criminal restraining order is paired with police 
officers’ on-the-scene authority to confiscate firearms—makes these laws 
difficult to summarize and even harder to assess in terms of impact.344 State 
laws supplement and sometimes exceed federal law in the severity, scope, and 
duration and the level of Due Process accorded to defendants/respondents.345 In 
contrast, some states have few, if any, laws or only lax restrictions—a situation
that undercuts the federal restraining order provision, which depends on state 
and local cooperation.
                                                                                                                     
338 Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii).
339 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
340 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A).
341 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 819–20.
342 See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22.
343 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 831, 833. Another source indicates that Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Texas, and West Virginia also allow gun prohibitions under ex parte orders. 
Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22.
344 See Jolly, supra note 30, at 688 (“This wide variety in state approaches creates a 
patchwork of protection for potential victims of domestic violence.”); Vigdor & Mercy, 
supra note 89, at 317 (making a similar observation).
345 Several writers describe California as having adopted one of the strictest approaches 
to reinforcing federal firearms prohibitions with even tougher state laws. See Gildengorin, 
supra note 21, at 833, 835–37; see also Jolly, supra note 30, at 692–97. Note that, although 
one writer characterizes California gun laws as being “progressive,” her use of this term ties 
it to a narrow feminist understanding of the benefits of punitive laws in the battle against 
gender violence, without regard to their cost to individual victims, their families, or 
communities. See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 835–37. In contrast, this Article calls 
attention to the potential harms of ratcheted-up criminalization of firearms possession and 
enforcement of such laws against low-level domestic violence offenders.
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One researcher sorts states into a three-part typology in which Arkansas 
exemplifies the most lenient approach.346 In Arkansas, persons subject to a civil
DVRO are neither prohibited from purchasing or possessing guns, nor 
compelled by Arkansas law to relinquish them in compliance with federal 
statute.347 The only state law that restrains domestic violence offenders from 
gun possession authorizes criminal courts to strip batterers of their guns 
pursuant to a domestic violence no-contact order.348 Arkansas has one of the 
highest femicide rates in the United States.349 A second approach gives state 
judges the discretion, but not the legal obligation, to ban persons subject to a 
DVRO from possessing firearms.350 In “discretion” states, courts are also 
authorized, but not required, to enforce gun relinquishment laws.351
Pennsylvania takes this type of approach.352 Lastly, in the strictest state, 
California, the relevant laws exceed the federal provision covering DVROs353
by encompassing ex parte orders and including victims of harassment, stalking, 
and elder abuse.354 California has one of the most aggressive models for 
removing guns from the hands of DVRO respondents.355 Under California law, 
a person served with a restraining order, including an ex parte order, must 
surrender firearms immediately at a law enforcement officer’s request.356 In the 
absence of a request from the police, the respondent has twenty-four hours to 
surrender his firearms and forty-eight hours to notify the court that he has done 
so.357 Protocols exist to help California courts determine whether the offender 
has complied,358 and police officers now can obtain a search warrant to look for 
firearms that a DVRO respondent has not relinquished.359
Empirical studies of laws that prohibit DVRO respondents from purchasing 
and possessing a gun suggest that such laws have a positive impact, especially 
                                                                                                                     
346 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 834. Another writer chooses Missouri as an 
example of a state that leaves firearm purchase and possession largely unregulated. See Jolly, 
supra note 30, at 697.
347 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 834. Missouri leaves the same areas unregulated, 
which Aaron Jolly characterizes as a deliberate choice by the Missouri legislature, rather 
than an oversight. Jolly, supra note 30, at 697–98.
348 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 834.
349 See id.
350 See id. at 834–35.
351 See id. at 835.
352 See id.
353 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012).
354 See Jolly, supra note 30, at 694–95 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.91 (West 2010 
& Supp. 2017); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6218, 6389 (West 2013); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 15657.03 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017)); see also Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 835–37
(describing California’s provisions at the time of her article’s publication).
355 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 835–37; Jolly, supra note 30, at 695.
356 Jolly, supra note 30, at 695 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389).
357 Id.
358 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 836–37; Jolly, supra note 30, at 695–96.
359 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 836.
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with regard to intimate-partner homicide.360 In 2006, for example, Elizabeth 
Vigdor and James Mercy published a population-based, ecological study that 
used state variation in restricting abusers’ access to firearms to assess the impact 
of three types of laws on intimate-partner homicide: (1) laws prohibiting persons 
subject to a restraining order from possessing or purchasing a firearm, (2) laws 
that prevent domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing or purchasing a 
firearm, and (3) laws allowing police officers to confiscate firearms from the 
scene of a domestic violence incident.361 This study also contrasted statutes that 
bar purchase and possession with those that only bar possession.362
State laws prohibiting both the purchase and possession of guns under a 
DVRO were associated with an 8% reduction in the rate of intimate-partner 
homicides and a 9% reduction in the rate of such homicides perpetrated with a 
firearm.363 Although the primary effect was on the killing of women, there was 
also “a reduction in [intimate-partner homicide] rates for both genders when a 
restraining order law [was] passed;” the researchers surmised that this showed 
a decline in self-defensive homicides, too, due to the availability of greater legal 
protection for victims.364 Another study demonstrated a 14% reduction in the 
rate of nonfatal dating violence, but not spousal violence, in states that had 
DVRO gun bans extending to these relationships.365 In sum, although federal 
prosecutors have brought relatively few charges under § 922(g)(8), states with 
complementary laws barring DVRO respondents from possessing and 
purchasing firearms have achieved some measurable success in reducing 
intimate-partner violence and homicides.366 By contrast, restraining order laws 
that only ban possession and not purchase have not shown a positive impact.367
Confiscation requires a lot of effort on the part of judges and law enforcement 
officers; in states that lack a firearms registry, it is difficult to know which 
                                                                                                                     
360 See Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 135.
361 See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 314.
362 See id. at 318 tbls.1 & 2.
363 See id. at 332 (noting that, in absolute terms, this means only an average of 2.9 fewer 
intimate-partners homicides and 2.0 fewer intimate-partner homicides committed with a gun 
each year in a state with a DVRO gun law in effect). These findings must be qualified by an 
acknowledgement of the study’s limitations. Chiefly, it did not control for additional factors 
that might have reduced the rate of intimate-partner homicide, such as victims’ increased 
access to domestic violence hotlines and other support services. See id. at 340.
364 See id. at 332 (finding that states with DVRO gun laws experienced a 10% reduction 
in the rate in fatal shootings of women by their intimate partners).
365 See Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 131 (citing Dugan, supra note 318, at 302).
366 See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 332; Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 131.
367 See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 333, 337; see also Wintemute et al., Firearms 
and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 2 (citing KATHRYN E. MORACCO ET AL., PAC.
INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, DOC. NO. 215773, FINAL REPORT: PREVENTING 
FIREARM VIOLENCE AMONG VICTIMS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION OF 
A NEW NORTH CAROLINA LAW 6 (Aug. 2006)) (“An analysis of individual-level data found 
that simply requiring respondents to surrender firearms did not reduce the proportion of 
respondents who possessed firearms or the rate of firearm-related IPV.”). For more on the 
study by Moracco and her collaborators, see infra note 372.
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abusers possess guns.368 Thus, purchase restrictions seem to be more 
effective.369
Although police chiefs and public health experts agree that the removal of 
firearms under a DVRO constitutes a beneficial approach to lowering the risk 
of lethal violence,370 a counter-narrative tells a bleaker story: Courts decline to 
impose firearms restrictions in restraining orders;371 abusers deny possessing 
guns or refuse to comply with provisions requiring relinquishment;372 and law 
enforcers fail to detect and remove weapons.373 Anecdotal reports abound of 
judges who decided not to deprive a respondent of a gun required for his 
employment or desired for use in hunting season.374 Furthermore, whether or 
not a judge checks a box requiring the surrender of firearms, DVRO applicants 
are often left in the dark about which provisions their order includes.375
While proponents of strong Second Amendment protections worry about 
“cases in which the right to bear arms is denied to the targets of restraining 
                                                                                                                     
368 See Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 136.
369 However, purchase restrictions only work well if states put DVRO information into 
a background check system. See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 334; Zeoli et al., supra
note 318, at 136.
370 See Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1094; Vittes et al., supra note 208, at 603 (noting 
that a 2007 meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police resulted in a 
recommendation that officers remove guns when serving a DVRO).
371 See Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 136 (according to qualitative research, judges’
views on both gun control and intimate-partner violence affect their willingness to require 
firearm surrender as a DVRO provision). In a North Carolina study, judges asked fewer than 
half the victims seeking an ex parte protection order about their batterer’s possession of 
firearms, even though North Carolina law required judges to do so. See MORACCO ET AL., 
supra note 367, at 4.
372 According to the North Carolina study cited, supra note 367, and further discussed, 
supra note 371, only 14% of the victims who reported that the DVRO required their abuser 
to relinquish his guns said that sheriff’s deputies confiscated the weapons, and only 5%
reported that the defendant voluntarily surrendered his firearms to authorities. Thirty-seven 
percent of the DVRO petitioners said that the abuser kept his weapons, and another 37%
either did not know or did not respond to the question. See MORACCO ET AL., supra note 367,
at 6.
373 See infra notes 383–411 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of recent 
empirical studies regarding the difficulty of detecting and removing guns from abusers).
374 See, e.g., Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2–3, 22, 29 (2005) (recounting her observation of a judge’s
practices in denying the requests of battered women for restraining orders in rural Missouri).
375 See Daniel Webster et al., Women with Protective Orders Report Failure to Remove 
Firearms from Their Abusive Partners: Results from an Exploratory Study, 19 J. WOMEN’S
HEALTH 93, 97 (2010). But see id. at 97 (noting that “[t]hese checkboxes have since been 
eliminated, and firearm prohibition language is now a standard part of all California’s
[domestic violence protection order] forms”). In this study of DVRO petitioners in New York 
and Los Angeles, Webster and his collaborators noted that their findings of “significant gaps 
in the enforcement of firearms surrender conditions of domestic violence restraining orders”
were in line with research based on other types of data, as well as studies like theirs that used 
victim self-reporting. Id. at 96–97.
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orders even in the absence of a credible finding of threat or 
violence,”376empirical research on judicial responsiveness377 suggests that such 
concerns are overstated, at least with regard to jurisdictions that give courts 
discretion about whether to order gun removal. For example, in a study of 
DVRO petitioners in New York and Los Angeles, Daniel Webster and his 
collaborators found that, out of eighty-two cases with a respondent who owned 
a firearm, petitioners in only twenty-one cases (i.e. 26%) reported that that the 
judge ordered the surrender or confiscation of firearms under the DVRO.378
Unlike in California, New York courts at the time were allowed (but not 
required) to mandate the relinquishment of guns in cases where the abusive 
incident did not actually involve the use or threatened use of a gun.379 According 
to the researchers, judges were more likely to order firearm removal if the abuser 
had tried to kill the victim; yet, despite the letter of the law, threats with a gun 
did not increase the likelihood that judges would order removal.380
California’s relinquishment laws have been described as being among the 
most effective at keeping guns out of the hands of domestic violence 
perpetrators.381 But while California’s approach to DVRO firearms prohibitions 
is comparatively strict, it still has shown only limited success.382 In 2010, two 
California counties—San Mateo and Butte—participated in pilot studies in 
which sheriff’s detectives proactively tried to determine whether DVRO 
respondents had access to firearms.383 They then tried to recover those firearms 
or ensure that the respondent sold them to a licensed retailer.384
                                                                                                                     
376 Volokh, supra note 253, at 1507.
377 See e.g., Webster et al., supra note 375, at 96.
378 See id. In thirty-seven of the eighty-two cases, women expressly requested that 
batterer’s guns be confiscated, but courts granted only eighteen of these requests. Three 
women said the judge ordered removal without their request. Fourteen petitioners did not 
know if the order mandated firearm removal. 52% of the petitioners whose DVROs included 
a firearms removal provision reported that the respondent kept at least one gun. Id.
379 See id. at 96–97. To impose gun restrictions in such circumstances, there had to be a 
“substantial risk of future gun assault.” See id.
380 Id. Courts reportedly included gun prohibitions in DVROs more often in Los Angeles 
than in New York, where the law permitted greater judicial discretion. Id. at 96.
381 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 835–37.
382 Vittes et al., supra note 208, at 604.
383 In San Mateo County, sheriff’s detectives used standardized procedures to screen 
DVRO respondents for access to firearms. This involved reviewing petitioner declarations; 
other court documents; California’s Automated Firearms System, which records handgun 
purchases from licensed retailers, as well as denied purchases, since 1996; applications for 
concealed weapons permits; the Armed and Prohibited Persons System, which lists 
prohibited persons believed to possess a firearm; and other databases. When these procedures 
associated a DVRO respondent with a firearm, detectives often followed up by interviewing 
the petitioner. Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 3.
384 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Identifying Armed Respondents to Domestic Violence 
Restraining Orders and Recovering Their Firearms: Process Evaluation and an Initiative in 
California, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e113, e114 (2014) [hereinafter Wintemute et al., 
Identifying Armed Respondents].
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Several problems recurred in the San Mateo program. The first and most 
common cause of the non-recovery of firearms from a respondent who had been 
linked to them “was that the order was [issued but] never served.”385 Slightly 
fewer than 70% (361) of the 525 San Mateo respondents linked to firearms were 
served with a DVRO.386 Some abusers were not served because their victims 
changed their minds about imposing the restraining order. If the abuser was
already banned from firearms possession, but kept illegal weapons, “the 
possibility of [his] incarceration might . . . deter some petitioners from having 
DVROs served.”387 Other petitioners probably feared retaliation.388
Respondents’ nondisclosure or lying about firearms represented a second 
problem, which occurred in Butte County, as well.389 Law enforcement 
recovered guns from only about one-third (119) of the 361 respondents linked 
to firearms who were served with a DVRO in San Mateo County.390 Civil 
division deputies who served DVROs on respondents not in custody and 
explained the firearms prohibition to them lacked authority to recover guns; 
hence, there was a period of time before a detective arrived, during which 
unsupervised abusers might hide or otherwise temporarily dispose of their 
firearms.391 Many respondents were subject to prior firearms disabilities.392
They thus had “particular incentive to deny possession or dispose of firearms if 
given the opportunity[] [because] recovery could lead to a felony prosecution 
for illegal possession.”393 Respondents from whom law enforcers successfully 
recovered guns tended to be older and less likely to have extensive criminal 
records, which reduced their motivation to resist.394
The study authors noted that “CalDOJ no longer accepts uncorroborated 
claims of non-possession,” which should help combat the problem of abusers’
nondisclosure of firearms.395 In addition, San Mateo County sheriff’s detectives 
                                                                                                                     
385 Id. at e115 & tbl.2.
386 Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 4. In San 
Mateo County, detectives screened 2972 respondents to DVROs issued between May 2007 
and June 2010. Of these, 525 (17.7%) were linked to firearms. DVROs were served on only 
56.4% of all the respondents (1677 of 2972) and 68.8% of those linked to firearms (361 of 
525). Id.
387 Id. at 9.
388 Cf. Webster et al., supra note 375, at 97 (surmising that fear of retaliation is one 
reason some women whose abusers have guns do not ask for gun removal, even when they 
seek a protection order).
389 See Wintemute et al., Identifying Armed Respondents, supra note 384, at e115.
390 “Firearms were recovered from 33.0% of respondents linked to firearms [119 of 
361].” Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 4. 
391 See Wintemute et al., Identifying Armed Respondents, supra note 384, at e114–16; 
see also Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 3 (noting 
that “service by the detectives themselves was generally limited to respondents who were in 
custody”).
392 See Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 9.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 5.
395 Id. at 8.
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rarely obtained search warrants before January 2010, the effective date of a new 
California statute enabling officers to search for DVRO respondents’ guns, and 
their lack of search-and-seizure authority further limited the success of the San 
Mateo program.396
Unfortunately, the researchers who studied the San Mateo program “did not 
find that firearm recovery reduced the incidence of violent criminal activity, 
arguably the goal of the initiative.”397 Why did confiscating abusers’ guns fail 
to have a positive effect on their risk of subsequent arrest? The authors offered 
several possible explanations. One relates to the victims’ false sense of security. 
Petitioners who felt safe because their abusers surrendered their guns might have 
been more likely to stay in those intimate relationships, thus increasing their 
exposure to violence.398 Second, some respondents whose guns were 
confiscated might have been angry and resentful about it, which likely increased 
their brutal behavior and risk of arrest.399
While the San Mateo study revealed hurdles to firearms recovery400 and was 
“inconclusive” as to the effect of recovery on DVRO respondents’ risk of 
incident arrest,401 the Butte County program seemed to demonstrate greater 
cause for optimism about the potential for enforcing prohibitions and 
confiscating guns.402 The Butte County study highlighted a couple of factors 
that may have made that county’s approach more successful: First, judges 
apparently participated in the program and supported its goal of recovering guns 
from DVRO respondents; second, and related to the first point, officers were 
able to obtain search warrants, which helped counteract batterers’ nondisclosure 
of weapons.403 The fact that, in Butte County, detectives could get a warrant to 
search for firearms if the evidence justified it, whereas in San Mateo County 
warrants were seldom obtained, constituted a key difference between the two 
programs.404 Warrants were more readily available to law enforcement in Butte 
County because Butte County judges participated in the pilot program.405 When 
officers learned about the existence of guns, they usually could recover them 
                                                                                                                     
396 Wintemute et al., Identifying Armed Respondents, supra note 384, at e114.
397 Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 5.
398 Id. at 5–6.
399 Id. at 5.
400 See supra notes 389–96 and accompanying text (discussing problems encountered in 
the efforts to recover firearms in San Mateo County).
401 Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 9.
402 Wintemute et al., Identifying Armed Respondents, supra note 384, at e115 (stating 
that firearms were recovered from more than half of all respondents to whom they were 
linked in Butte County).
403 See id. at e114. Nevertheless, in Butte County, where “detailed data were largely 
limited to cases in which the order was served,” the respondent’s false denial or failure to 
disclose that he possessed firearms constituted the most common reason for nonrecovery. Id.
at e115.
404 Id. at e114.
405 Id.
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without a violent or threatening response.406 Hence, the researchers concluded 
that “it is possible to enforce prohibitions on firearms possession among persons 
subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Hundreds of firearms were 
recovered without significant adverse effects.”407
These California studies contain some red flags, however. First, DVRO 
respondents tended to “select themselves into 2 groups—those who would 
comply with the [gun] prohibition and those who would not.”408 The 
noncompliant respondents, mostly young men with extensive criminal records 
and even prior gun prohibitions, were already at higher risk for domestic 
violence perpetration and arrest.409 In other words, the confiscation of guns may 
have taken guns from the hands of the least dangerous men and driven higher-
risk respondents further to the margins of illegal and violent behavior. Second, 
the safety goals of gun bans may backfire in the context of domestic abuse. Even 
when DVROs led to the confiscation of a batterer’s firearms, his partner was 
sometimes lulled into believing things would get better, when the assaultive 
behavior actually continued and perhaps got even more violent due to the 
batterer’s anger over the loss of his weapons.410 Third, in some cases, rigorous 
efforts to enforce California’s gun laws inhibited victims from having a DVRO 
served on an abuser because of fear that he would retaliate, be incarcerated, or 
both.411 A strict, discretionless gun-control regime thus might put abuse victims 
at risk by providing a disincentive to seek the law’s protection.
Mandating the confiscation or surrender of firearms when a petitioner for a 
civil protection order does not request it constitutes an undue infringement on 
her autonomy. A major advantage of civil protection orders, compared to 
mandatory criminal justice responses, is that they allow a person subject to 
domestic abuse to retain a measure of control over the remedy she seeks.412
Some researchers advocate making gun relinquishment a mandatory DVRO 
                                                                                                                     
406 Only two out of forty-five Butte County cases in which officers recovered guns 
involved a violent response. See id. at e115. Three additional cases involved threats, and 
“another 5 respondents were considered uncooperative.” There were five arrests and one 
minor injury to an officer. Id.
407 Id. at e115.
408 Wintemute et al., Firearms and the Incidence of Arrest, supra note 89, at 9.
409 See id. at 4–5. More than 80% of the DVRO respondents who were already barred 
from possessing weapons had felony convictions; just over 10% had prior domestic violence 
misdemeanor convictions; and the rest had been convicted for other violent misdemeanors 
which trigger gun prohibitions under California law. Id. at 4–5.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 5, 9.
412 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 131, at 95. Because many civil DVRO petitioners file pro 
se, the need for police officers and others to dispense information about the availability of 
firearms restrictions and other provisions to protect abuse victims remains critical. Mary Fan 
has noted the benefits that might flow from making scene-of-the-assault advice about the 
civil protection order process a uniform practice. See Fan, Disarming the Dangerous, supra 
note 87, at 176–77.
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condition in a wide variety of circumstances.413 This trend poses problems for 
both petitioners and respondents. The concern that numerous respondents are 
being forced to surrender their guns, without evidence of illegal gun use or even 
past violence against the protected party,414 does not track the situation currently 
prevalent in many jurisdictions. Even in restrictive states like California and 
New York, judges sometimes decline to impose gun bans when victims ask 
and/or the law requires them to do so.415 Yet, a move to sweeping, mandatory 
prohibitions—especially pursuant to emergency proceedings in which the 
respondent had no opportunity to participate—might raise Second Amendment 
and Due Process issues, as well as concerns about the ineffectiveness of gun 
confiscation and the denial of victim autonomy.
The issuance of ex parte orders containing gun prohibitions under state laws 
is a thorny matter that has received relatively little attention from appellate 
courts.416 Due to the lifesaving potential of gun removal, this Article rejects the 
position of the NRA, some father’s rights groups, and other activists that 
respondents must have an opportunity to be heard before firearms can be 
confiscated, even in emergency situations.417 The types of restrictions often 
                                                                                                                     
413 See, e.g., Webster et al., supra note 375, at 97 (encouraging states to “follow 
California’s approach and require, rather than merely allow, judges to order firearm removal 
from IPV offenders”).
414 See Volokh, supra note 253, at 1505–07 (suggesting that cases from California, 
Delaware, Hawaii, and Iowa show that DVROs containing gun prohibitions are imposed on 
respondents who engaged in relatively minor verbal abuse, offensive touching, or reckless 
driving). Three of these states—California, Hawaii, and Iowa—have among the most 
restrictive and least discretionary state gun laws related to domestic violence in the nation. 
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, GUNS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: AMERICA’S
UNIQUELY LETHAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROBLEM, app. at 12–13 (2014), 
https://everytownresearch.org/reports/guns-and-violence-against-women/ [https://perma.cc/PJJ8-
GD3P].
415 See supra notes 378–80 and accompanying text.
416 Federal law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)(A), but some states allow gun prohibitions to be included in ex parte orders. See
supra notes 356–57 and accompanying text (offering California as an example); see also
United States v. Hamm, 134 F. App’x 328, 330 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (distinguishing 
an ex parte order authorized by an Alabama statute from an order that qualifies for
§ 922(g)(8)’s federal gun prohibition). Thirty-seven states provided preliminary protection 
against domestic violence, though not necessarily gun removal, via ex parte orders as early 
as 1988. See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 760 (W.D. Wis. 1988). Yet, “[e]xactly 
what or how much process is due” to a person restrained by a temporary protection order is 
an issue that “courts have had little opportunity to decide.” Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 
F.3d 861, 871 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Nollet v. Justices of Trial Courts, 83 F. Supp. 2d 
204, 212 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating “there is very little case law on the constitutionality 
of . . . ex parte temporary restraining order procedure[s]” that require the restrained party to 
vacate the home, avoid contact with the victim and their children, and/or refrain from 
possessing or using firearms).
417 See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Kopacki, Conn. State Liason, NRA-ILA, to 
Honorable Members of the Joint Comm. on Judiciary (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/JUDdata/Tmy/2016HB-05054-R000314-Kopacki%20Ph.D.,
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imposed under temporary DVROs—not only relinquishment of firearms, but 
also exclusion from the family home, loss of contact with children, and the 
depletion of financial resources due to child or spousal support, as well as the 
criminal repercussions of violating the order—implicate the restrained party’s
liberty and property interests.418 Such orders generally meet federal Due Process
requirements, as interpreted in Mathews v. Eldridge,419 if they involve 
“participation by a judicial officer; a prompt post-deprivation hearing; verified 
petitions or affidavits containing detailed allegations based on personal 
knowledge; and risk of immediate and irreparable harm.”420 They must be 
temporary and brief in duration and followed by a hearing, in which both parties 
have the opportunity to participate.421
However, the nature of the alleged injury or threat to the DVRO petitioner 
is a pivotal matter on which courts and legislatures have provided insufficient 
guidance. Statutes allowing emergency orders define the requisite showing of 
“abuse” in different ways: Some include threats, as well as “physical abuse,”
“bodily injury,” and “assault;”422 others expressly require “a substantial 
                                                                                                                     
%20Christopher%20G.%20-%20Connecticut%20State%20Liason,%20National%
20Rifle%20Association-TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/PA2Z-KAGG] (expressing opposition 
of Connecticut gun owners to House Bill 5054, which would require subjects of an ex parte 
restraining order to relinquish all firearms within twenty-four hours); see also Nollett, 83 
F. Supp. 2d at 212–14 (dismissing Due Process challenge by alleged perpetrators of domestic 
abuse and father’s rights group, Fatherhood Coalition/CPF, to Massachusetts statute 
allowing ex parte restraining orders as temporary protection against domestic abuse). Some 
challenges to ex parte gun restrictions by exceedingly violent individuals have been 
particularly unpersuasive and ironic. For example, Nathaniel Wood claimed that his violation 
of an emergency protection order should not have counted as an aggravating circumstance 
in his murder of the ex-girlfriend the order was imposed to protect. Wood v. Pancake, No. 
Civ.A.1:06CV00197JHM, 2007 WL 2874442, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2007) (“[S]ince 
Wood violated a condition of his bond in murdering Jones, any alleged error with respect to 
the EPO is harmless.”).
418 State v. Poole, 745 S.E.2d 26, 35–38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that although an 
ex parte domestic violence order deprived defendant of “a fundamental right” to “keep and 
bear arms,” neither the deprivation nor the prosecution of defendant for violating the order 
offended procedural Due Process); Moore v. Moore, 657 S.E.2d 743, 746–47 (S.C. 2008) 
(describing impact of ex parte orders on various liberty and property interests, including
job loss by law enforcement employees due to inability to possess a weapon). Other courts 
have acknowledged the burden that ex parte orders put on the restrained party’s right to use 
his home and have a relationship with his children. See Willmon v. Daniel, No. 3:05-CV-
1391-M, 2007 WL 518555, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2007); see also Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 
762.
419 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
420 Nollett, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (quoting Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 763–64).
421 See, e.g., Hamm, 134 F. App’x at 328 (ruling that the issuance of ex parte order 
pursuant to an Alabama statute that required “a hearing [at which defendant could be 
represented by counsel] within fourteen days of the filing of a petition” did not violate Due 
Process); Nollett, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 213–14 (within ten business days); Poole, 745 S.E.2d at 
32–34 (within ten days of order’s issuance or seven days of service on defendant).
422 Moore, 657 S.E.2d at 749–50 (analyzing South Carolina statute).
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likelihood of immediate danger of abuse.”423 Judges have supplemented 
legislative provisions by confirming an implicit requirement of immediacy,424
which is satisfied in some states by demonstrating “a threat of future 
occurrence.”425 While not all courts require a definitive finding of past physical 
abuse,426 others have held that a petitioner’s subjective fear of future injury, 
arising from alleged verbal threats, does not suffice.427
The practice of issuing ex parte domestic abuse orders “based on the petition 
alone,” without any judicial contact with the petitioner, further complicates 
matters.428 Can a valid ex parte order be granted after only a perfunctory review 
of the alleged victim’s petition? Federal and state cases are not especially clear 
on this issue.429 Although an emergency DVRO petitioner must provide detailed 
allegations of immediate harm,430 some jurisdictions do not require the judge to 
make findings based on anything beyond the aggrieved party’s written statement 
in the complaint.431 In my view, the court should make a preliminary finding of 
                                                                                                                     
423 Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (quoting Massachusetts law) (emphasis added).
424 See, e.g., Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 766 (concluding that “the legislature was aware of 
the constitutional requirement that ex parte orders be issued only when risk of immediate 
and irreparable harm exists and that it intended to require that showing”).
425 Moore, 657 S.E.2d at 750; see also Williamson v. Basco, No. 06-00012 JMS/LEK,
2007 WL 4570496, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2007) (stating that family court in Hawaii is 
authorized to issue an ex parte temporary restraining order “only upon ‘probable cause to 
believe that a past act or acts of abuse have occurred, or that threats of abuse make it probable 
that acts of abuse may be imminent’”) (emphasis added).
426 See Moore, 657 S.E.2d at 750.
427 See, e.g., Kopelovich v. Kopelovich, 793 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that husband’s alleged emotional abuse of wife and threats to harm her and her dog 
physically and ruin her financially “fail to satisfy even the relatively minimal requirements 
of the statute” governing temporary DVROs).
428 Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 759 (describing the prevalence of this practice in Wasau, 
Wisconsin, in the 1980s).
429 Judicial interpretation of § 922(g)(8)(C) indicates that, for the federal gun ban to 
apply, a court order enjoining the respondent’s use of physical force against a protected party 
must either be uncontested or based on evidence of “a real threat or danger of injury to the 
protected party.” See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001). According 
to Emerson, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) passes muster under the Second Amendment, even though it 
does not require the issuing judge to include any express finding about the threat in the order 
itself. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 263. However, because an ex parte order, by definition, does not 
allow the respondent to contest the evidence against him, this Article contends that an issuing 
court ought to make specific, preliminary findings about the reason for ordering gun 
confiscation under state law.
430 See, e.g., Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 768 (holding that ex parte order violated Blazel’s
due process rights because his wife’s petition contained “no allegation that she feared he 
would attack her again in the near future”).
431 Compare State v. Poole, 745 S.E.2d 26, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (deeming North 
Carolina’s ex parte protection order process a “hearing” because the aggrieved party must 
appear and the judge cannot decide simply by reading the verified complaint), with Blazel,
698 F. Supp. at 764 (stating that “a personal appearance is not a constitutional requirement”
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serious violence or a credible threat to kill before imposing a gun ban in an 
emergency proceeding. Demanding that the petitioner appear or at least provide 
some documentation of physical injuries, such as bruises, so the judge could 
assess his or her credibility, would give firearms restrictions under an ex parte 
restraining order a stronger claim to constitutionality, fairness, and 
effectiveness.432 Deborah Epstein has also urged caution with regard to ex parte 
orders:
[V]irtually no attention has been paid to the data demonstrating a close 
connection between batterers’ sense of unfair treatment and victim safety. 
Of course, providing defendants with due process is a concept firmly 
rooted in the U.S. Constitution. Ensuring that an accused person is treated with 
fairness, respect, and neutrality enhances the morality and decency of our 
justice system. But if such treatment has the additional benefit of increasing 
compliance with the law, it is of particular importance in domestic violence 
cases.433
Epstein refers here to a protection-order respondent who is “ordered out of his 
home, forced to stay away from a range of persons and places, with no access 
to his children, and without the use of his car,”434 rather than specifically to gun 
restrictions.
What about guns? The burdensomeness of a firearms provision in a DVRO 
varies from case to case. Relinquishment of guns used for target shooting and 
hunting is arguably a minor inconvenience, compared to loss of one’s residence, 
vehicle, or parenting time. However, for some Americans, firearms form an 
integral part of social identity, and their confiscation might trigger a sense of 
persecution and rage. Social research confirms that guns have a variety of 
deeply-felt meanings and attractions, depending on the gun carrier: the “citizen-
protector;”435 the African-American who obtains a gun to address the 
deficiencies and abuses of law enforcement;436 the gang member for whom guns 
confer power, action, and protection;437 the black-market dealer who sees guns 
                                                                                                                     
and that “ex parte temporary restraining orders may be issued on the basis of affidavits 
without other documentary or physical proof”).
432 But see Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 764 (maintaining that both the Constitution and Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 65(b) allow the issuance of ex parte restraining orders without the personal 
appearance of the petitioner or documentary or physical proof of harm).
433 Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1873–74 (2002).
434 Id. at 1873.
435 CARLSON, supra note 7, at 19–20.
436 Id. at 123.
437 In a series of interviews conducted at a juvenile corrections facility in Arizona, 
Bernard Harcourt discerned several clusters of meaning surrounding guns. See BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 58–59 (2006). He 
associated at least one of these—the action/protection cluster—with youths involved in 
gangs. See id. at 61–65; see also id. at 42–43 (describing how some of the teens, including 
gang members, associated guns with power).
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as a form of entrepreneurship;438 the recreational user;439 even the suicide.440
For many men who carry, firearms are connected intimately to an ideal of 
masculinity,441 and being deprived of them amounts to emasculation, 
humiliation, and loss of self. The confiscation of guns required for military, 
police, and other careers might even have a financially devastating impact on 
the prohibited person and his family. Epstein’s exhortation to legislators and 
scholars to look at the fairness of domestic abuse laws and policies, including 
the issuance of ex parte DVROs, from the perspective of an alleged abuser thus 
provides wise counsel that might reduce violent recidivism by assuring abusers 
that the outcome of their cases was not arbitrary or unjust. 
A final question surrounds the effectiveness and desirability of several types 
of laws that authorize the removal of guns, after a domestic violence arrest, but 
before the defendant has been convicted of a crime. In many states, a judge must 
impose a criminal restraining order that includes firearms restrictions when a 
defendant is charged with a domestic violence offense. For example, in 
Colorado, the court “shall order” the defendant to “refrain from possessing or 
purchasing any firearm or ammunition” and “relinquish . . . any firearm or 
ammunition in the defendant’s immediate possession or control or subject to the 
defendant’s immediate possession or control” as part of any mandatory criminal 
protection order that fits the federal description under § 922(g)(8).442 The court 
may require the relinquishment of firearms and ammunition before the 
defendant is released from custody on bond; otherwise, the defendant “shall 
relinquish” all firearms and ammunition not more than twenty-four hours after 
being served, unless he can make a satisfactory showing of inability to comply 
with this deadline.443 The order remains in effect until final disposition of the 
criminal case. However, if the defendant is convicted or pleads guilty, the 
                                                                                                                     
438 Another reason that guns appeal to youths (and perhaps adults, too) is that they are a 
source of money for both legal and black market sellers. See HARCOURT, supra note 437, at 
65–67 (describing how an African-American youth from a low-income part of Tucson got 
involved exchanging guns for cash).
439 Another of the youths Harcourt interviewed—an Anglo boy who grew up target 
shooting in the Arizona desert before he ran afoul of the law—espoused sentiments that 
might also be associated with law-abiding, adult gun carriers: “I think [guns] are a 
tool . . . [.] For life. For hunting. For protection . . . . It’s in the Constitution, the right to bear 
arms because of protection, like your dog for protection.” HARCOURT, supra note 437, at 70.
440 See id. at 54–55 tbls.3.1, 3.2; see also CARLSON, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that “white, 
rural, middle-aged men are most likely to commit suicide,” the most common type of gun 
death).
441 See, e.g., CARLSON, supra note 7, at 175 (connecting guns to the masculine ideal of 
protecting one’s family and community). For some of the youths that Harcourt interviewed, 
“[g]uns are attractive and eroticized because they confer control.” HARCOURT, supra note 
437, at 10.
442 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-1001(9)(a)(I)(A)–(B) (2016). Under other circumstances, 
the imposition of gun restrictions in pre-trial restraining orders in criminal cases is 
discretionary. Id. § 18-1-1001(3)(c).
443 In that case, the court may allow a defendant up to seventy-two hours to relinquish 
firearms and up to five days to relinquish ammunition. Id. § 18-1-1001(9)(b).
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federal prohibition kicks in and remains permanent unless the conviction is 
expunged, the defendant obtains a pardon, or otherwise gets his civil rights 
restored.444
Eighteen states also allow, or even require, police officers to remove guns 
from the scene of a domestic violence assault;445 state laws vary as to whether 
the abuser must be arrested for the confiscation to occur.446 There is no federal 
statute regarding at-the-scene confiscation. Such laws, properly applied and 
combined with appropriate search-warrant authority, might have the potential to 
protect victims in the short term. Yet, thus far, they have not had a significant 
impact on intimate-partner homicide rates447 and have even lead to retaliatory 
crimes like burglary and assault.448
At least part of the reason for the ineffectiveness of at-the-scene-
confiscation laws lies in the narrow scope of police officers’ authority. Many 
jurisdictions only allow confiscation of the gun used in the domestic violence 
offense, which obviously reduces the effectiveness of the procedure, since the 
batterer likely has other guns.449 Some states require that the firearms be found 
during a consensual search or in plain view.450 Giving officers greater authority 
to conduct a full search for weapons at the scene of a domestic violence arrest 
might interrupt an escalating situation more effectively and avert a fatal shooting 
in the short term. At-the-scene confiscation would not necessarily lead to the 
imposition of the long-term disabilities associated with the Lautenberg 
Amendment; hence, it imposes a lesser burden on Second Amendment rights.
However, any criminal justice response that the abused person does not 
choose—including a mandatory criminal protection order and at-the-scene gun 
confiscation—sacrifices her autonomy, distrusts her judgment, and may actually 
put her in greater danger. She may not even have been the person who called 
the police. When the police confiscate weapons before a no-contact order is 
imposed, they leave “the enraged perpetrator—freshly bereft of expensive 
property—in proximity to the target of violence.”451 If we respect the victim’s
autonomy and ability to assess the best course of action for her individual 
circumstances, mandatory criminal justice approaches have less to recommend 
                                                                                                                     
444 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012).
445 See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 22.
446 Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 317, 318 tbl.1. Thirteen of eighteen states require 
removal of firearms used to assault or threaten the victim, while the other five give officers 
discretion with regard to firearms removal. See Domestic Violence and Firearms, supra note 
22.
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intimate-partner homicide rates] from . . . laws that allow police to confiscate firearms at a 
domestic violence scene.”).
448 See id. at 335 (noting that confiscation laws are “significantly associated” with these 
other crimes).
449 See id. at 317; see also Zeoli et al., supra note 318, at 135 (“One might not expect a 
policy that leaves all but 1 firearm in the home to prevent homicide.”).
450 See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 317.
451 Fan, Disarming the Dangerous, supra note 87, at 175.
2017] FIREARMS IN THE FAMILY 1329
them than encouraging the abuse survivor to seek a civil protection order that 
includes gun possession and purchase restrictions. In the latter scenario, the 
decision is her own, even if she is counseled to ask the court to impose a firearms 
disability on her batterer.
B. The Shortcomings of Misdemeanor Gun Bans 
Many states also have gun prohibitions for domestic violence 
misdemeanants; a few extend such bans to persons convicted of stalking and/or 
dating violence.452 However, these state-level misdemeanor gun prohibitions 
have not shown any significant effect on intimate-partner homicide rates, and 
the view that the federal Lautenberg Amendment also “fails spectacularly” is 
starting to become widespread.453
A few scholars express dissenting views. For example, in a recent study that 
accounted for uneven implementation of federal law at the state level and 
changes in judicial interpretation of the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence,” Kerri Raissian claims that the Lautenberg Amendment has reduced 
gun-related homicides of female intimate partners by 17%454 and that homicides 
without guns did not increase to offset the reduction in fatal shootings.455
Rassian attributes the federal misdemeanor ban’s impact on intimate-partner 
homicide to several possible effects. First, the Lautenberg Amendment “makes 
it more difficult for a convicted domestic offender to obtain a firearm,” despite 
such notorious loopholes in the background check system as the private sale 
exemption.456 According to Raissian, between 1998 and 2009, approximately 
188,000 potential gun sales were denied because a background check revealed 
that the would-be purchaser had a domestic assault conviction.457 Second, the 
federal law removes guns from the home earlier (i.e., before a homicide or 
severe assault occurs) and for the long term.458 Third, it disrupts the offender’s
access to new firearms, which Raissian believes may be “particularly 
protective” of victims who try to leave abusive relationships.459 She also 
speculates that the Lautenberg Amendment deters people from committing
domestic violence misdemeanors because they know they will be barred from 
                                                                                                                     
452 See, e.g., Jolly, supra note 30, at 689.
453 Lininger, supra note 19, at 193 (quoting Kimberly Brusk, Gun Laws Still Don’t
Protect Women from Abusers, USA TODAY (July 30, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2014/07/30/gun-control-deaths-women-column/13332165/ [https://perma.cc/2WFJ-
DND4]). 
454 Kerri M. Raissian, Hold Your Fire: Did the 1996 Federal Gun Control Act Expansion 
Reduce Domestic Homicides?, 35 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 67, 69, 90 (2016).
455 Id. at 90. According to Raissian, the reduction in gun-related killings of male children 
was even greater (31% fewer). Id. at 69, 90.
456 Id. at 73.
457 Id. at 72.
458 See id. at 74 (discussing post-conviction effects).
459 Id. at 74.
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possessing guns if they are convicted, and they will face substantial prison terms 
if they disobey the federal prohibition.460
However, many abusers still circumvent the federal gun ban for domestic 
violence misdemeanants, as the next sub-part of this Article will show. 
Furthermore, backlash and strategic behavior produced by the harsh law may 
even mean that abusers get treated more leniently than they would have been 
before the Lautenberg Amendment.
1. Enforcement Woes and Backlash
The Lautenberg Amendment has not been rigorously enforced.461 Flaws in 
the background check system—including exceptions for sellers who are not 
federally-licensed, the existence of a robust black market, and incomplete 
databases that undercount domestic violence crimes—have been well-
documented by other scholars.462 These gaps allow persons prohibited from 
purchasing guns under § 922(g)(8) or § 922(g)(9) and related state laws to 
obtain them anyway. Moreover, the failure of many states to enact enforcement 
legislation or background check requirements that support federal law has 
hampered the effectiveness of § 922(g)(9).463
This Article nevertheless eschews advocating either discretion-stripping 
measures or a more punitive approach to keeping guns out of the hands of 
batterers. A variety of people involved in the system—including offenders, 
judges, prosecutors, and police officers—view gun prohibitions for domestic 
violence misdemeanants as an overreaction to low-level, even unintentional 
infliction of bodily injury, often without the use of a gun. Eliminating discretion 
might offer a cure for backlash. But there is reason to think that, if defendants 
and institutional actors perceive the system to be unfair, gun control in the 
context of domestic violence will remain an intractable part of the culture war 
over firearms. Consequently, it will not produce real accountability and reform 
on the part of abusers or safety for victims, no matter how severe the “law on 
the books” is.
State misdemeanor gun prohibitions are at least “weakly associated with 
higher rates of rape and assault,” which suggests a “substitution by batterers into 
less lethal violence, or a backlash by angry abusers.”464 Law enforcers may also 
be motivated by resentment, or at least skepticism, toward such laws. For 
instance, beneath the level of the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
                                                                                                                     
460 See Raissian, supra note 454, at 74 (discussing pre-conviction effects).
461 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (describing critics’ complaints about 
low levels of prosecution and lenient sentencing decisions).
462 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 822–24; Jolly, supra note 30, at 700–01; Lininger, 
supra note 19, at 189. 
463 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 838. For this reason, some scholars advocate the 
passage of state legislation requiring universal background checks for firearms, regardless 
of source, and tougher surrender and removal laws. See, e.g., Jolly, supra note 30, at 706.
464 See Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 89, at 335–37.
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(“IACP”), which has adopted “zero-tolerance” toward domestic violence,465
officers dislike the Lautenberg Amendment for a variety of reasons.466 Foremost 
among them is its detrimental impact on the employment of police convicted of 
qualifying offenses. The tendency to circle the wagons to shield an abusive 
officer makes it difficult for his victimized intimate partner to obtain support 
services, get the abuser arrested and charged with a domestic violence crime, 
and have his gun confiscated if he is convicted.467
Judges can also impede federal and state bans. They may fail to make 
requisite findings of fact, exercise their discretion not to impose gun and “use 
of force” prohibitions in restraining orders, and neglect to order gun confiscation 
or notify offenders about applicable firearms laws. Although the existing 
empirical studies shed little light on why judges behave this way,468 anecdotal 
evidence suggests they have strong beliefs about Second Amendment rights, 
sympathize with defendants who claim to need guns for work or hunting, or 
both.469
Prosecutors also play a big role in the lax enforcement of § 922(g)(9), 
though legal scholar and former prosecutor Tom Lininger believes more fault 
lies with local prosecutors than with U.S. Attorney’s offices.470 Because federal 
prosecutors rely on databases like the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check, the willingness of district attorney’s offices to seek convictions that can 
be identified as domestic violence offenses in such databases assumes 
paramount importance.471 Prosecutors often charge defendants under generic 
assault or battery laws, instead of specialized statutes—that is, if they pursue the 
case at all. Instead, they might dismiss the matter or order the defendant to 
pretrial diversion.472
Indeed, the Lautenberg Amendment actually seems to have led some 
prosecutors to treat domestic violence more leniently than they otherwise would 
have because the firearms ban has raised the costs of bringing a case. Defendants 
are now more likely to go to trial and seek acquittal, rather than plead guilty to 
an offense that triggers a potentially permanent prohibition on gun 
possession.473 Since the costs of trial are high, and victims often refuse to 
cooperate, prosecutors may be more willing to negotiate deals that evade the 
firearms ban.474 The recent Supreme Court decision, Voisine v. United States,
                                                                                                                     
465 See Goodmark, supra note 229, at 1230.
466 According to survey data, for example, both victims and abusers on a police force 
“tended to disagree with the gun ban, believing spouses would use the law to take advantage 
of their partners.” Walton & Zelig, supra note 197, at 367.
467 See Goodmark, supra note 229, at 1187, 1193, 1199–1201, 1230–32.
468 See supra notes 377–80 and accompanying text.
469 See Gildengorin, supra note 21, at 828–29.
470 See Lininger, supra note 19, at 190–91.
471 See id.
472 See id. at 191–92.
473 See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1411, 1459–60 (2005).
474 See id. at 1465.
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only ensures that generic assault and battery convictions qualify as 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence for the purposes of § 922(g)(9).475
Voisine does not prevent prosecutors and defendants from negotiating a guilty 
plea to a charge that lacks an element of force—disorderly conduct, for 
example.476 Nor does it solve the problem of identifying violators in federal 
databases.
Lininger argues that, whether prosecutors sympathize with alleged batterers 
or simply bargain cases down for the sake of expediency, the solution to the 
under-enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment lies in codifying an ABA 
model rule that obliges prosecutors to charge the most serious offense 
provable.477 In doing so, he fails to respond adequately to the concern that, in 
reaction to such a rule, prosecutors might become more reluctant to prosecute 
batterers at all. Another possibility is that even more victims, fearing or 
disagreeing with the imposition of harsh gun prohibitions, would decide not to 
call the police.
2. A Vicious Circle? Socioeconomic Impacts, Retaliation, and 
Recidivism
Perhaps if their guns are confiscated, domestic violence misdemeanants 
simply pay an acceptable price for inflicting injury. But several costs of 
misdemeanor gun prohibitions warrant further consideration. First, victims may 
lose autonomy without gaining safety if the criminal justice system 
automatically and permanently bars the offender from having a firearm, no 
matter how minor or unintentional the disqualifying harm. Victims’ fear of 
retaliation by their enraged partners is legitimate. The incarceration of abusers 
for weapons offenses also affects victims and their children emotionally and 
financially. Second, the lack of any exemption for guns required for 
employment ought to be reexamined, given the contribution of joblessness to 
both coercive, controlling abuse and situational couple conflict. At least on 
paper, the Lautenberg Amendment’s blanket prohibition against the on-duty 
possession of firearms by police, military personnel, prison guards, and other 
public employees convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors is particularly 
hard to justify, since the “official use” exemption does extend to violent 
felons.478
Stake-in-conformity variables, including employment status, play a 
significant role in reoffending. When researchers compare men who murder 
their female intimate partners to other abusive males, unemployment emerges 
as “the most important demographic risk factor for acts of intimate partner 
                                                                                                                     
475 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016); see also supra notes 262–64
and accompanying text (discussing the holding and reasoning in Voisine).
476 See Mikos, supra note 473, at 1460.
477 See Lininger, supra note 19, at 197–98, 204.
478 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012) (indicating that domestic violence misdemeanants 
are the only class of public employees who cannot claim the exemption).
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femicide.”479 Indeed, “[u]nemployment appears to underlie increased risks 
often attributed to race/ethnicity.”480 An experimental study in Broward County, 
Florida, found that young, unmarried men who lacked jobs and permanent 
housing were more likely to be reported for subsequent “incidents of severe 
violence” and cited for probation violations than employed, married men.481
Due to the correlation between unemployment and severe, repeat offenses, 
reconsideration of the impact of the Lautenberg Amendment on military and 
police couples is especially warranted.
Some police officers use their weapons, as well as their “command 
presence,” to intimidate, rape, and inflict other abuse on their intimate partners 
and family members.482 Their violence at home is all the more dangerous 
because they have specialized training in the use of force to subdue others; they 
are socialized in a hyper-masculine police culture that emphasizes the need for 
dominance and often denigrates women and homosexuals; and they enjoy a 
great deal of influence with the very organizations—shelters and other service 
providers, courts and prosecutors—supposedly dedicated to helping abuse 
victims obtain safety and justice.483 Indeed, despite their own brutality, arresting 
batterers is part of their job description.
This Article deplores the violent conduct of some officers at home, as well 
as their use of excessive force against suspects on the street.484 Yet,
acknowledging the need to prevent and punish police-perpetrated domestic 
violence does not necessarily mean embracing the Lautenberg Amendment’s
one-size-fits-all approach to the problem. Several courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of the misdemeanor gun ban insofar as it applies to people who 
need their guns for official government use.485 The leading case, Fraternal 
Order of Police v. United States, was decided under a pre-Heller interpretation
of the Second Amendment as a collective right to bear arms for militia 
                                                                                                                     
479 Campbell et al., supra note 1, at 1092.
480 Id.
481 SHELLY JACKSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 195079, SPECIAL REPORT: BATTERER INTERVENTION 
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482 See Goodmark, supra note 229, at 1188, 1190–91, 1196–97.
483 See id. at 1199–1201, 1233–34.
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civil rights cases. See Philip M. Stinson, Sr. & John Liederbach, Fox in the Henhouse: A 
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Violence, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 601, 618–19 (2013).
485 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1575–78 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997) (upholding the Lautenberg Amendment against Tenth Amendment, Equal 
Protection, Commerce Clause, substantive Due Process, and ex post facto claims), aff’d,
Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998), reh’g denied, 189 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 1999).
1334 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
service.486 But one federal district court, considering a challenge by a police 
officer whose misdemeanor battery conviction jeopardized his employment, 
asserted that the Lautenberg Amendment could even survive strict scrutiny.487
My goal here is neither to promote American gun culture, nor augment 
Second Amendment rights already enhanced by Heller and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago.488 This Article nevertheless questions the wisdom of an absolute, 
federal gun ban that extends to domestic violence misdemeanants who need to 
possess guns for their jobs. Even if unemployment were not a risk factor for 
reoffending and femicide, a career-ending prohibition for the batterer likely 
would impose heavy financial costs on the victim and her children. Whether the 
victim remained in the relationship, separated, or divorced, she probably would 
retain financial ties to her abuser, including reliance on his contribution to child 
support. Thus, there are valid, victim-centered reasons for questioning the lack 
of an on-duty use exemption from § 922(g)(9).
Some proponents of gun restrictions for batterers have expressed concern 
about the potential impact of the Lautenberg Amendment on law enforcement 
families. For example, Democratic Representative and former police officer 
Bart Stupak unsuccessfully spearheaded a House Bill in 1997 that would have 
allowed “police officers to carry their departmental-issued firearm while on 
duty—not at home, not to go hunting, or any other place—just while on 
duty.”489 Stupak further claimed, “This law was never intended—never 
intended—to end the careers of law enforcement officers, which is exactly what 
this law is doing.”490 Indeed, Senator Lautenberg did not actually draft the 
proposed legislation in the form that eventually passed. He later suspected that 
Senator Bob Barr had removed the exception for police officers and military 
personnel to make the proposal “less attractive to his fellow Republicans and 
decrease the likelihood of its passage.”491 In short, the lack of an exemption was 
an anomaly, a change that crept into the legislation in the eleventh hour.
                                                                                                                     
486 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized 
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Federal law technically makes it certain that a police officer convicted of 
misdemeanor assault will lose not only his right to carry a firearm, but also his 
job. However, this rule seems to be honored more in the breach than in the 
observance. Citing a variety of empirical evidence, Leigh Goodmark claims that 
abusive officers often stay on the force without facing serious sanctions.492
Some are never convicted of offenses that trigger the Lautenberg gun 
prohibition or comparable state laws, but others escape serious repercussions 
despite qualifying misdemeanor convictions.493 According to a 2013 study by 
Philip Stinson and John Liederbach, for example, fewer than half of the officers 
who were convicted of domestic violence offenses lost their jobs, “either 
through resignation or termination.”494 An abusive officer might be reassigned 
to a desk position, whereas colleagues who test positive for drugs get fired.495
But Stinson and Liederbach actually found that “many of the police convicted 
of misdemeanor domestic assault are . . . still employed as sworn law 
enforcement officers who routinely carry firearms daily” in violation of the 
Lautenberg Amendment.496
Prosecutors and courts are complicit in some of these outcomes. Numerous 
officers in the cases Stinson and Liederbach studied “received professional 
courtesies of very favorable plea bargains where they readily agreed to plead 
guilty to any offense that did not trigger the firearms prohibitions of the 
Lautenberg Amendment.”497 Even in prosecuted cases, fewer than half of the 
officers who used only their hands or fists in an assault, or who only inflicted 
minor injuries, were convicted.498 (By contrast, convictions occurred in 87% of 
the cases in which the defendant used a personally owned gun against the 
intimate-partner or family member.)499 But officers who committed serious 
crimes sometimes escaped permanent firearms disabilities, too. For example, to 
prevent a police officer from losing his job, a California judge expunged his 
conviction for raping his estranged wife multiple times.500
Cases in which an incident of officer-involved domestic violence results in 
conviction likely represent the tip of a large iceberg of unreported or 
unprosecuted assaults. The hushing of cases to prevent prosecution is perhaps 
the inevitable product of a police culture that erects a “blue wall of silence” to 
shield comrades from scrutiny and even places the blame on victims.501 If this 
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were the whole problem, the solution might lie in enacting laws and policies to 
compel (1) police departments to give teeth to the “zero tolerance” approach the 
IACP recommends; (2) prosecutors to charge abusive officers with serious 
offenses; (3) judges to order the confiscation of guns; and (4) police departments 
to fire officers who perpetrate domestic violence. But lawmakers also need to 
listen to the voices of abused women. A lawyer and former director of a victim-
advocate program for police families justified the Chicago Police Department’s
rejection of a “zero tolerance” approach to terminating officers convicted of 
domestic violence by saying, “Most victims don’t want abusers to lose their 
job . . . . They just want to be safe.”502 The latter is an outcome that gun 
confiscation, especially paired with job loss, does not guarantee.
The Lautenberg Amendment also puts military personnel convicted of 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence at risk of discharge. A soldier 
convicted after the effective date of the amendment is given a reasonable time 
to get the conviction expunged or petition for a pardon, but if he does not, the 
commander “must initiate adverse action, including bars to reenlistment, or 
alternatively, discharge from the military.”503 He can lose his retirement 
benefits, as well as his job, even after years of honorable service,504 and even 
though “[s]oldiers . . . are not permitted to take their weapons home during non-
duty hours.”505 Because the military has undergone public scrutiny of the way 
its culture and hierarchy seem to promote domestic and sexual violence, soldiers 
convicted of crimes triggering § 922(g)(9) may experience more severe 
repercussions than police officers do.506 However, the termination of soldiers 
for a first-time misdemeanor offense could backfire. Families in the armed 
services are often young, poorly paid, and subject to the stress of frequent 
moves, so loss of employment is likely to be combined with other risk factors 
for recidivism and even femicide.507
3. The Problem of Permanence
Because a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction leads to a gun 
prohibition, the violation of which is punishable as a felony, it contributes to the 
problem of collateral consequences that saddle “a significant portion of the 
[United States] population with a seemingly permanent, crippling criminal 
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record history.”508 There is no federal procedure through which the § 922(g)(9) 
gun ban can be lifted. If a defendant is convicted of a state domestic violence 
crime, as most individuals subject to § 922(g)(9) are, he might be able to get the 
conviction expunged under state law, which removes the misdemeanor from his 
record;509 obtain a pardon; or have his civil rights restored.510 The Seventh 
Circuit noted in United States v. Skoien that “[s]ome of the largest states make 
expungement available as of right to misdemeanants who have a clean record 
for a specified time.”511 Expungement “is generally done by court order, and it 
can be automatic, mandatory upon request, or discretionary upon request.”512
Thus, it perhaps overstates the problem to describe the Lautenberg gun ban as 
“permanent” or “perpetual,” as Steven Skoien tried to do after being convicted 
of possessing multiple guns while on probation for a domestic violence 
offense.513
Skoien, who had beaten both his former wife and his new fiancée, was 
hardly a poster child for reformed batterers.514 However, while the Seventh 
Circuit did not hold in Skoien’s favor,515 it admitted that the Lautenberg 
Amendment “tolerates different outcomes for persons convicted in different 
states,” which may have “widely disparate approaches to restoring civil rights,”
issuing pardons, or making expungement available to misdemeanants.516 A
couple of possible results arise from this uncertainty about the restoration of 
firearms rights, and both are problematic. First, as Robert Mikos found when he 
researched the expungement of domestic violence misdemeanors, some states 
expunged the records of thousands of convicted abusers in the first five years 
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after the Lautenberg Amendment was passed.517 Like prosecutors’ lenient 
charging and plea bargaining practices and police officers’ inclination to protect 
comrades accused of domestic violence, the wholesale expungement of 
convictions in certain states indicates that § 922(g)(9) has provoked more 
backlash than accountability. Expungement is seldom automatic and is often 
granted on the basis of extremely subjective and even capricious decision-
making.518 Whether it arises from a rubber-stamping process, a gut reaction of 
sympathy for a particular offender, or disagreement with the harsh effects of 
federal law on domestic violence misdemeanants, it does not represent the 
cautious, neutral, and fair determination that should precede the lifting of gun 
prohibitions.519 Indeed, some defendants probably manage to get their records 
wiped clean, even though they are exceedingly dangerous individuals. Others, 
by contrast, may really deserve an expungement, based on a showing of law-
abiding behavior and non-violence.520
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character and propensity evidence. See Balson, supra note 272, at 36.
If risk assessment tools were used to determine whether a domestic violence 
misdemeanor conviction should be expunged and the offender’s gun rights restored, the tools 
might need to be revised to place less emphasis on gun ownership and possession—given 
the circularity of relying on these factors to determine whether lawful gun access could safely 
be restored. The potential for impermissible traits, such as race, to serve as proxies for 
dangerousness also constitutes a legitimate concern.
520 For example, in one Ohio case, a female defendant appealed the denial of her motion 
to have her domestic violence misdemeanor expunged. The appellate court held in her favor 
because it believed that her past act of domestic violence was “an aberration resulting from 
a specific and unique set of circumstances.” Cleveland v. Cooper-Hill, No. 84164, 2004 WL 
2931001, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004). The court further stated:
Hers was a situational response, and the evidence shows that Ms. Cooper-Hill has 
carefully managed her life to avoid repeating such a situation.
[She] testified that she is no longer involved with her husband, who had girlfriends 
and spent the grocery money on drugs. She has, instead, invested enormous energy and 
persistence into establishing a service career. Her eight years of demonstrated model 
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The second possibility is that jumping through the requisite hoops to get a 
misdemeanor expunged will be legally or practically impossible. In such 
instances, the ban really is permanent. Some state legislatures expressly have 
removed expungement as an option in cases involving domestic violence,521 and 
in other states, there are restrictions that make expungement difficult to obtain 
for misdemeanors in general. The dissenting judge in Skoien observed, for 
example: “In Wisconsin the expungement remedy is extremely narrow; it 
applies only to misdemeanants under the age of 21 and must be ordered at the 
time of sentencing. There is no after-the-fact or generally available opportunity 
to seek expungement.”522 The concurrence in a Ninth Circuit case, Fisher v. 
Kealoha, described another road to the restoration of Second Amendment 
rights—gubernatorial pardon—“as notably slender” and completely dependent 
on the mercy of the executive.523
The near impossibility of getting one’s gun rights restored, in some 
jurisdictions, after conviction for a domestic violence misdemeanor might be 
the right outcome for serial batterers like Skoien.524 Indeed, a core of especially 
dangerous men continues to pose an intractable problem for the prevention of 
violence against women.525 But after the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Castleman and Voisine, the range of conduct that qualifies as a “misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence” is quite large; it extends from “offensive touching,”
which recklessly results in minor injury,526 to aggravated attacks that defendants 
manage to bargain down to simple assault.
                                                                                                                     
citizenship carry greater weight than the state’s need to preserve a record for the purpose 
of enhancing a future domestic violence offense that is merely a theoretical possibility.
Id. at *3–4; see also In re Criminal Records of H.M.H., 960 A.2d 821, 822 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 2008) (holding that the prosecutor failed to demonstrate basis for denying 
expungement considering that H.M.H. and his wife remained married, and there had been 
no active restraining order and no subsequent allegations of domestic violence in twelve 
years).
521 See, e.g., State v. Cardenas, 145 So. 3d 362, 369 (La. 2014); Williams v. State, 879 
So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also City of Maple Heights v. McCants, No. 
80128, 2002 WL 451292, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (finding that a statutory 
amendment making domestic violence convictions nonexpungeable “simply foreclosed 
[defendant’s] opportunity to have his record sealed, which has been found not to violate the 
ban against ex post facto application of the law”); City of Euclid v. Sattler, 756 N.E.2d 201, 
202–04 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that because expungement is a remedial request and 
thus exempt from constitutional limits on retroactivity, a statutory amendment excluding 
certain violent misdemeanors from expungement was applicable).
522 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
523 Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., “ruminating”).
524 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643.
525 See supra note 295.
526 See supra notes 256–72 and accompanying text (explaining and critiquing the 
Castleman and Voisine cases).
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For defendants who use a relatively trivial amount of force and then remain 
nonviolent for an extended period of time, a perpetual gun ban is unnecessary 
and perhaps unconstitutional.527 Even with regard to supposedly incorrigible 
recidivists, the assumption that an offender cannot or will not reform is often 
self-fulfilling. Epstein warns about mandatory criminal justice responses to 
domestic violence:
These developments, along with other system reforms . . . reduce the ability of 
state actors to tailor their actions in response to individual circumstances. This, 
in turn, reduces the likelihood that defendants will voice their version of events, 
perceive they are being treated with respect, and feel that state authorities are 
attempting to be fair.528
The offender who places high value on his firearms may be pushed further into 
a violent (and perhaps misogynistic) firearms sub-culture by the judgment that 
he does not deserve an opportunity to strive for a restoration of his rights. The 
congressional decision to make § 922(g)(9) a ban of virtually perpetual duration 
lacking a “a good-behavior clause” (which would restore gun rights to those 
who avoid committing new domestic violence offenses for a certain number of 
years) may not make the statute unconstitutional.529 However, the permanent, 
one-size-fits-all nature of the ban does make it ineffective and ill-advised.530
C. The Potential Impact of More Rigorous Enforcement on Vulnerable, 
Minority Communities
A final cost, to which I have already alluded, is the impact on vulnerable 
communities.531 Men of color constitute the majority of weapons possession 
offenders, despite the cultural and political association of gun ownership with 
rural, white, working-class males.532 When domestic violence is added to the 
equation, racial minorities still bear the brunt of enforcement in many 
jurisdictions, especially in urban areas.533 Domestic violence misdemeanants 
constitute a very small percentage of total weapons offenders.534 But, in 
Manhattan, for example, more than 80% of the individuals arrested for domestic 
                                                                                                                     
527 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 653 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
528 Epstein, supra note 433, at 1846.
529 See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The breadth 
of the statute and the narrowness of [its] exceptions reflect Congress’s express intent to 
establish a ‘zero tolerance policy’ towards guns and domestic violence.”).
530 As clarified, supra note 310, this Article focuses on the triviality or severity of the 
predicate offense, the offender’s subsequent behavior, and the duration of the ban, rather 
than the type of gun prohibited.
531 See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
532 See Levin, supra note 173, at 2194.
533 See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 60 n.250 (2006).
534 See Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, supra note 29, at 532.
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violence are black or Hispanic.535 If these arrestees plead guilty or are convicted 
of misdemeanors involving even a reckless use of force, they will be barred from 
possessing guns, possibly for life. The prohibition arises from the offender’s
status (a domestic violence misdemeanant), but even more troublingly, from a 
stereotype (a monster who will inexorably become a fatal shooter). The 
enforcement of the prohibition, in turn, subjects the offender to surveillance and 
potentially to imprisonment simply due to the risk that he might inflict future 
harm on his intimate partner with a gun, whether or not the predicate 
misdemeanor involved serious bodily injury.
Because black and Hispanic men are already subject to greater police 
surveillance, more aggressive apprehension and prosecution of domestic 
violence weapons offenders would have a greater impact on them, particularly 
in large cities, than on the paradigmatic rural, white male with a gun rack in his 
pick-up truck. One-size-fits-all criminalization of gun possession by batterers, 
many of whom are racial minorities, thus has the potential to tie a rigid, crime-
control approach to domestic violence to racially-based stop-and-frisk policies 
like the one for which the New York Police Department became infamous.536
Indeed, some federal cases hint that this type of selective surveillance and 
enforcement of § 922(g)(9) is already in play.537
Although mass incarceration and race-based policing constitute serious 
concerns, they would not, in my opinion, be sufficient to defeat rigorous 
enforcement of gun prohibitions for domestic violence offenders, if such 
prohibitions were finely tuned and showed success in saving lives. Low-income, 
black women who rent their homes or apartments and are separated or divorced 
face an especially high risk of suffering abuse.538 But a turn to zealous 
prosecution of domestic-violence gun crimes comes without any guarantee that 
the surveillance and conviction of minority men will actually keep their partners 
safe. Indeed, as Lawrence Sherman and his colleagues found years ago, when 
they explored the correlation between mandatory arrest policies and recidivist 
violence in cities with large African-American populations, the discretion-less 
imposition of criminal sanctions on black men actually may put black women 
at greater risk.539
Moreover, since women of color often do not fit the stereotype of the 
innocent and passive victim, their reliance on self-help—including physical 
resistance to abuse—could place them on the receiving end of surveillance and 
                                                                                                                     
535 Suk, supra note 533, at 60 n.250.
536 See Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding, 
in a § 1983 suit, that New York’s stop-and-frisk policy was based on racial classifications 
and discriminatory intent, which violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
537 See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
the illegal gun was found on defendant’s person during a frisk after police “received a 
complaint about loud music coming from a vehicle parked in a high-crime area of Mobile, 
Alabama”).
538 See SAMPSON, supra note 35, at 14.
539 See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3 (1992).
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punishment for gun possession.540 Women (or men) incarcerated for felony 
weapons offenses, such as a violation of § 922(g)(9), may lose contact with their 
children. This collateral consequence of a conviction is especially likely for 
female prisoners, who often serve time hundreds of miles from their families, 
due to the scarcity of women’s correctional facilities.541 A highly prosecutorial 
use of firearms prohibitions in response to intimate-partner violence thus 
threatens to contribute to the further destabilization of precarious social and 
family relationships in poor, minority communities.
V. TOWARDS REASONABLE GUN CONTROL FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
OFFENDERS
The enforceability of permanent firearms disabilities, which even extend to 
offenders whose jobs require them to carry a gun on-duty, presents what Dan 
Kahan calls a “sticky norms” problem:
If the law condemns the conduct substantially more than does the typical 
decisionmaker, the decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too 
severely will dominate her inclination to enforce the law, and she will balk. 
Her reluctance to enforce, moreover, will strengthen the resistance of other 
decisionmakers, whose reluctance will steel the resolve of still others, 
triggering a self-reinforcing wave of resistance.542
Although a “gentle nudge” in the domestic violence context543 could occur 
outside the realm of statute (for example, educating judges, prosecutors, police, 
and victims about the homicide risks posed by batterers’ access to firearms),544
this Article also advocates tailoring gun prohibitions to ensure that they target 
the right offenders, avoid pushing an already abusive relationship over the brink 
by destroying the couple’s economic livelihood, and incorporate a careful 
mechanism for restoring firearms rights if the offender changes his behavior. It 
would be preferable to acknowledge various interests, besides the goal of 
lowering homicide rates, and try to re-draft the laws so that they are not only 
more reasonable, but also more enforceable. Without discounting the lives of 
domestic abuse victims, this Article has demonstrated that the relevant 
considerations are more numerous and complicated than simply debating how 
many murders the existing statutes have averted.
                                                                                                                     
540 See supra Part IV.C.
541 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black 
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1496 (2012).
542 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000).
543 See id. at 628–31.
544 Cf. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous, supra note 87, at 176–77 (suggesting that police 
advice to victims about obtaining gun removal through a civil DVRO should become 
standard practice); May, supra note 374, at 32 (advocating judicial education). 
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Such considerations include respect for victims’ autonomy and capacity to 
help determine whether their abusers’ guns should be confiscated and the non-
stereotypical reality of women’s use of force for self-protection. There are 
hidden costs, as well. Section 922(g)(9) and state-level firearms laws for 
domestic violence misdemeanants have proved problematic. Their perceived 
harshness, potentially perpetual duration, and lack of an “official use”
exemption for employees who need guns on-duty make them difficult to 
enforce. I have critiqued proposals to make such firearms laws even less 
discretionary and more punitive because this approach might have a detrimental 
impact on victims and their families and drive offenders deeper into a violent 
(and perhaps misogynistic) gun sub-culture. It might lead to recidivism and even 
homicide, despite ostensibly eclipsing the victim’s preferences for the sake of 
her safety. Moreover, not all domestic violence misdemeanants are male 
batterers. Women who use force in reaction to trauma and abuse should not end 
up in federal prison on weapons charges. For similar reasons, we should be 
cautious about increasing the policing and punishment of vulnerable, minority 
communities under the appearance of protecting families.
In my view, civil DVRO provisions barring the restrained party from 
possessing and purchasing firearms hold the most promise. They have produced 
the best results, to date, in jurisdictions that have taken them seriously, and they 
have the greatest potential to respect an abuse victim’s preferences. A protection 
order could empower her to set the boundaries of her relationship with her 
abuser, including his access to guns, if she can offer evidence of the need to 
confiscate them and prevent him from buying new ones. I also briefly discussed 
ex parte orders and scene-of-the-crime gun confiscation. With regard to these 
emergency measures, precautions like brief duration and an express, preliminary 
finding of severe violence or a credible threat to kill may be essential to uphold 
the respondent’s constitutional rights and preserve his sense that he has received 
fair treatment, which in turn may help reduce retaliatory assaults.
This Article has aimed to spark a conversation about a more reasonable 
approach to gun control in the context of intimate-partner abuse that rejects the 
manipulation of gender and “the politicization of safety” by both gun-rights and 
gun-control camps.545 It is impossible to remove discretion from the system 
completely. This means that we need to give judges, prosecutors, and police 
good reasons to support domestic violence firearms restrictions and apply them 
fairly. We also need to listen to the voices of abuse victims, who may have 
legitimate concerns about the enforcement of one-size-fits-all gun bans.
                                                                                                                     
545 I owe the phrase “the politicization of safety” to the name of a conference hosted by 
the U.C. Irvine Initiative to End Family Violence, at which I was privileged to present a draft 
of this Article. Other scholars’ conference papers will be published as chapters in THE
POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane Stoever ed., forthcoming 2018), an anthology to which 
time constraints prevented me from contributing.

